



European Parliament

Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide

Normandy Index 2020



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Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide

Normandy Index 2020

The 'Normandy Index', now in its second year, aims to measure the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world. It was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2020 exercise and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 40 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

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The Normandy Index is also available in an [online version](#). The present paper updates and expands the 2019 Normandy Index, also available on the European Parliament's [Think Tank website](#).

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Foreword



This year marks the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, and of the signature of the Charter of the United Nations. For the European Union it is also the 70th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, which is seen as the EU's founding act. These anniversaries serve as a reminder of the destructive nature of war, and of the values of peace, security and multilateralism that lie at the core of the EU and of its foreign policy pursuits.

But 2020, perhaps more than any year in recent decades, has reminded us that we should never take security for granted, and that threats to security and to democracy can come in many forms. The health security crisis caused by the global coronavirus pandemic has jeopardised so many facets of our way of life, our prosperity, our welfare systems, our economy and our democracy. In conflict zones around the world, the virus has exacerbated the daily threats of violence and hunger. This offers evidence, every day, that peace and security are the result of a complex equation,

with several traditional and new threats functioning as variables. In this environment, the promotion of peace is both more important and more complex than ever before.

Even before the pandemic, in several parts of the world, peace, security and stability were not in fact part of people's reality. Climate change, terrorism, cyber-attacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty and transborder crime are just some of the many factors that disrupt peace, at times leading to violent and deadly conflicts and to the deterioration of citizens' lives.

The promotion of peace and international security are the cornerstones of the EU's foreign policy, and underpin all facets of its external action. As we move towards consolidating EU foreign policy further, understanding these threats and their interplay becomes an ever more important task. Only by understanding them, can we work with partners to help bolster their capacity to withstand, adapt to, and recover quickly from stresses and shocks. Even within the EU, we have experienced threats in the form of economic crises, pandemics, climate change and attacks on our democracy in the past two decades. This has required resilience and solidarity; values we strive to weave into our external action.

The pandemic has also reminded us of the importance of solid scientific research for policy-making, and this is true of all fields. In foreign policy, research is needed to understand the challenges and to show the best way to formulate strategy and distribute resources. By assessing the level of threats to peace and democracy across the world scientifically, the Normandy Index is a tool that can support this work.

In facing the coronavirus crisis, our generation must summon up the same courage as the Founding Fathers, and focus on the shared future of the EU project, which so many all over the world view as an example of peace, solidarity and prosperity. We also need to focus our attention outwards. Seventy years after the Schuman Declaration, we face a world that may be very different from the world we have known since the end of the Second World War, a world that will require us to reflect on how to defend peace and security in innovative and unprecedented ways. The European Parliament is committed to re-energising multilateralism for development, security and peace. In this dedication to promoting peace, security and democracy as key objectives of the EU's action in the world, we welcome this work and its contribution to our understanding of peace and its many variables.

David Maria Sassoli

President of the European Parliament

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1. Pursuing peace in a more connected, contested and complex world

The European Union's [foreign policy](#) has long been the subject of varied and contested academic debate – on subjects ranging from the Union's capacity and legitimacy to act, to its need for a strategy, vision and objectives. In response, in part, to some of those questions, the 2016 [Global Strategy](#), launched by the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini, set out a structured and coherent vision for European Union (EU) foreign policy in an increasingly complex geopolitical and socioeconomic global environment. Building on the provisions of the founding Treaties of the EU – and more specifically the [Treaty of Lisbon](#) – the Global Strategy raises the EU's level of ambition as a foreign policy actor in pursuit of the objectives defined in the Treaty. Key among those is the pursuit of peace, both in the EU and globally.

While the Global Strategy is not a classic [threat assessment](#) exercise, it captures in its approach a number of threats to global peace and security and goes beyond traditional understandings of security by including in those threats traditional and emerging issues that challenge peace. It also draws on the crucial links between developments that hold the potential to exacerbate, catalyse and magnify the threats identified. Thus, with regard to health security – without doubt the most notable security threat of 2020 – while the strategy does not analyse the EU's approach to pandemic preparedness explicitly, it does state that the EU will redouble efforts 'on prevention, monitoring root causes, such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change – which is a threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement'. It also commits to working 'more effectively for the prevention, detection and response to global pandemics' through global governance structures.

Following the logic of the interconnectedness of threats, the Normandy Index, a product of a 2018 memorandum between the region of Normandy and the European Parliament, aims to provide a holistic picture of the world – regions and countries – through the prism of the pursuit of peace, measured against threats explicitly defined in the Global Strategy. Its objective is to provide a tool to help EU policy-makers design targeted external action instruments. It is deliberately framed to be concise and easy to understand, in order to serve as a communication tool for the wider public – in terms both of understanding threats across the world, and also of providing information about EU external action. It complements the annual Peace and Security Outlook produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service.

1.1. Measuring peace

The modern definition of peace [refers](#) not only to 'an absence of war', but also includes elements of well-being: people demand and expect more from peace. This positive dimension of peace is difficult to measure as it is a continuum, stretching from inter-state war to positive public perceptions. This [continuum](#) includes international violence (i.e. wars, hybrid conflicts) and intra-national violence (i.e. gang or police violence, forced displacements). Therefore, any measure of peace has to take numerous dimensions into account.

Another way to measure peace is to take into consideration the level of threats to peace, in order to address them and avoid possible deterioration. To be sure, several states in the world are faced with multiple threats that not only affect peace individually but can also merge to create new challenges – and hybrid threats. The coronavirus pandemic is an [example](#) of such a threat: a health

security threat in essence, the pandemic has brought about economic insecurity, offered grounds for a considerable increase in disinformation and cyber-attacks, exacerbated food scarcity in parts of the developing world and threatened democracy by giving authoritarian regimes around the world justification for further control and surveillance. According to a new [report](#) by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the pandemic is likely to have a negative impact on most of the indicators used to calculate rankings such as the Global Peace Index and the Positive Peace Index.

Recognising the interconnectedness of threats, the rationale behind the Normandy Index is twofold. First, the Index focuses on the realm of EU external action, by selecting and measuring those threats perceived as such by the EU, and that EU action aims to tackle, prevent, resolve or address. Second, the Normandy Index aims to monitor the probability (or existence) of conflict (or destabilisation of peace and security) in a given country on the basis of the aggregate level of these threats.

1.2. Identifying threats and shaping policy: Indices and policy-making

Indices can be [used](#) as early-warning systems and are designed to give policy-makers insights into potential risks and developments in economic, social, environmental, security and political factors. Depending on their make-up, indices can quantify possibilities of an event occurring in the near/foreseeable future, thus acting as foresight tools. Foresight, as defined in the 2019 [Global Trends to 2030](#) report of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) is 'an intellectual exercise where we imagine different alternatives of the future ... tracing how we end up there'. In that sense, foresight is a tool to help determine and choose a path for action; it is 'an organising yet selective principle'.

An index can also offer a comprehensive overview of a situation made up of a basket of contributing factors. Existing indices relating to peace and security present differing versions of such baskets, taking into account selected variables to build their measurements of conflict and peace. Some function as [conflict trackers](#), focusing specifically on the prevention of deadly violence and its particular relevance for a region or country's foreign policy. [Others](#) aim to be broadly informative about the levels of a multitude of factors such as societal safety and security, domestic and international conflict and degree of militarisation. A third category, including the [Fragile States Index](#) (FSI), highlights areas of vulnerability contributing to the risk of state fragility.

The limits to policy implementation are naturally marked in terms of resources, time and politics. Yet, even in hindsight, indices can provide an understanding of the elements that contributed to a policy response's adequacy to face critical events. For example, the [2019 Global Health Security Index](#) indicated limited global capacity to deal with a large scale epidemic or pandemic, and that all countries had important gaps to address in health security.

A timely example of the link between indices and policy-making is the [Global Health Security Index](#), which indicated limited global capacity to deal with a large scale epidemic or pandemic, and that every country – including high income countries - had major gaps to fill in health security. Overall average global preparedness for epidemics and pandemics scored 40.2 out of 100. Even though the Covid-19 crisis struck before the issues highlighted in the study were addressed, a renewed look at its component indicators, namely prevention, detection and reporting, health systems, rapid response, risk environment and compliance with global health norms can help guide policy decision to prepare for the next health crisis. In this way, indices and indicators can support the work of policy-makers.

Overall, these indices aim to measure the comparative level of pre-defined variables across a region or the world; to make political risk assessments for the future; and to contribute to the work of policy-makers and other foreign policy actors. The vision of the Normandy Index is to perform these

functions in the service of EU foreign policy, in a way that is consistent with its objectives and aims. This is particularly timely, given the current reflection on a [Strategic Compass](#) to guide the EU's action and to define its level of foreign policy ambition.

2. The Normandy Index

The Normandy Index differs from other indices in that it adopts an approach tailored by and to the action of the EU. It also defines conflict and the numerous stages between perfect peace and total war ([conflictualité](#)) as a product of factors linked to the main threats identified by the EU in its external action strategy. As described in EPRS's [2018 Peace and Security Outlook](#), the [EU Global Strategy](#) identifies the following 11 threats as the main current challenges to peace and security.

terrorism	hybrid threats	economic crises	climate change
energy insecurity	violent conflicts	cybersecurity	disinformation
fragile states	transborder crime	weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)	

The index uses nine of these eleven threats as factors assigned equal weight in the final result for 137 UN countries (with the EU-27 counted as one).¹

In addition, the Normandy Index includes a composite indicator on crime. While no solid dataset measuring transborder crime on a global scale is currently available, given the enormous methodological hurdles this would involve since there are thousands of dyads (borders separating two countries) in the world, the level of criminality in the 137 entities measured is assessed by means of a component indicator. This indicator consists of a global measurement of organised crime: the number of homicides (75 % of the composite indicator) and an indicator on perceptions of criminality (25 %).

The threat category [hybrid threats](#) is excluded from the Normandy Index, as hybrid threats are, by their very nature, multi-faceted, comprising a combination of factors. The index therefore assesses hybrid threats indirectly by examining the accumulation of their various dimensions (energy insecurity, economic crises, disinformation, cyber-attacks) but, to avoid duplication, does not explicitly include a 'hybrid threat' category. In its [online version](#), the Normandy Index allows the user to view a ranking of the 137 entities based on the basket of threats that together constitute 'hybrid'.

Quantifying or even estimating the level of [disinformation](#) in a given country remains a contentious issue among specialists, as new knowledge about this field continues to be generated. For this reason, the initial, 2019, version of the Normandy Index used a measure of 'press freedom' in its place, in spite of the recognition that the media landscape is merely one of many factors affecting resilience to disinformation. As of 2020, data on the spread of misleading views and false information by governments and political parties have become available through the [VDEM](#) (Varieties of Democracy) project. While not exhaustive of all sources of disinformation, the data collected by VDEM has been used for the measurement of the disinformation threat in the Normandy Index.²

¹ See Methodological Annex.

² Note that the 2019 Normandy Index has been retroactively calculated to include new data on disinformation as well as a more precise calculation of other indicators, such as energy insecurity. Retroactive calculations have been used in

The Normandy Index adds to the above 10 factors the quality of the democratic process, as democracy support is a core dimension of EU external action. In addition, as analysed in the 2020 Peace and Security Outlook, there is a strong correlation between weak democratic processes and threats to peace and security. Given the complex and multidimensional nature of the domains, the methodology chosen for the Normandy Index is based on the selection of one key representative indicator for each (two for crime as explained above), based on current academic and policy literature and the data available.

Table 1 – Summary of domains, indicators and sources

Domain	Indicators	Definition	Source	No of countries covered	Latest year of data
Climate change	INFORM Global Risk Index	INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters.	United Nations	193	2019
Cybersecurity	Cybersecurity Index	The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a survey measure capturing the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity in order to raise awareness. It is the only open source cybersecurity index available.	International Telecommunication Union	199	2017
Democratic processes	Participatory Democracy Index	A measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy is achieved within a country.	VDEM	179	2018
Economic crises	Financial vulnerability – non-performing loans as a % of total loans	The non-performing loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.	World Bank	136	2018
Energy insecurity	Energy imports	Energy imports, net (% of energy use). Banded to be 0 if the country is a net exporter of energy.	World Bank	187	2015
Fragile states	Fragile States Index	The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on the proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach of the Fund for Peace. Based on a comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data – quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation – are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI.	Fund For Peace	177	2019

all graphics included in this publication. For more on the methodological approach see the annex to this study. For the revised 2019 data, visit the [Normandy Index website](#).

Crime	Homicide rate per 100 000	Homicide rate per 100 000 – used as a proxy for crime	UNODC	137	2017
	Perceptions of criminality banded	Assessment of the level of perceived criminality in society, ranked from 1 to 5 (very low to very high) by the Economist Intelligence Unit's country analysis team. Country analysts assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.	Economist Intelligence Unit	163	2019
Disinformation	Disinformation	A measure of how often domestic and foreign governments and political parties use social media and advertising to spread disinformation within a country.	VDEM	179	2018
Terrorism	Global Terrorism Index	A composite score in order to provide an ordinal ranking of countries for the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries and property damage caused by terrorism.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2019
Violent conflict	Conflict sub-indicators of the Global Peace Index	Average of the following six indicators from the Global Peace Index: (1) intensity of internal conflict, (2) deaths from internal conflict, (3) number of internal conflicts, (4) intensity of external conflict, (5) deaths from external conflict, (6) external or internal conflict.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2019
WMD	Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities indicator from the Global Peace Index.	This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using data from a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries that are signatories to non-proliferation treaties score better in this indicator	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2019

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace & EPRS.

The Normandy Index is therefore a tool to be used by EU policy-makers to assess countries most at risk in the world according to the EU's Global Strategy, and to target EU action. It is not a ranking of countries according to their peacefulness but a ranking of specific threats to peace per country. As new data becomes available, the expectation is that the Normandy Index will evolve in accuracy, geographical spread and precision, thus serving policy-makers and analysts in their work ever more effectively. In addition, events such as the current coronavirus crisis may cause security strategists


around the world to reconsider the magnitude and relevance of pandemics when it comes security and peace. As events unfold, the Normandy Index will adapt as the EU's strategic approach to peace and security evolves, with the potential inclusion of new threats in future versions.

The comparisons across regions, countries and time offered by the online version of the Normandy Index will enable EU policy-makers to grasp which areas need to be given greater consideration when assisting partners all over the world at national and regional levels, while also potentially monitoring improvement (or absence of improvement) in resilience to those threats in countries where the EU is already engaged.

2.1. The Normandy Index 2020: Findings and functions

For each of the 136 countries and the EU27, the Normandy Index uses the 11 threats to peace and compares them to the same 11 dimensions for other countries in the same region (or to the world), as regional environment is assumed to play a major role in countries' resilience to threats.

Figure 1 – EU Peace profile for 2019 and 2020




Data source: Normandy Index.

For each dimension, 10 represents no risk and 0 a major threat. In the examples shown above, in 2019 and 2020, the EU appears less at risk in nine out of eleven dimensions, while being more at risk in the area of energy security than the rest of the world and equally threatened by WMDs as the world average. The comparison between the two years indicates that for the EU27, as opposed to other countries and regions, there is no significant change in the peace profile between the two years.³ Similarly, the global peace profile remains almost unchanged between 2019 and 2020.

The online version of the Normandy Index also offers the possibility for comparison between countries, individual countries and regions and across time. In addition, rankings of countries on the basis of one or more threats are also available, using the source indicators.

³ Note that health security is not included in the 2020 Normandy Index as the threat is not explicitly referred to in the EU Global Strategy. In addition, data reflecting health security in the world for 2020 will only be available in 2021, so the new coronavirus pandemic cannot be taken into account in measurements at this stage.

Figure 2 – Normandy Index evolution

Data source: Normandy Index.

The results of the 2020 Normandy Index (Figure 2) indicate a slight increase in the Index world average from 2019 to 2020 by 0.03 on a scale of 10, suggesting that overall the threats to peace and security included in the dataset have declined slightly. By focusing on the top 10 and lowest 10 scoring countries (Figure 3), it can be seen that change is rather absent or marginal, particularly among the top performers. This indicates that the process of transformation in peace and security takes place across a period of time normally longer than the one-year period observed here. An additional observation is that there tends to be more change (increase or decrease in vulnerability to the

11 threats) among those countries scoring lowest than among those which demonstrate high levels of peace and security, as high scorers are by default more resilient. This observation further justifies the EU's focus on building resilience, both internally and in its neighbourhood.

Figure 3 – Highest and lowest scoring countries

Top 10					Lowest 10				
country	rank 2019	rank 2020	rank change		country	rank 2019	rank 2020	rank change	
Norway	1	1	0	↗	Iraq	127	128	-1	↘
Australia	2	2	0	↗	Democratic Republic of the Congo	128	129	-1	↘
Switzerland	3	3	0	↗	Chad	130	130	0	↗
New Zealand	4	4	0	↗	Pakistan	131	131	0	↗
Canada	5	5	0	↗	South Sudan	134	132	2	↑
Iceland	6	6	0	↗	Afghanistan	132	133	-1	↘
Uruguay	7	7	0	↗	Somalia	135	134	1	↑
Oman	8	8	0	↗	Yemen	133	135	-2	↘
Singapore	9	9	0	↗	Syria	137	136	1	↑
Mauritius	11	10	1	↓	Central African Republic	136	137	-1	↘

Data source: Normandy Index.


Perhaps even more interesting is to focus on those countries that exhibit the biggest positive or negative movement in their position in the ranking. For example, in 2020 Nicaragua and Brazil are notable for their drop by 11 and 7 places respectively, while the moves in the position of Egypt or Tajikistan in the ranking indicate positive developments (Figure 4). The examination of the individual factors that lead to these position moves (for example a stark change in a specific indicator or merely a relative lack of change compared to other countries) can be done through a meticulous deconstruction of the component indicators on the Normandy Index website and qualitatively through the production of individual country studies, such as the forty included here.

Figure 4 –Risers and fallers

Top 10 risers				Bottom 10 fallers			
country	rank 2019	rank 2020	rank change	country	rank 2019	rank 2020	rank change
Egypt	125	117	8	Djibouti	105	108	-3
Tajikistan	113	106	7	Tunisia	34	38	-4
Nepal	59	54	5	South Korea	10	15	-5
Congo	97	92	5	Iran	105	110	-5
Qatar	15	11	4	Myanmar	108	113	-5
Indonesia	33	29	4	Zimbabwe	111	116	-5
The Gambia	40	36	4	Burkina Faso	46	52	-6
Ghana	64	60	4	Senegal	70	76	-6
China	104	100	4	Brazil	59	66	-7
Niger	107	103	4	Nicaragua	87	98	-11

Data source: Normandy Index.

Figure 5 – Normandy Index, 2020



3. The Normandy Index and its relevance for the European Parliament

According to a Eurobarometer [survey](#) conducted in 2016 and then [repeated](#) in 2018, the majority of European citizens would like to see increased EU involvement in all policy areas relating to peace and security. While EU foreign and security policy remains in the intergovernmental sphere to a much larger extent than other policy areas, the Lisbon Treaty has contributed to a considerable increase in the EU supranational institutions' [contribution](#) in this area. For Parliament, the most relevant provisions relate to consultation, oversight, accountability and budgetary functions.

Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), obliges the HR/VP to consult Parliament regularly on the main aspects and choices relating to common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) and to keep Parliament [informed](#) of policy developments, requiring that Parliament's views be taken 'duly into consideration'. The European Parliament therefore holds annual debates on the state of play of the CFSP and of the CSDP, on the basis of annual progress reports on the implementation of these policies. Parliament also votes on two annual own-initiative reports (INI) on the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP respectively, asks questions of the HR/VP, and makes recommendations to the HR/VP and to the Council on related matters. Parliament exercises authority in security and defence matters through its function as budgetary authority. Most notably perhaps, the Parliament oversees civilian aspects of CSDP that are financed by the EU budget ([Article 41 TEU](#)).

The Normandy Index aims to contribute to the European Parliament's role in foreign policy oversight. It offers Members of the European Parliament a measure of threats to peace throughout the world that is consistent with the EU's Global Strategy. Consequently, it serves as a tool in response to increased demand for accountability from actors involved in CFSP and CSDP, as well as an empirical argument in support of demand for attention to regions and countries at risk.

At a time of growing demand for EU institutions to demonstrate greater legitimacy and transparency, the gradually growing involvement of the European Parliament in CFSP has helped increase democratic accountability in this policy area. Although Parliament's formal powers in CFSP are limited, it nonetheless has growing influence as a '[norm entrepreneur](#)' in human rights and democracy, both through its close relationship with the HR/VP and as a diplomatic player through its 44 delegations.

4. The added value of case studies

In order to illustrate the use and potential of the Normandy Index, 40 case studies have been singled out in the following pages. For each case study, the reader will find an analysis of traditional sources of instability and threats to peace, a graphic representation of the situation in the country compared with other countries from the same region, and notable points of interest regarding the country's performance in the index. In addition, there is a focus on new sources of insecurity, and an analysis of the EU's contribution and assistance in building [resilience](#) through its involvement with the country in question. The latter can take many different forms (development cooperation, support for democracy and human rights, cooperation within the European Neighbourhood or regional cooperation, pre-accession assistance, peacekeeping, trade agreements etc.) and varies from country to country, depending on the degree and type of cooperation put in place with the country concerned. The case studies have been chosen to represent key EU partners (strategic partners or



trade partners); countries in which the EU operates military or civilian missions; countries that are part of the G20; and countries with notable vulnerabilities or achievements in one or more of the Normandy Index variables. Fifteen case studies have been added to the 25 published in 2019, which have also been updated, the aim being to increase their number every subsequent year. All case studies will also be available on the Normandy Index website. The website provides user with the possibility to produce comparative graphs for each of the 137 entities studied.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan ranks 133 in the Normandy Index. Although the country has seen some improvement in economic stability and growth, it continues to face conflict and security challenges, including increasing levels of crime, all this further compounded by the effects of climate change.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Afghanistan has been embroiled in conflict since the mid 19th century and the first of multiple British attempts to annex the country. The cold-war period saw an unsuccessful and protracted invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, which ended in Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989 after 10 years of war. Nevertheless, the conflict between the Soviet-backed Afghan government and the Mujahedeen continued, leading eventually to [the rise of the Taliban who took power in 1995](#) on the promise of bringing peace. The events of 11 September 2001 and the Taliban's response to this attack, reignited an intensely violent conflict in the country, as US forces invaded in a bid to oust the Taliban. [As of October 2019](#), more than 157 000 people are estimated to have died as a result of the ongoing war, of which 43 000 civilians. Although the US signed a peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020, it is considered [extremely fragile](#).



New security and hybrid threats

Afghanistan is suffering increasingly from the effects of climate change, which exacerbate existing tensions. It is the 26th most vulnerable country on the [2019 Climate Risk Index](#). In 2018-19 the country faced an [extreme drought](#) that left around 14.3 million Afghans food insecure, and at least 1 million displaced, putting added pressure on scarce resources. The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that [80 %](#) of current conflict in Afghanistan is over land, water and resources. Afghanistan also faces the threat of increased crime, with the homicide rate increasing from 6.6 homicides per 100 000 population in 2017 to [7.1 per 100 000 in 2018](#). Data from Kabul suggests that criminality in the capital is now considered by the city's population and the government as possibly [the single most important problem](#) – more so than terrorism.

EU involvement



The EU has [supported](#) peace in Afghanistan for several decades and has made a significant difference in the country by improving health and education, creating governance frameworks and laying the foundation for nation-building. The EU has provided more than [€4 billion in development aid](#) to Afghanistan since 2002; the country is the largest beneficiary of EU development assistance in the world. Since 1992, the EU has also supported [humanitarian operations](#), with up to €866 million to date. An EU-Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development was concluded in 2017.

Albania

Albania ranks 37 in the Normandy Index. Since the end of the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s, it has made significant progress on political and economic reforms, to the extent that it has joined NATO (April 2009) and opened talks with the EU on accession (March 2020). Albania is a good example of religious tolerance and diversity. Despite this, the country still faces significant economic and democratic hurdles, as well as challenges linked to irregular migration.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Enmeshed in the Balkan Wars of 1990 to 1993, Albania continued to suffer from [domestic civil unrest](#) erupting in 1997 in the 'pyramid crisis', alongside ongoing military involvement in the Kosovo conflict against Serbia. Albania is also a hub for organised crime, with one of the highest human trafficking rates in Europe. The clandestine nature of human trafficking, however, means that Albania lacks reliable [data](#). Nevertheless, Albania has been ranked by Eurostat among the top 10 countries in terms of numbers of trafficking victims for several years in a row. More recently, the scale of [drug trafficking](#) in Albania was estimated to be so high that the value of marijuana trafficking alone, US\$4 billion a year, is equal to about half of Albania's gross domestic product (GDP).



New security and hybrid threats

Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe: according to the World Bank, in 2019 [34.6 % of Albanians](#) were living on less than US\$5.5 per day per capita (in 2011 purchasing power parity terms). In 2019, Albania suffered another [downturn in growth](#) due to falling electricity exports and an earthquake in November 2019 that left 17 000 homeless. [Democratic backsliding](#) has been evident since elections held in 2017 were deemed fraudulent, leading to bursts anti-government protest throughout 2018 and 2019.

EU involvement



Albania was identified as a potential [candidate](#) for EU membership as early as the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003. In 2009, Albania submitted its formal application for membership. The Commission's 2018 country report recommended opening accession talks. On 25 March 2020, accession talks were [opened](#) and Albania took part at the EU-Western Balkans summit on 6 May 2020. The EU is the largest provider of [financial assistance](#) for the country. Following the coronavirus outbreak, on 29 April 2020, the Commission [announced](#) over €3.3 billion of EU financial support [mobilised](#) jointly with the European Investment Bank for the benefit of the western Balkan citizens, including citizens of Albania.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 68 in the Normandy Index, considerably more at risk than the European average. It performs significantly less well than the European average in cybersecurity and fragile states, but scores well in terrorism and crime.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced armed conflict between 1992 and 1995, triggering several international peacekeeping missions. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement resulted in a decentralised government system, dividing the country into two semi-independent federal units, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This decentralised governance is partly the reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina having the second lowest [Fragile States Index](#) score in Europe. Efficient cooperation among the country's constitutional entities is impeded by mistrust among ethnic groups and political parties and also differing foreign policy orientation. Between the October 2018 elections and November 2019, the country remained without a government, as the three members of the presidency were unable to reach a consensus on the NATO membership. The country is heavily dependent on coal, at 67 % of total electricity production, but is investing in renewable energies, with vast hydro and non-hydro renewable energy potential.



New security and hybrid threats

Bosnia and Herzegovina has some vulnerabilities to new security threats, owing to resources still being allocated to rebuilding following the conflict and a highly decentralised state structure. The country ranked 118 out of 175 countries in 2018 for cyber-defence, as its constitutional entities lack the expertise and resources to build a coherent and solid [cybersecurity](#) strategy; the country is also highly vulnerable to disinformation. [Undocumented migration](#) has put local and state authorities under stress, especially in the areas that have been shouldering most of the burden of migration management. While growth in GDP has stagnated somewhat since 2008, some areas of the economy have grown significantly and offer opportunities to build resilience to these threats.

EU involvement


Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential EU membership [candidate](#). Since 2004, the EUFOR [Althea](#) mission has been supporting the country's efforts to secure peace after the [Dayton Agreement](#). In its opinion on Bosnia's EU membership application of May 2019, the European Commission recommended moving towards opening EU accession negotiations. Other priorities include the need to ensure effective coordination of border management and migration management capacity, and to ensure the functioning of the asylum system. The EU is [assisting](#) with a number of building and twinning programmes. It is also supporting environmental and climate transition through the [Pre-accession Instrument](#), allocating €9.5 million in 2018. The EU has committed [over €80 million](#) to tackle pandemic-related challenges in the country, including disinformation.

Bolivia


Bolivia ranks 28 in the Normandy Index. It has been challenged by democratic instability since the results of the 2019 presidential elections were nullified, as a result of and resulting in significant social unrest, which has continued into 2020.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Bolivia has a history of conflict between its indigenous population, peasant farmers, and those considered to be of Spanish colonial descent, including rich agro-business owners. Land and natural resources rights and tenure have been the main drivers of tensions and [conflict](#). Beyond this, power and identity issues connected to the land as a productive and social good have fuelled [land conflict](#). The marginalisation of Bolivia's 36 groups of [indigenous inhabitants](#) also has a long history, with indigenous rights not being formally recognised until [1993](#). This changed with dramatically the election of Evo Morales in 2005, the first indigenous person to be elected head of state in any South American country. Morales introduced sweeping land redistribution and rights reforms, which also brought with it conflict and clashes as land was reallocated away from non-indigenous Bolivians and [commercial farmers](#).



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Bolivia's most immediate security threat is from democratic instability. Presidential elections held in October 2019 were marred by accusations of fraud and corruption, as President Evo Morales claimed victory for an unprecedented fourth term. Although [these accusations](#) remain contested, the elections ignited a bout of social unrest, protests and demonstrations, not seen in Bolivia since [2005](#) when Morales first came to power. Violent clashes between pro- and anti- Morales protesters left more than 30 dead in the four weeks following the election, before Morales bowed to domestic and international pressure and [resigned](#). The military-backed opposition government that took interim power had scheduled new elections for 3 May 2020 but with the country in lockdown owing to the pandemic there have been calls from the electoral commission to postpone the elections until a [later date](#). Like much of the region, Bolivia [demonstrates](#) high vulnerability to cyber-attacks.

EU involvement



The EU cooperates with [Bolivia](#) in the fields of human rights, freedom of expression, conflict prevention, migration, the fight against drugs, terrorism, regional integration, and prevention and response to [emergencies](#) and disasters. It has become one of the [country's main donors](#), with €281 million for the 2014 to 2020 period, mainly covering justice reform, the war on drugs and integral water management. Bolivia also benefits from the EU's regional cooperation programmes for Latin America, which have among their priorities the [security-development nexus](#). EU Member States cooperating with Bolivia have developed a [joint European strategy](#).

Brazil

Brazil ranks 66 in the Normandy Index, deteriorating significantly from 2019. It performs lower than the South American average for the indicators measuring crime, democratic processes and disinformation.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Brazil has the 21st highest score for weapons of mass destruction. While it is not a nuclear power, the country has a [large arsenal](#) of tanks, armoured vehicles and combat-capable aircraft. Brazil's deep economic recession from 2014 to 2017 exacerbated deep-rooted social inequalities, translating into a steep rise in homicide: the country has the ninth highest homicide rate globally. According to the [Atlas da Violência](#) Brazil's homicide rate was 31.6 per 100 000 people in 2017. This is more than five times the global average of around six people per 100 000. The rise in homicide and violent crime in recent years is also connected with [organised crime](#), with most homicides occurring near the main drug smuggling routes. Although it performs lower as South America on average, Brazil scores well on democratic processes, with the 32nd highest score globally.



New security and hybrid threats

At global level, Brazil's performance is above average for every indicator relating to new security and hybrid threats. Recognising [the high level](#) of cybercrime and cyber threats in Brazil, the Brazilian government and legislators have been working intensively on this issue. As a result, Brazil has the second highest score in cybersecurity in the South American region. [A 2018 law](#) passed by Brazil's Congress and inspired by the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will further enhance national cybersecurity by addressing concerns about digital privacy. However, implementation of this law has been postponed until 2021, [raising](#) some concern. The spread of [disinformation](#) in the country is currently an issue of parliamentary investigation.

EU involvement



The EU and Brazil entered a strategic partnership in 2007. Through a large array of [sector dialogues](#) the EU [supports](#) Brazil in addressing the pervasive social inequalities that fuel the country's high homicide rate. EU projects are among others aimed at strengthening the protection of [human rights defenders](#) and the human rights of particularly vulnerable groups such as the [homeless](#), and at countering violence, notably [domestic violence](#) against [women](#). EU [projects on fake news](#) seek to enhance Brazilians' resilience to disinformation. The EU fosters transparency in areas such as [public procurement](#). The EU's [Partnership Instrument](#) funds a wide variety of sustainability projects in Brazil. Moreover, Brazil [benefits](#) from the EU programme for Latin America [EUROCLIMA+](#), addressing climate change. In June 2019 the EU and the four founding members of Mercosur, including Brazil, reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive [trade agreement](#).

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso ranks 52 in the Normandy Index. It faces significant threats from violent extremist activity as regional terrorist groups infiltrate the country taking advantage of local grievances. This has led to Burkina Faso being ranked 27th most impacted by terrorism in the world according to the Global Terrorism Index.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Burkina Faso enjoyed a period of relative security and stability under the authoritarian leadership of Blaise Compaoré between 1987 and 2014. Compaoré played a key role in negotiating peace deals in neighbouring countries (for example between the Tuaregs and Malian government in 2012) and kept armed groups at bay. The country's stability came at the [price](#) of a narrow democratic space and wide-spread security sector abuses that eventually boiled over into popular protest and the overthrow of the dictator in 2014. Since then there has been an increase in political unrest amid a vacuum in the security apparatus of the state, creating an enabling environment for increased violent extremist activity.



New security and hybrid threats

Burkina Faso faces an overwhelming threat of violent extremism. Jihadist groups based in Mali, such as those affiliated to the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, an umbrella coalition of al-Qaeda-aligned movements, and domestic terror groups such as Ansar ul Islam flourish and perpetrate an increasing number of attacks. In the year from March 2019 to March 2020 alone, Burkina Faso recorded [2 246](#) fatalities from violent extremist activity and the state's response to it, up from only 80 attributed to violent extremist activity in 2016. Its national response has ranged from inadequate, with a complete absence of the state in some parts of the country, to exacerbating radicalisation, with the [abusive response](#) of security sector actors.

EU involvement


The EU supports Burkina Faso through a mix of national and regional initiatives, some focusing on security, and others with a broad development objective, with a view to achieving durable peace and security. As one of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, Burkina Faso benefits from the European Development Fund (EDF). Improving governance is one of the [three main objectives](#) of EU development aid. The EU also supports [confidence building](#) between the military and local populations in the east of the country. The [EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel](#), adopted in March 2011 and initially targeting Mauritania, Niger and Mali, was extended in 2014 to cover Burkina Faso and Chad. It aims to find synergy between development measures and those aimed at improving security in the region. As of July 2019, the EU has provided €147 million in support for counter-terrorism to the G5 Sahel, a forum for dialogue between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, with a cross-border military component, created in 2014.

Canada


Canada ranks 5 in the Normandy Index, indicating low levels of risk. It performs better than the world average in nearly every indicator, and scores notably well in democratic processes.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Canada has a long-standing democratic tradition in the form of a parliamentary system, enhanced by strong levels of education and a high GDP per capita. In the [2019 Human Development Index](#), it ranked 13 out of the 189 countries measured. In the Economist Intelligence Unit's [Democracy Index](#), Canada comes seventh with regard to political freedom, culture and participation. In addition, it is the world's third most stable country according to the Normandy Index, as measured by the fragile states' indicator. This is largely due to strong perceptions of state legitimacy, effective public services and low levels of external intervention. While Canada performs well on most indicators of traditional conflict, it moved up three rankings to 54 in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#). Although there were only four attacks in 2018 compared to 12 the prior year, the country experienced 10 terror-related deaths, compared to 6 in 2017.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Canada has high levels of both economic development and human capital, with the 10th largest economy and third most stable economy globally, as measured by the economic crises indicator. Canada is one of only a few developed countries to be a net exporter of energy. The country has known several separatist movements. In January 2020, the separatist party Wexit became eligible to run for the federal elections. Canadian society enjoys a high level of press freedom, ranking 16 in the Freedom of Information Index. This is due to [varied media coverage](#) and freedoms grounded in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enshrined in the Constitution Act of 1982.

EU involvement



Canada has been a formal [strategic partner](#) for the EU since 2016. Since then, the two have strengthened their [foreign policy and sectoral cooperation](#), with a view to upholding their joint commitment to advance democratic principles and human rights and to work together to strengthen international peace and security and rules-based multilateralism. Canada is one of the steadiest contributors to the CSDP, having taken part in 10 missions and operations to date. The EU and Canada have also concluded a security of information agreement for the exchange of classified information. The agreement aims to facilitate further CSDP cooperation, and cooperation on counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and sanctions. The EU and Canada hosted the first annual [women foreign ministers' conference](#) in September 2018, aiming to propose initiatives to elevate a feminist foreign policy agenda around the world. Canada and the EU meanwhile operate jointly within the [NATO](#) framework. Canada and the EU are also strong economic partners. In 2017, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada ([CETA](#)) provisionally entered into force, and aims to set a high standard for sustainability chapters in trade agreements. The EU and Canada have joined forces as leaders in the international fight against climate change, including by co-convening a [Ministerial on Climate Action](#) (MoCA) with China in 2018.

Central African Republic

The Central African Republic ranks 137 and bottom in the 2020 Normandy Index, and is therefore the country most at risk in the world. The constitutional republic has struggled through ongoing episodes of civil war since 2003.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Despite numerous ceasefire and peacebuilding efforts, including the Brazzaville Agreement in 2017 and democratic election of President Touadera in 2016, violence between armed groups remains common and the country is de facto partitioned between the Anti-Balaka in the southwest and ex-Séléka in the northwest. In 2019, the Central African Republic ranked sixth globally on the [fragile states index](#), reflecting the weakness of the central elected government. The security vacuum that has emerged as a result has contributed to the country's high violent conflict score. In 2019, the Central African Republic had the 14th highest impact on the [Global Terrorism Index](#). The two deadliest attacks recorded in 2019 were carried out by Anti-Balaka-affiliated groups. Both sides of the civil war have demonstrated the capacity and will to attack civilians, internally displaced persons and even United Nations personnel. Ethnic cleansing crimes have been committed by both factions.



New security and hybrid threats

Limited central government capacities and authority make the Central African Republic vulnerable to the emerging threats that accompany weak states, including problems with cybersecurity and press freedom. These shortcomings are conducive to the country's low score for democratic processes. Reflective of this, attacks on the media are common and the central state authority is often opposed to media criticism, leading to a [World Press Freedom Index](#) rating of 132, below the sub-Saharan African average. In 2018, three foreign journalists were [murdered](#).

EU involvement



The EU helped the Central African Republic (CAR) government to draw up the [2017-2021 national recovery and peacebuilding plan](#) and the EU comprehensive approach in the country is in line with this plan. CAR is part of the [ACP-EU partnership](#). In this context, EU aid to the CAR is financed by the [European Development Fund](#) (EDF) up to [€442 million for 2014-2020](#). In addition, the EU [Békou trust fund](#) for the CAR aims to improve coordination of EU donors and CAR approaches and to reduce aid fragmentation. At the end of 2016, pledges to the Békou trust fund totalled €146 million, mostly from the EU budget and the EDF; the European Parliament has called on Member States and other donors to '[scale up their contributions](#)'. The EU has committed to [support implementation of the peace deal](#) signed in February 2019 between the CAR government and armed groups. One military mission, [EUTM RCA](#), is currently operating in the country, to help restructure national forces. In December 2019, the Council established a civilian advisory mission to be launched in 2020, in order to support the reform of the internal security forces.

Chad

Chad ranks 130 in the Normandy Index. It is suffering the spill-over effects of Boko Haram activity, particularly around Lake Chad. This is further compounded by climate fragility and food insecurity.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Chad has a turbulent [history](#) of civil war, coups and democratic suppression. Libyan involvement in the country has further exacerbated instability. Idriss Déby took over in a coup in 1990 and won the first multiparty presidential elections in 1996, however rebellions continued. Déby's regime turned to repressive tactics to stifle opposition, including alleged human rights abuses by security forces and electoral fraud. A new Constitution expanding presidential powers was adopted in 2018. Legislative elections have been [delayed](#) several times since 2015, currently until December 2020. In 2019, Chad is a 'not-free state', scoring 17/100 in the [Freedom in the World index](#).



New security and hybrid threats

As well as internal strife, Chad has been involved in conflicts along its border regions. The Darfur conflict caused a mass flight of refugees into Chad and attacks by rebel groups. Chad took a lead in the regional response to violent extremism activity in the region, notably within the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with Niger and Nigeria, but announced its [withdrawal](#) from the MNJTF after a Boko Haram ambush killed over 92 soldiers in March 2020 in one of the deadliest [assaults](#) ever experienced by Chad. Food insecurity affects 4 million Chadians and 5.3 million require humanitarian assistance. The country's economy [remains](#) fragile and vulnerable to several risks. Increased [pressures on natural resources](#) owing to climate change and population displacement have led many to turn to Boko Haram as a source of income.

EU involvement


In the framework of its [comprehensive strategy in the Sahel](#), the EU supports the security initiatives of the G5 group of Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) and provided €147 million to establish the G5 Sahel-led Joint Force. The EU also provided financial support for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), set up in 1998 between Nigeria, Chad and Niger to combat transnational crime in the Lake Chad region, and from which Chad withdrew in April 2020. The [European Development Fund](#) earmarked up to €542 million for the 2014-2020 period, to support food security, nutrition and rural development; sustainable management of natural resources; and consolidation of the rule of law. In addition, the EU allocated €9.85 million through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) from 2015 to 2019. The [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed for €113 million since 2016 for governance, migration management, resilience and economic projects. Between 2013 and 2019 the EU provided €353 million in [humanitarian aid](#) for Chad, including €31 million for displaced people and refugees in 2019. In addition, in 2019, the EU allocated €35 million in humanitarian aid at Sahel regional level.

China

China ranks 100 in the Normandy Index and is considered more at risk than the Asia-Pacific average. Since the economic reforms of 1978, China has experienced significant economic growth, becoming the world's second largest economy in terms of nominal GDP.


Traditional sources and indications of conflict

China is still entangled in border disputes with India and Bhutan. Moreover, China's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan and several maritime features in the East and South China Seas have been heavily contested. In support of these claims, China fields the [world's largest army](#) and second largest global [defence budget](#). China also possesses active nuclear weapons. China ranks 86 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with particularly weak scores in the human rights and state legitimacy categories.



New security and hybrid threats

China's rapid economic growth has had a negative impact on its natural resources and environment, severely undermining water quality and leading to erosion and widespread pollution. Desertification claims an additional 4 000 km² per year of arable land. The country has been facing [flood risks](#) owing to extreme weather, threatening essential infrastructures. According to a [recent study](#), the increased frequency and intensity of drought events in China, one of the greatest natural threats to the country, is the result of global warming. China's [deployment of coal](#) has dangerous implications for the environment and human health, coal combustion being the single-largest source of air pollution-related health impacts in the country. China relies on new technologies for an authoritarian model of social surveillance and conformity that it is portraying as an alternative to liberal governance models. It subsequently ranks 177 in the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#). A one-party state, it scores far below other Asia-Pacific countries when it comes to democratic processes.



EU involvement



Since the EU and China established their strategic partnership in 2003, they have broadened and deepened their relations through more than [60 dialogue formats](#), including on non-proliferation and disarmament. These have contributed to the implementation of the [EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation](#). Cooperation on [climate change](#), including [emissions trading](#), and on [sustainable development](#), [energy](#), [urbanisation](#), [water](#) and the [circular economy](#) is high on the agenda. The [thematic and regional programmes](#) of the EU's Development Cooperation Instrument aim to strengthen civil society, the rule of law, human rights, and good governance in China. The regular EU-China [human rights dialogue](#) also raises issues such as freedom of expression and of religious belief, although with limited progress on these issues. The EU has repeatedly called on China 'to expedite the process of ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', which China signed in 1998. At the 21st EU-China Summit in April 2019 the EU and China [committed](#) to contribute jointly to international peace in several areas, including cyberspace and conflict settlement.

Colombia

Colombia ranks 81 in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the South American regional average, and performs below the regional average for crime, terrorism, violent conflict and democratic processes.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Colombia has struggled with organised crime and the impact of terrorism. A peace agreement between the government and the biggest terrorist group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), was signed in 2016. However, there are an [estimated](#) 2 500 active FARC dissidents. In March 2019, hundreds of Colombians were [displaced](#) after a key drug trafficking region experienced increased fighting between ex-FARC groups. In August, former FARC leaders [declared](#) their intention to take up arms once again. It is likely that organised crime and terrorist groups will continue to pose a threat to peace in Colombia. This includes knock-on effects to other aspects of society, such as homicides. The homicide rate in Colombia is higher than the South American regional average and among the 20 highest in the world.



New security and hybrid threats

Colombia performs below the South American regional average for new security threats. However, the country does show resilience in a number of areas, including energy insecurity, being a net exporter of energy. It also performs higher than the South American regional average in cybersecurity. Colombia performs relatively poorly in press freedom and access to information. The country ranks 130 in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#), largely owing to high numbers of death threats towards journalists and resultant self-censorship.

EU involvement


The EU has [supported](#) the Colombian peace process with an overall investment of more than [€645 million](#). This includes actions such as the Peace Laboratories and the Peace Territories project, the [Trust Fund](#) for Colombia (to which 21 EU Member States and Chile have pledged [€125 million](#)); EIB loans; and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace ([IcSP](#)), which mobilised an [extra €40 million](#) for critical elements of the peace process, such as transitional justice. EU cooperation covers areas such as victims' rights, reintegration of ex-FARC guerrillas into civilian life, de-mining, rural development, land restitution, environment, conflict resolution, peace post-conflict projects, and the establishment of a [special investigation unit](#) in the prosecutor-general's office to combat crime and protect activists. Eamon Gilmore, special EU envoy between 2015 and 2019, considered the EU's role in the peace process a great success and a [model](#) for EU external policy. [Development cooperation](#) between EU and Colombia totalled €127 million for the 2014-2020 period. The EU has a [Comprehensive Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru](#), provisionally applied since 2013. Regional cooperation between the EU and the Andean Community aims to help cement regional ties in Colombia's neighbourhood.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica ranks 18 in the Normandy Index, indicating relatively low levels of risk. In contrast to several other countries in the Central America and Caribbean region, Costa Rica has high levels of peace and political stability. Costa Rica enjoys a stable and uninterrupted democracy, with 14 presidential elections since 1948.


Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Costa Rica abolished its military in 1948 following the end of an intense civil war. This has had positive ramifications for its violent conflict and weapons of mass destruction scores. There is a limited threat of armed conflict within the country, and it enjoys good relations with neighbouring states. Additionally, it ranks among the countries suffering the lowest impact from terrorism. Costa Rica ranks [eighth](#) globally in terms of electoral integrity, and this is reflected in its high score on democratic processes. While it performs well on other indicators of traditional conflict, Costa Rica has relatively high levels of homicide. High homicide rates are attributed to [organised crime](#), which also affects many other countries within the Central American and Caribbean region.



New security and hybrid threats

Costa Rica has a relatively high level of resilience to new security threats. It has a long-standing and stable democracy and benefits from high levels of press freedom and human rights. It ranks 7 in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#), owing to low levels of violence against journalists and state interference. As such, it performs above the regional average for the indicators measuring democratic processes and fragile states. Although Costa Rica performs better than the regional average for climate change, it ranks 32 among the countries most susceptible to hazards resulting from natural events in INFORM's [Global Risk Index](#). In response, Costa Rica is aiming to be carbon neutral by 2021 and is the only country to have met all five of the United Nations Development Programme's environmental stability measures.



EU involvement


The EU has traditionally maintained strong political relations with Costa Rica. Both parties played an active part in the [San José dialogue](#) of 1984 to support the peace process and democratization efforts in [Central America](#). Cooperation agreements were concluded in 1985 and 1993, and a political dialogue and cooperation agreement in 2003. The [3rd EU-Costa Rica High Level Dialogue](#) was held in November 2019. [Costa Rica](#) is also signatory to the EU-Central America Association Agreement concluded in 2012. Under the 2014-2020 financial exercise, Costa Rica benefits from the EU thematic cooperation lines, the regional programmes for Latin America and the [sub-regional programme](#) for Central America, including cooperation on security and impunity. The EU also supports [new regional approaches](#) through triangular cooperation schemes; for instance, it is working with Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico on strengthening restorative justice. The EU has also funded [projects](#) in the areas of citizen security, fighting discrimination against vulnerable groups, border security, and the Central American security strategy. Costa Rica is aligned with the EU in international fora on various issues, including regional peace and security.

Democratic Republic of the Congo


The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ranks towards the bottom of the Normandy Index at 129. The republic is still mired in the effects of a profound political and security crisis triggered in 1997 when President Kabila seized power.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

There were successful elections in 2006 and in 2011, but continued allegations of government corruption and the deferral of elections beyond their 2016 constitutional limit until 30 December 2018 led to escalating violence and government repression from 2016. Despite the ongoing efforts of the United Nations MONUSCO mission and the successful – yet contested – election of President Tshisekedi in January 2019, DRC ranks 5 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#) and performs lower than the regional average for democratic processes. The DRC ranked 10 in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#). The terrorism score continues to deteriorate as the ungoverned eastern regions of the DRC host a number of extremist groups and militias, which have shown the capacity and resolve to engage both DRC government forces and United Nations peacekeepers. Groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord's Resistance Army are known to use child soldiers and commit acts of ethnic cleansing.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

The unconstitutionally long term of President Kabila took its toll on democratic processes and on press freedom, with reportedly regular threats and physical attacks and occasional killings of journalists. DRC now ranks 150 out of 180 countries in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). The country is considered at-risk, with particular vulnerability when it comes to threats to its energy supply and infrastructure.

EU involvement


DRC is part of the [ACP-EU partnership](#). In this context, EU aid is financed primarily by the [European Development Fund](#), with up to €709 million for the 2014-2020 period, of which one quarter has been dedicated to strengthening governance and the rule of law. The EU deployed two military missions and three civilian missions in DRC, to help stabilise the country and reform police and army forces, the latest ended in June 2016. EU relations with the DRC are strained on account of [sanctions](#) against several Congolese perpetrators of human rights violations, including a number of former President Kabila's relatives. The EU was not invited to send an electoral observation mission and 'noted' that Tshisekedi's election as the new president was contested.

Egypt


Egypt ranks 117 in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) average. Street protests in 2011 forced long-term President Hosni Mubarak to resign. Morsi's successor, President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, was elected in 2014 and re-elected in 2018. Security issues, and the Islamic terrorist threat within the North Sinai governorate, remain high.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Egypt ranks 35 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with particularly high scores for the human rights and factionalised elites indicators. The military remains the predominant political force in the country and it has demonstrated its capacity to influence the political direction of the country. Since 2014, the terrorist group Wilayat Sina, the Islamic State's local branch in the Sinai Peninsula, has conducted a prolonged insurgency against Egyptian authorities. The group was responsible for 457 deaths in 2017 alone. This is the main reason for Egypt ranking 11 in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#).



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

The vast majority (98 %) of Egypt's population of approximately 95 million people are concentrated around the arable Nile valley and delta, which represents only 3 % of the country's total landmass. The population relies on the Nile's regular flow for its basic water needs, a supply that is threatened by Ethiopia's planned construction of a dam upstream. [Soil salinisation](#) also threatens 15 % of the country's farmland. The pipelines from Port Said and other energy infrastructures are affected by Islamic terrorist attacks, presenting additional security and economic vulnerabilities. Egypt's ongoing security threats have led to the detention and sentencing of journalists and political opponents of the government. Censorship intensified during the 2018 presidential elections. The country is one of the biggest jailers of journalists, ranking 166 out of 180 countries in the 2020 [Press Freedom Index](#). Public access to more than 500 websites has been blocked. In 2017, Egypt launched a national cybersecurity strategy to defend its national infrastructure against cyber-attacks.

EU involvement


The [European Union](#) stands by the Egyptian people in their ongoing efforts to achieve socio-economic development, as well as democracy, respect for human rights, social justice and security. The 2001 Association Agreement, which entered into force in June 2004, forms the legal basis of EU-Egypt relations. Relations were further strengthened through the jointly agreed [EU-Egypt action plan](#), adopted in 2007, which helped to develop bilateral relations in the political, social and economic realms. In the context of [the revised European Neighbourhood policy](#), the EU and Egypt have adopted [partnership priorities](#) that will guide the partnership for the 2017-2020 period. The EU's [assistance](#) to Egypt will focus on economic modernisation, energy sustainability and the environment; social development and social protection; and governance.

Eritrea


Eritrea ranks 96 on the Normandy Index. Despite the historic peace deal signed with Ethiopia in 2018, Eritrea continues to have little tolerance for press freedom and democratic practices.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia reigned in 1998 over a border dispute. The 20 years to 2018 have been termed a state of '[frozen war](#)'. Despite the peace deal signed with Ethiopia in 2018 and other indications that Eritrea was emerging from international diplomatic isolation, domestic repression has remained as intense as ever. Any hopes that Eritreans had of a relaxation of the security state and opening up of personal freedoms have faded, leading many citizens to [voice their criticism](#) in public places. The revolution in neighbouring Sudan in 2019 toppled Omar al-Bashir, a dictator of 30 years, and subsequent democratic reforms (though not unproblematic) have led some to suggest that a similar [popular uprising](#) could take place in Eritrea and that President Afwerki is concerned about such a possibility.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Under the guise of defending Eritrea from its enemies, President Afwerki has clamped down on opposition groups, the judiciary, free press and civil society. Eritrea's score on the resilience to disinformation domain in the Normandy Index is zero, and it ranks 178 out of 180 on the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#), just above Turkmenistan and North Korea. Eritrea's dire score in the democratic processes domain reflects a total [lack of political freedom](#). Its low score in energy insecurity results from its dependency on oil imports. Less than half of the country's population have [access](#) to electricity.

EU involvement


In the framework of its [comprehensive strategy for the Horn of Africa](#), the EU promotes regional cooperation on migration and displacement, security, and the fight against violent extremism. Three CSDP missions are operating in the region, including the EUNAVFOR naval force against piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The EU and Eritrea are part of the [EU-Horn Africa Migration route initiative](#), a policy dialogue on the fight against migrant smuggling. Following the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal in 2018, the EU and Eritrea redefined priority cooperation areas in support of peace, regional integration and sustainable development. The new [Development Cooperation Strategy for 2019-2020](#) focuses on infrastructure and energy (€125 million); job creation in the agricultural sector (€30 million); economic governance (€5 million) and the promotion of Eritrean culture and heritage (€15 million). The EU has allocated €6 million funding through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace ([IcSP](#) 2015-2019) for crisis response and preparedness projects. The [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed for €121 million since 2016 for better governance and conflict prevention, and support for resilience and economic projects. To tackle food crises in Eritrea and the Horn of Africa, the EU has launched the 'supporting Horn of Africa resilience' ([SHARE](#)) programme, linking humanitarian aid and development policy.

Ethiopia


Ethiopia ranks 120 in the Normandy Index, and is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average. Despite two national states of emergency declared in response to popular protests in five years, Ethiopia under its prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, has made great efforts to both resolve ongoing disputes with Eritrea and introduce wide-ranging political, economic and electoral reforms.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Ethiopia, a federal parliamentary republic, with significant power vested in the prime minister, ranks 21 in the 2020 [Fragile States Index](#), with particular vulnerabilities arising from demographic pressures and group grievances. The prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, has attempted to resolve ongoing disputes with Eritrea following the 1998-2000 war and in 2019 [received](#) the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to achieve peace. However, conflict with Eritrea and among ethnic and religious groups has given rise to terrorist violence. In 2018, clashes between ethnic groups displaced more than 1.2 million people. Ethiopia ranks 29 in the 2019 [Global Terrorism Index](#), with nine recorded incidents and 22 fatalities. Anti-terror measures are particularly harsh and cause for concern for many human rights organisations.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Ethiopia ranks 99 in the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#), up from its previous ranking (110). The declared states of national emergency in 2016 and 2018 were used to silence dissenting voices, with a number of newspapers being shut down and certain broadcast media being banned. Since then, the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali has allowed many detained journalists and bloggers to be released, and no media professional was in [prison](#) in connection with their work at the end of 2018. However, [renewed](#) concerns about media freedom emerged in late 2019. While it scores well on energy insecurity, the country [plans](#) to increase production to make electricity available to everyone by 2030. Ongoing [disputes](#) with Egypt over construction of the Millennium Dam on the River Nile remain a point of tension.

EU involvement



Ethiopia is a key partner for the EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, owing to its economic potential, its military capacity and its ability to retain refugees. Ethiopia is part of the [ACP-EU partnership](#). In this context, EU aid to Ethiopia is financed primarily by the [European Development Fund](#) up to €745 million for the 2014-2020 period. Conflict prevention and resilience efforts are also financed by means of the [EU Trust Fund for Africa](#) (EUTF Africa), for projects worth €250 million, with a view of mitigating the root causes of irregular migration. One of the projects partly financed by the EUTF Africa is dedicated to rebuilding roads between Ethiopia and Eritrea to [support the 2018 peace agreement](#), which ended two decades of conflict between the two countries.

Georgia

Georgia ranks 33 on the Normandy Index. It performs higher than the Eurasian regional average in the indicators measuring crime, terrorism, violent conflict, and weapons of mass destruction.

Traditional indications of conflict

Since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia has had to face economic crisis and war. In August 2008, a five-day war with Russia resulted in the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While most of the international community and the EU support Georgia's territorial integrity, the intensity of the conflict has decreased without the conflict being resolved. The country has experienced relatively low levels of terrorism in the past five years. In 2019 it [adopted](#) a new counter-terrorism strategy, given that events in the Middle East could have an impact on the Caucasus region. The country also scores well in the democratic processes indicator compared to its region.



New security and hybrid threats

Georgia has the region's third best score on the economic crisis indicator, and a relatively resilient economy. [Reform](#) over the past 15 years has focused on globalising the business sector and boosting gross domestic product. Over the past decade, Georgia has cultivated trade relationships across different geographic areas. While neighbouring countries Russia, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Turkey remain the main export destinations, it has expanded its ties with China, boosted its ties with the EU through an association agreement (AA), including a deep and comprehensive free trade Area (DCFTA), and committed to the NATO Response Force. Georgia has also increased its resilience in other areas and now has the highest score for cybersecurity in the Eurasian region. It remains vulnerable in the area of energy security, however, mainly on account of its dependence on imported natural gas.

EU involvement


Although Georgia lives with a Russian [military](#) presence in two regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), it ranks as the most resilient [Eastern Partnership](#) (EaP) country. An EU monitoring mission ([EUMM](#)) has been deployed in Georgia since 2008. The country has been committed to deepening relations with the EU, through European Neighbourhood policy ([ENP](#)) since 2004 and the Eastern Partnership since 2009. With the EU-Georgia [AA/DCFTA](#), the EU is supporting the modernisation of the Georgian economy and the strengthening of state institutions and policies. The EU is also working to offer Georgian citizens new travel, study and business opportunities. Since the entry into force of the visa-free regime in 2017, Georgian citizens holding biometric passports can enter the Schengen area visa-free and remain for up to 90 days in any 180-day period. Since then, more than 500 000 Georgians have travelled to the EU. In the 2015-2018 period, 5 579 students and academic staff took part in the Erasmus+ programme for the purpose of teaching or studying in the EU or Georgia. In areas where Georgia is more at threat (energy security and climate), the EU [funds](#) projects in renewable energies, i.e. €107 million for energy security since 2010.

India


India ranks 125 on the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than average for southern Asia. The country has been a federal parliamentary republic since it won independence from the UK in 1947. India's relatively low ranking is largely the product of a number of unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, both of which are also nuclear-armed powers, as well as vulnerabilities relating to climate change and terrorism. Inter-religious disputes are on the increase.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Although India is traditionally recognised as the world's most populous democracy, Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2020 [report](#) awarded it a lower score than the previous year and placed it under the spotlight. India ranks 68 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#). Despite high-level economic success since the 1990s, the country has been challenged by ongoing inter-religious, inter-caste and inter-ethnic disputes. India has struggled in particular with endemic poverty, both rural and urban. An [estimated](#) 31.8 million Indians live below the poverty line. India meanwhile ranked seven in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#). The Naxalite Communist Party of India is the deadliest terrorist actor in the country and has been active for several decades. India's tensions with Pakistan, particularly over ownership of the Jammu-Kashmir region, have also given rise to a number of Islamist terrorist groups operating from within Pakistani territory.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Out of a population of 1.38 billion, approximately [197 million](#) Indian households have access to television and [687 million](#) people use the internet in India. Government efforts to limit 'anti-national' thought have led to India ranking 142 in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). The risks posed by flooding, rising temperatures and declining rainfall, mean that India's agricultural sector is particularly vulnerable to climate change. Some [estimates](#) suggest that up to 40 % of total crop yield could be lost if temperatures were to rise by 2°C. India has a much stronger cybersecurity infrastructure than average for southern Asia.

EU involvement


India and the EU have been strategic partners since 2004. They began talks on a [bilateral trade](#) and investment agreement (BTIA) in 2007, but negotiations are at a deadlock. In November 2018 the EU adopted a new [strategy on India](#) to relaunch the partnership. India is not eligible for bilateral assistance from the EU's Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), however it can still [benefit](#) from DCI-funded thematic and regional programmes for Asia. EU-India cooperation has expanded significantly when it comes to research and innovation ([R&I](#)). At their last two summits, the EU and India have agreed on an [Agenda for Action 2020](#) and stated their joint commitment to [cooperation on combating terrorism](#), and promoting action on [clean energy and climate change](#), a [water partnership](#), [smart and sustainable urbanisation](#), [information and communication technology](#), [circular economy and resource efficiency](#), and [global peace and security](#).

Indonesia


Indonesia ranks 29 in the Normandy Index. Significant economic growth in this populous country has raised it to political prominence in the region. This rise has not been without issues: sectarian unrest, corruption, terrorism and the 1997 financial crisis each posed significant challenges.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Indonesia has faced a number of separatist and militant movements since its independence in 1949 and ranks 42 in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#). The country's occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 1999 led to conflict with Fretilin, a pro-independence militia and conflict with Papuan separatists remains ongoing. Islamist movements, in particular, Jemaah Islamiyah, while formerly active in the country, have been less active in recent years.



New security and hybrid threats



Despite its success in instituting democratic practices, including the conduct of the 2019 general election, Indonesia ranks 119 in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#) and 96 on the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with a particularly high score in the group grievances category. This is largely to do with ongoing unrest in the province of Papua, where media access is restricted. The 2004 Aceh earthquake and tsunami, in which over 160 000 people were killed, demonstrated Indonesia's vulnerability to environmental and climatic factors. Increasing drought frequency is [predicted](#) to threaten Indonesia's monsoon-based agricultural practices and lead to food shortages, while rising ocean levels are forecast to threaten approximately 42 million low-lying households.

EU involvement



Although the EU and Indonesia are geographically far apart, they have common values, such as a commitment to democracy, human rights and multilateralism. Both are pluralistic societies with a motto of 'unity in diversity'. In 2014, Indonesia became the first south-east Asian country to sign a [partnership and cooperation agreement](#) with the EU, and a free trade agreement is currently being negotiated. As a middle-income country, Indonesia no longer receives EU bilateral [aid](#), except for programmes pre-dating 2014, but it continues to participate in programmes such as [Erasmus+](#) for higher education; EU funding also supports Indonesia's foreign trade through the [ARISE Plus](#) facility. The EU and Indonesia conduct a wide range of policy dialogue on topics such as [human rights](#) and [security](#). As a regional leader, Indonesia is key to the EU's efforts to build a strategic partnership with the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Iran

Iran ranks 110 in the Normandy Index. The country is currently facing an economic crisis, largely as a result of US economic sanctions, re-imposed at the end of 2018, and the subsequent impact on oil exports, inflation and unemployment.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Tensions around Western interference in Iranian domestic affairs date back to the early 1900s when the British government took control of Persian [oil production](#). The overthrow, with CIA backing, of Mohammad Mossadeq, a democratically elected prime minister, in 1953, set off a wave of unrest that ultimately led to the revolution of 1979 and subsequent [US hostage crisis](#). Since then, Iran has found itself embroiled in several conflicts in neighbouring countries, beginning with the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, and continuing to this day in the conflict in Yemen. The country came under increasing [international pressure](#) over its WMD capabilities and intentions, which were held in check by the Iran [nuclear deal](#) (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), which was signed in 2015, but from which the US withdrew in 2018.



New security and hybrid threats

Since President Trump reimposed [US economic sanctions](#) on it in November 2018, Iran has suffered tremendous economic and social consequences. A fall in the value of domestic currency – the rial – of around 60 % in 2019, and a decline in oil exports, considered Iran's economic lifeline, from 2.8 million barrels a day [to a few hundred thousand](#), have hit Iranian citizens hard. [The cost of basic goods](#) for example, has doubled since 2016. The NI's threat comparison shows that economic crisis poses the most significant threat to Iran when compared to the MENA average. The targeted assassination of Major General Qassam Soleimani in January 2020 [further increased tensions](#) with the US, with Iran responding by ramping up its nuclear programme, further entrenching itself in regional conflict, and firmly suppressing any sign of [domestic unrest](#).

EU involvement



The EU played an important role in facilitating the [nuclear agreement](#) between Iran and the EU3+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom, plus China, Russia and the US). Following the [endorsement](#) of the JCPOA in July 2015, the EU established an [Iran Task Force](#), to coordinate the different strands of action in relations with Iran (including the implementation of the JCPOA and the development of bilateral relations). After the US [withdrew](#) from the JCPOA in 2018, the EU put in place several initiatives to save the agreement, notably the [Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges](#) (INSTEX) and the update of the [Blocking Regulation](#).

Iraq

Iraq ranks 128 in the Normandy Index. As the country continues to be impacted by regional and domestic terrorism, it also faces political instability in the wake of country-wide protests against corruption that began in October 2019.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Iraq has a [history of military coups and revolutions](#) beginning in 1958. When Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979, Iraq began a new chapter of brutal authoritarianism, becoming embroiled in a series of conflicts to establish regional hegemony, starting with the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. In 1989, Iraq invaded neighbouring Kuwait, beginning the first Gulf War. In the aftermath of this, the international community, led by the US, continued to impose devastating economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on the country, to which Saddam Hussein responded with increasing domestic repression. In 2003, claiming Iraq had WMD capabilities, the US once again invaded Iraq and began a conflict that is still ongoing. This conflict has embroiled the entire region, with state and non-state actors such as ISIL/Da'esh, still very active in the conflict arena. The estimated death toll since 2003 ranges from around [185 000](#) to over [2.4 million](#) civilians.



New security and hybrid threats

Iraq faces the continued threat of terrorism, as the second most terrorism-impacted [country](#) in the world in 2019, behind Afghanistan. In addition, Iraq is challenged by [increasing political instability](#), exacerbated by underlying sectarian tensions and worsening economic conditions. In October 2019, [protests](#) began against high levels of unemployment, state failure to deliver public goods, and Iranian influence, all of which has led to hundreds of protesters being killed in the space of a few months. These protests also led to the [resignation of the Iraqi prime minister](#), Adel Abdel Mahdi, in December 2019. Nevertheless, [many doubt](#) the prospects for long-term structural political change in a system designed to share power between ruling elites from several ethnic factions. Iraq is [considered](#) one of the Arab countries most vulnerable to climate change, with limited [water](#) resources of its own.

EU involvement



Under the 2018 [EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement](#) (PCA), the EU [cooperates](#) with Iraq in many areas, including humanitarian assistance, stabilisation, reconstruction, human rights, migration, security, and the political, social and economic reform agendas. The EU adopted an [EU strategy for Iraq](#) in January 2018 to respond to the specific challenges Iraq is facing following the territorial defeat of ISIL/Da'esh. Iraq has benefited from over €1 billion in EU assistance since 2014. In October 2017, the Council set up a CSDP mission – [EUAM Iraq](#) – to assist the Iraqi authorities with the implementation of its national security strategy.

Lebanon

Lebanon ranks 121 in the Normandy Index. The collapse of the country's currency and economic upheaval have fostered social discontent since October 2019. Popular unrest escalated on 28 April 2020, following the funeral of 26-year-old Fawwaz al-Samman, who died from army gunshot wounds and was designated a 'Martyr of the Hunger Revolution.'

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Lebanon's history of conflict dates back at least to the civil war that erupted in 1975. A small state, Lebanon is at the centre of regional power struggles lead today by Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Syrian-assisted assassination of the prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in 2005, ongoing Iranian support for Hezbollah, and the spill-over of fighting and millions of refugees from the current Syrian crisis, among other events, have not only ensured [continued political and violent conflict](#) in the country, but have also led to deep economic crisis. Around 1.5 million Syrian refugees (one quarter of Lebanon's population) have sought refuge in Lebanon since 2011.



New security and hybrid threats

Lebanon is facing an economic crisis not seen since independence in 1943. Since October 2019, when nationwide protests broke out against the deepening economic crisis and perceived corruption, more than [220 000 jobs](#) in the private sector have been lost – over one tenth of Lebanon's workforce. These protests resulted in the resignation of the prime minister, Saad Hariri, but protests continue as [the cost of living](#) becomes increasingly unaffordable for ordinary citizens. In addition to this, Lebanon has low levels of energy security, with the electricity supply being notoriously poor and uncertain for the past several decades. In 2009, the [supply of electricity](#) to households averaged 18 hours for the whole country and, as today's protesters claim, the situation has not improved.

EU involvement



The EU recognises the importance and supports the efforts of Lebanon as the country with the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world. The Commission has allocated more than €1.6 billion in assistance to Lebanon since 2011, both for bilateral assistance (€292 million) and specifically in response to the Syrian crisis (over €1.3 billion). Bilateral assistance has been allocated under [European Neighbourhood policy](#), focusing on local social and economic development. Following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU is reallocating up to €2.1 billion of existing funds for bilateral and regional assistance as part of the EU's global [response to the pandemic](#). This includes €30.8 million for immediate needs, €572 million to strengthen national health systems and €1.5 billion to support socio-economic recovery.

Mali

Mali ranks 119 in the Normandy Index. The country faces continued threats from violent extremist activity, as well as climate change-related challenges, including increased resource scarcity.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Mali enjoyed relative economic, social and political stability in a region otherwise beset by conflict and insecurity until 2012. The Arab Spring enabled a large-scale insurgency and rebellion to begin in [Mali's north](#), launched by the Tuareg Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Mohammed Qaddafi's downfall in Libya in 2011 had allowed them to seize an abundance of small arms. Islamist extremist groups operating in the region then entered the conflict arena. When the armed extremist groups made an advance on the capital Bamako in 2013, French forces intervened, driving back the insurgency but creating a dependency on international military resources that continues to this day. Mali has been the beneficiary of a 15 000+ [UN peacekeeping force](#) since 2013. Mali has significantly lower scores than the sub-Saharan average in the violent conflict and terrorism domains. It went from a rank of 79th to 16th most [fragile state](#) between 2012 and 2020.



New security and hybrid threats

Although the security situation in the northern part of the country has stabilised to an extent in recent years, the actions of transnational criminal organisations, terrorist groups and armed militia have led to a [spike in violence](#) against civilians, with over 85 000 having fled their homes in 2019. In addition to the ongoing terrorist threat, Mali faces a situation of increasing resource scarcity combined with a growing population, which has already seen the exacerbation of inter-ethnic tensions particularly between traditional farmers and pastoralist populations in the north of the country. Resource-related conflicts are expected to [spread from northern Mali](#) into the central region around Bamako.

EU involvement



In the framework of its [comprehensive strategy in the Sahel](#), the EU supports the G5 group of Sahel countries security initiatives and provided €147 million to establish the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Mali hosts two EU CSDP missions: [EUCAP Sahel Mali](#) – a capacity building mission in support of national security policies in Mali, and since February 2019, in Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania – and EUTM Mali – a training mission for the armed forces of all five G5 Sahel countries and for the G5 Sahel force. The [European Development Fund](#) has provided up to €665 million in support for the 2014-2020 period, mainly to support peace consolidation. In addition, the EU allocated €22 million through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace ([IcSP](#) 2015-2019). Since 2016, the [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €214 million towards better governance, migration management, resilience and economic projects. In 2019, the EU allocated more than €43 million to the country in [humanitarian aid](#), while in parallel the EU allocated €35 million in humanitarian aid to the Sahel region as a whole.

Mauritania

Mauritania ranks 107 in the Normandy Index, lower than the world average. It is considered more at risk in democratic processes, crime and fragility, while it is at low risk in terms of terrorism.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Mauritania ranks 33 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#). [Failure to eradicate slavery](#) despite its abolition in 1981 explains the country's particularly low score in state legitimacy. In recent decades, Mauritania's political life has been marked by several military coups, the most recent led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2008, followed by his election in 2009. In June 2019, Mauritania saw the first peaceful transfer of power since it became independent in 1960, with the election of the ruling party candidate and former defence minister, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. Mauritania ranks 137 in the [Corruption Perceptions Index](#). In February 2020, the national Parliament formed a committee of enquiry to investigate [alleged corruption cases](#) during the former president's mandate. Despite increasing numbers of attacks in the Sahel, Mauritania has proved to be remarkably [resilient](#) against jihadism, and has suffered no terrorist attacks since 2011.



New security and hybrid threats

Mauritania faces the second highest risk of drought according to the INFORM [Global Risk Index](#), as its southern regions experienced [drought-like conditions](#) in 2019 for the third consecutive year. The country passed its first data privacy laws in 2017, but is still at the early stages of addressing cybersecurity, ranking 145 in the [Global Cybersecurity Index](#). Despite substantial renewable energy resources, the country's energy sector faces significant [challenges](#) and Mauritania scores low on energy security. Mauritania fell from 72nd to 97th place in [the World Press Freedom Index](#) between 2018 and 2020. The internet was disconnected for 11 days during the 2019 presidential election, and fear of reprisal causes journalists to censor themselves.



EU involvement

In the framework of its [comprehensive strategy in the Sahel](#), the EU supports the security initiatives of the G5 group of Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) and granted €147 million to establish the G5 Sahel-led Joint Force. The EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell has been deployed in Nouakchott, where the G5 Sahel permanent secretariat is based. The [European Development Fund](#) provided up to €160 million in the 2014-2020 period for food security and sustainable agriculture; the rule of law; and improvement of the health system. The EU [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €79 million since 2017 for conflict prevention projects. In 2019, the EU allocated nearly €16 million in [humanitarian aid](#) to Mauritania.

Mexico

Mexico ranks 69 in the Normandy Index. Despite significant progress made in combating organised crime, Mexico has seen an increase in violent crime and homicide that has affected civilians and politicians alike.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict
 Mexico has suffered from large-scale organised criminal activity including drug-trafficking, kidnapping and extortion since at least the 1980s, when Mexico's crime groups started coordinating and assigning distinct regional areas of control and establishing trafficking [routes](#). The ensuing violence emanated not only from inter-cartel competition, but also the Mexican State's officially declared 'War on Drugs' in 2006. It is estimated that over 61 000 people had disappeared in drug-related crime since [2006](#).



New security and hybrid threats

The overall level of peacefulness in Mexico has deteriorated for three years in a row since 2016, driven by an upsurge in the homicide rate, which reached historically high levels in 2018, at 27 deaths per 100 000 people, or over 34 000 victims. This is an 80.5 % increase on 2015 levels, surpassing the previous peak of [2011](#). Gun violence is also on the rise, with the firearms crime rate doubling from 13.5 per 100 000 people in 2015 to 28.6 in 2018. The violent crime rate has increased by 25 % since 2015, with violence affecting civilians and politicians alike. During the 2018 election cycle, at least 850 acts of political violence were recorded, killing at least [175](#) candidates or elected officials. Mexico's geography, situated between two oceans, makes it [vulnerable](#) to severe weather events and climate change; the country has had a climate change [law](#) since 2012.

EU involvement


The EU has a long-standing comprehensive partnership with Mexico, established through the European Union-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in December 1997 and entered into force on 1 October 2000. This 'Global Agreement', also includes a free trade agreement, which is currently being [updated](#). It was the first EU agreement to create a free trade area and the first partnership agreement with a country in Latin America. The Global Agreement established a political dialogue and broad cooperation between the parties. In 2008 the EU agreed a [strategic partnership](#) with Mexico that introduced new high-level dialogue issues, such as on security, law enforcement and human rights. The EU is stepping up cooperation with Mexico on combatting organised crime. [Negotiations](#) concluding a working arrangement between Mexican authorities and Europol began in February 2020.

Niger


Niger ranks 103 in the Normandy Index. Regional instability has led to the proliferation of violent extremist groups, causing a surge in numbers of refugees and internally displaced people. For Niger this compounds the already dire effects of climate change on access to resources, a further trigger for conflict.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Niger currently ranks 19 out of 178 in the [Fragile States Index](#) for 2020, and 189 (bottom) in the UN Human Development Index. The country's riches still overwhelmingly benefit foreign uranium mining interests and a handful of politically connected elite triggering conflict notably with Tuareg groups. Niger has also suffered from [regional instability](#), consequently its own conflict environment increased from 10 conflict events in 2011 with 25 fatalities, to 369 conflict events and 714 fatalities in 2019.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Niger's most immediate security threats come from the rapid spread of terrorism and violent extremist groups throughout the Sahel region. Deaths from [violent incidents](#) related to extremist groups in the Sahel reached 4 000 in 2019, a five-fold increase since 2016. Niger's ranking on the Global Terrorism Index has risen from 40th most impacted in 2011 to 23rd in 2019. Niger has also been overwhelmed by an increase in [internally displaced people and refugees](#) fleeing neighbouring countries, particularly Mali. This displacement compounds the impact of climate change, which is also affecting Niger, heightening the competition for scarce resources such as arable land and water that has already led to increased conflict between traditional [farmers and herders](#). By some estimates, soil erosion and desertification leads to the loss of between 100 and 120 thousand hectares of arable land per year in Niger.

EU involvement


The EU supports the security initiatives of the G5 group of Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) as part of its [comprehensive strategy in the Sahel](#), and provided €147 million to establish the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The EU civilian capacity building mission EUCAP Sahel Niger is aimed at strengthening the capacities of the Nigerian forces – and since February 2019, the Burkinabe, Chadian and Mauritanian military – to fight terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration. The EU also contributed funding for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), set up in 1998 between Nigeria, Chad and Niger to combat transnational crime in the Lake Chad region. The [European Development Fund](#) earmarked €716 million in the 2014-2020 period to help deliver social services, food security and resilience, and road infrastructure for regions at risk of insecurity and conflict. In addition, the EU has allocated €26 million in funding through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP 2015-2019). The [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €253 million since 2016 to better governance, migration management and support for resilience and economic projects. In 2019 the EU allocated €32 million to Niger in humanitarian aid.

Nigeria


Nigeria ranks 118 in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average. Ethnic tensions date back to colonial times. While the 1967-1970 civil war was primarily concerned with the equitable distribution of oil revenues between ethnic groups, more recent conflict has assumed more sectarian overtones. The country operates as a federal republic.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Despite an overall improvement on the previous year, Nigeria ranked third in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#), with 562 recorded incidents and 2 040 fatalities. Boko Haram, an ISIL/Da'esh-affiliated Islamist insurgency operating since 2002, was responsible for most of these deaths. However, tension between Christian farmers and Islamic Fulani herdsmen has also escalated into violent conflict, with the latter carrying out several terrorist attacks claiming numerous victims. The country's federal model allows for a large degree of state autonomy between the predominantly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south. However, the concentration of oil-producing regions in the southern Niger Delta, as well as endemic corruption, have led Nigeria to rank 14 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with particularly high scores in the factionalised elites and group grievances indicators.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Despite being Africa's biggest economy by nominal GDP, Nigeria has a fragile economic situation owing to its over-reliance on oil. The country's accelerated demographic growth is a potential factor of instability given the lack of enough jobs for young people. As a relatively wealthy country in the region, it is an outlier in terms of the strength of its cybersecurity capacities. However, Nigeria's political corruption has exacerbated issues relating to disinformation. Africa's most populous country thus ranks 115 in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). While internationally supported elections are generally praised as fair and efficient, they are often witness to large-scale disinformation campaigns.

EU involvement


The EU has supported numerous initiatives to increase Nigeria's resilience to violent conflict and other threats. To help fight terrorism the EU has [funded](#) an initiative grouping several Lake Chad countries – the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – against Boko Haram. The [European Development Fund](#) has provided over [€500 million](#) in [support](#) (2014-2020) to improve Nigeria's resilience in areas such as health and nutrition, electricity production, rule of law, and security. The EU has invited Nigeria to become party to a regional [economic partnership agreement](#) between the EU and west Africa, aimed at liberalising trade and fostering regional integration and sustainable development. The [EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) supports conflict prevention and relief measures, and greater economic and employment opportunities, to increase the resilience of communities in the areas most afflicted by conflict. In 2019 the EU sent an election observation mission for the Nigerian general elections. It published a report including [30 recommendations](#).

North Macedonia


North Macedonia ranks 39 in the 2020 Normandy Index. Although it performs less well than the European average on most indicators, it outperforms the global average for democratic processes, cybersecurity and homicide indicators.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

In 1991, North Macedonia gained independence from former Yugoslavia. Today, North Macedonia scores within the top quartile of countries in the democratic processes' indicator. The current government, led by the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) since May 2017, has improved relations with the EU and, in particular, with Bulgaria and Greece. Through the Prespa Agreement (June 2018), the country changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia in exchange for Greece ending its veto on its EU and (NATO) accession. In March 2020, following the signing of North Macedonia's accession protocol in February, the country officially joined NATO, the alliance's 30th member.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Since independence, North Macedonia has made progress in developing a westernised, open-market economy. This has included reforms such as registering property, gaining credit access and protecting minority investors. North Macedonia is the only middle-income country to rank among the top 20 countries globally when it comes to ease of doing business, [as ranked by the World Bank](#). Its progress on economic reforms is demonstrated in its strong economic crisis score. However, North Macedonia ranks just below the world average, and second lowest in the European region on press freedom: 92 in the 2020 [Press Freedom Index](#).

EU involvement



North Macedonia was the first western Balkan country to sign a stabilisation and association agreement with the EU (in 2004); just one year later, it became a candidate country. On 26 March 2020, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia. To prepare the country for membership, the EU has allocated [€664 million](#) of funding for the 2014-2020 period, focusing on the areas of institutional building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resources and rural development. The EU is supporting the [strengthening of transport and energy connectivity](#) within the western Balkans and with the EU through a new connectivity package, road improvements and the implementation of the regional rail strategy, through the [Western Balkans Investment Framework](#). The EU also helped to establish the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), modelled on the Franco-German Youth Office, created in 1963 to boost cooperation between young French and German citizens. RYCO promotes student exchanges with the EU and in the region, in order to foster reconciliation.

North Korea

North Korea is 115 in the Normandy Index, below the Asia-Pacific average. Talks on reunifying the Korean peninsula have consistently failed since 1948. The Korean War (1950–1953) produced a ceasefire, but no enduring peace, and each party claims legitimate sovereignty of the peninsula.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Under its 'military first' policy, North Korea produced the [fourth largest](#) active duty military in the world with [1.28 million](#) soldiers, supported by a reserve of almost [8 million](#) and paramilitary personnel. In 2013 this policy was replaced with the 'progress in tandem' policy, which emphasises economic progress and guaranteed security against South Korean or American incursion by nuclear development. The country has nuclear weapons and ballistic missile [programmes](#), and is believed to have chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In 2017, it successfully tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and claimed to have exploded a thermonuclear weapon. The country has used cyber-attacks and cyber theft to amass around [US\\$670 million](#) in foreign and virtual currency, circumventing international sanctions. North Korea ranks 30 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with a particularly weak score for state legitimacy. Its government has sought to address a number of issues related to living conditions under the 'progress in tandem' policy. Its authoritarian government ranks 172 in the [2019 Global Corruption Perceptions Index](#), and political prisoners are known to be interned in prison camps.



New security and hybrid threats

North Korea is bottom of the [2020 Global Press Freedom Index](#). The state security apparatus is extensive, maintaining control over citizens' residence, travel, employment, clothing, appearance, food and family life. Refugees report that the population is sorted by their 'Songbun' – a status system assessing a citizen's loyalty to the government – and granted opportunities accordingly. Furthermore, the shortage of skilled labour, energy, arable land and transportation has significantly impeded long-term growth and resulted in North Korea's ongoing difficulty in meeting development objectives, with a major impact on the agricultural sector and infrastructure.

EU involvement



The EU has a policy of 'critical engagement' towards North Korea, with a view to diminishing tensions in the Korean peninsula, upholding a nuclear non-proliferation regime and improving the human rights situation. It has applied [sanctions](#) against Pyongyang, implementing the UN Security Council Resolutions and adopting autonomous restrictive measures. Meanwhile, since 1995, it has contributed over €135.7 million in [aid funding to North Korea](#) – mostly on food assistance, but also on disaster relief and poverty alleviation. EU-North Korea trade in goods fell dramatically after 2013. In 2019, it amounted to a mere [€7 million](#) (0.2 % of North Korea's external trade). The EU has had diplomatic relations with North Korea since 2001, but has no delegation; its local representation is ensured in turn by one of the six Member States with embassies in the country (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Romania and Sweden).

Russia

Russia ranks 112 in the Normandy Index, performing better than the Eurasian regional average in terms of energy insecurity and cybersecurity indicators but worse in the overall score. This is largely owing to weak performance on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism and crime indicators.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has rebuilt or altered many of its institutions. Nevertheless, elements of authoritarian rule and weak democratic processes remain. Ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 20th century resulted in the development of nuclear arsenals in both countries. According to the [Arms Control Association](#), Russia holds around half of the world's nuclear capability, with an arsenal of nearly 7 000 weapons. Russia also has the highest homicide rate in the Eurasian region, at 9.2 per 100 000 in 2017. This is significantly higher than the global average of 7.27 per 100 000.



New security and hybrid threats

As a major oil, gas and coal exporter, Russia has relatively high levels of energy security. It also scores high on the cybersecurity indicator, ranking ninth globally. However, it faces threats from the impact of climate change. Challenges associated with [severe weather](#) have already affected the country's agricultural sector. Additionally, Russia is among the bottom 20 % of countries in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). Laws censoring independent media companies and the internet have had a severe impact on the spread of reliable information. The frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space and the 2014 annexation of Crimea have led to a deterioration of Russia's relations with the EU and NATO for more than a decade. Russia's [failure](#) to comply with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, caused further tensions in 2019.

EU involvement



EU-Russia [relations](#) took a sharp downturn after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and its involvement in separatist rebellions in eastern Ukraine. Since 2014, the EU has applied [sanctions](#) against Russia for its violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity; these have hurt the country's energy, banking and defence sectors. In return Russia has banned imports of EU agricultural products. Tensions have also arisen from Russia's interference in EU democratic processes (e.g. the UK's EU referendum, the 2017 French presidential election) and the attempted assassination of former Russian spy Sergey Skripal in the UK. EU funding for Russia is limited to four areas: research cooperation (Horizon 2020), cross-border cooperation, education (Erasmus+) and support for civil society.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia ranks 40 in the Normandy Index. It is enmeshed in several regional conflicts, most directly that in Yemen, and is facing increasing opposition both domestically and internationally to its limited democratic space.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Saudi Arabia has been engaged in [a decades-long proxy war with Iran](#) since the Iranian revolution of 1979. The new Shia Iranian regime, headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, encouraged other Muslims in neighbouring countries to overthrow their rulers as well; a call that the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia tried unsuccessfully to take up. This proxy war for regional hegemony has played out in [several conflicts in the Middle East](#) including in Lebanon, Iraq and, most directly perhaps, Yemen. The conflict in Yemen started out as a domestic uprising of Iranian backed Houthi rebels against a repressive Sunni-led government in 2014. The cause of the Yemeni government in fighting the rebels was quickly taken up by Saudi Arabia, which led a coalition of international forces, including the US, to take back control. In the five years up to the end of 2019, an estimated [100 000 people have been killed in Yemen](#), at least 12 000 of whom were civilians.



New security and hybrid threats

Aside from the ongoing war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia faces longer term challenges from its very limited democratic space. After Mohammed Bin Salman was appointed Crown Prince in 2017, he instituted several economic and social reforms, which many had hoped would also lead to greater democratic freedom. That has however [failed to materialise](#). The Kingdom, which has a poor human rights record, has repeatedly come under scrutiny for its [treatment of dissidents](#), including the execution of 37 pro-democracy activists in April 2019, and the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

EU involvement


In 1988, the European Union entered into a [cooperation agreement](#) with the Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), which comprises Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A regular EU-GCC dialogue aims to strengthen the stability of countries in the strategically important Gulf region, broaden economic and technical cooperation and strengthen existing cooperation on energy, industry, trade and services, agriculture, fisheries, investment, science, technology and the environment. There is no formal [bilateral relationship](#) between the EU and Saudi Arabia. The EU, and the European Parliament in particular, have been critical of Saudi Arabia's human rights record and have condemned and expressed grave concerns over [Saudi Arabia's role in Yemen](#).

Somalia


Somalia ranks 134 in the Normandy Index. It is significantly more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average and its performance is weaker for the indicators measuring terrorism, resilience to disinformation, fragile state measures and cybersecurity.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Somalia has struggled with the impact of its civil war, which began in 1991 with the overthrow of dictator Siad Barre. The country is also responding to the insurgency of jihadist and al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab, which is based in Somalia and which has been plaguing the country since 2008. In part as a result of this instability, the country is divided into autonomous and semi-autonomous regions. In the 2019 [Global Terrorism Index](#) Somalia recorded the second largest fall in deaths from terrorism, owing mainly to reduced activity by Al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, it still ranked as the country with the sixth highest impact of terrorism. Somalia ranks second in the [Fragile States Index](#). This highlights the weakness of the central government, which has little practical control over much of its territory, in particular but not only in the self-declared state of Somaliland.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

In response in part to the weakness of the central government, Somalia has adopted a decentralised federal model. As the federal government does not have significant territorial control or influence over policy, Somalia is vulnerable to threats that accompany weak states. This includes cybersecurity and press freedom. Somalia ranks 163 in the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#), being one of the most dangerous countries in Africa for journalists. Somalia is highly vulnerable to climate change, with the UNHCR having [called](#) for additional help for Somalians displaced by droughts in 2019.

EU involvement



Somalia is a major focus of the EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, which aligns various external policy programmes and instruments to tackle insecurity in the area, e.g. the piracy attacks off the Coast of Somalia, and its root causes. Somalia is part of the [ACP-EU partnership](#). In this context, EU aid to Somalia is financed primarily by the [European Development Fund](#), with up to €286 million for the 2014-2020 period, of which one third is dedicated to peace building and state building. Peace building efforts are also financed by means of the [EU Trust Fund for Africa](#), for projects worth €297 million, with a view to mitigating the root causes of irregular migration. Two EU military operations and one CSDP civil mission are based in Somalia: [EUNAVFOR operation Atalanta](#), [EUTM Somalia](#) and [EUCAP Somalia](#). While [EU direct naval action](#) has helped to secure the Coast of Somalia, international efforts to help improve Somali military and political governance, to which the EU has made a significant contribution, have yet to meet with success.

South Africa

South Africa ranks 70 in the Normandy Index scoring higher than the sub-Saharan African average. While it is considered low-risk and despite the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa still struggles with extremes of inequality.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

South Africa consistently has one of the highest income inequality indexes in the world and approximately 25 % of the country's population live below the poverty line. Despite South Africa's strong democratic processes and status as the second largest African economy, it therefore ranks 85 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#). South Africa's high violent crime rates also contribute to this fragility. The country's homicide rate, for example, is more than four times the sub-Saharan African average. South Africa also ranked 41 globally in the 2019 [Global Terrorism Index](#), with 33 small-scale incidents in 2019. In 1991, South Africa became the first country to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. Although South Africa energy security is overall much better than sub-Saharan African average, the country is facing an energy crisis, including rotational load shedding, due to mismanagement at the state-owned enterprise Eskom and aging generating capacity.



New security and hybrid threats

Owing in part to its pluralist political foundations, South Africa exhibits strong resilience to disinformation. It ranks 31 in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#) and has a relatively high score on the cybersecurity indicator for the sub-Saharan African region. Climate change poses particular risks for South Africa, as heatwaves, drought and bushfire all threaten the country's agricultural and urban areas. Between 2015 and 2018, for example, Cape Town faced a severe drought, requiring water rationing.

EU involvement



The EU and South Africa have a strong relationship based since 2007 on the [EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership](#) and [EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement](#) (provisionally) in force since 2016. Although [EU development aid](#) for South Africa was reduced from €980 million (2007 to 2013) to €241 million (2014 to 2020), as aid was redirected to poorer countries, in 2016 the EU collectively remained South Africa's second largest donor (after the US). EU-funded projects focused on [three sectors](#): employment creation, education, training, innovation, and efforts to enhance state capacity to provide public services. These areas are considered key when it comes to addressing the rampant inequality underlying South Africa's skyrocketing homicide rate and corruption, which weaken the state and undermine economic development and social progress.

Syria

Ranking 136th, Syria is the second least peaceful country on the Normandy Index. It performs worse than the global average in every indicator, especially in democratic processes, terrorism, resilience to disinformation and violent conflict.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Syria's low position on the Normandy Index is largely due to the ongoing impact of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011. This war is [estimated](#) to have resulted in over half a million deaths and has caused massive population displacements and destruction of infrastructure. Nearly 5.6 million Syrians are [registered as refugees](#) in neighbouring countries. The level of violence in the Syrian civil war has receded and deaths from terrorism in Syria decreased by nearly 40 % to 662 in 2018. ISIL/Da'esh was responsible for 73 % of these deaths. However, despite the decreased impact of terrorism, Syria still ranks 4 in the 2019 [Global Terrorism Index](#) and continues to suffer the long-term effects of instability as a result of the conflict.



New security and hybrid threats

The war and the extreme fragility of the Assad regime has devastated Syria and diminished the country's social and economic capital, all of which will impact post-war recovery. Syria ranks 174 out of 180 countries in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). Attacks and threats against journalists come from all participants in the war. In addition, despite having a weak cybersecurity score, the Assad regime has set up [special cybercrime courts](#) to target internet usage.

EU involvement


Civil war has been raging in Syria since 2011. The regime's recent offensive in the rebel-held province of Idlib, which began in December 2019, has led to the largest mass displacement of Syrians since the war began: since December, 1 million internally displaced people joined the [6.2 million Syrians](#) already internally displaced throughout the country by previous rounds of fighting. Over 11 million Syrians, including 6 million children, require humanitarian assistance. The EU suspended cooperation with the Syrian government under European Neighbourhood policy in 2011, in response to the violent repression of anti-government protests. However, the EU and its Member States are lead providers of [international aid](#) to those affected by the Syrian war, both inside and [outside](#) the country. Since 2011, the EU and its Member States have made almost €17 billion available for humanitarian, stabilisation and resilience assistance to Syrians in neighbouring countries and inside the country, including €340 million for humanitarian assistance inside Syria in 2019 and 2020. With a view to ending the civil war, the EU has [supported](#) the UN-led intra-Syrian negotiations towards a genuine political transition, and supported Syrian civil society organisations with a view to promoting a democratic form of governance and respect for human rights and freedom of expression.

The Philippines


The Philippines ranks 105 in the Normandy Index, lower than the Asia-Pacific average. Since securing independence following the Second World War, the country has faced a range of political, economic and environmental challenges. Thousands have died in a controversial war on drugs; there is also violence from rebel groups and terrorists.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The Philippines is among the top third most fragile countries in the world. Ranking 54 in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#) it has a particularly high score in the security apparatus category. Accordingly, it is considered more at risk than the Asia-Pacific average. One of the reasons for this fragility is the relatively high level of terrorism. The Philippines ranks 9 in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#). In 2018, despite a slight fall in terrorism activities, 424 separate incidents were recorded, with a total of 297 fatalities. The country has faced a number of insurgencies since independence, by Communist, Islamist, separatist and other movements. In 2016, ISIL/Da'esh-affiliated actors sought to establish an 'East-Asia province' in the country, occupying and holding the city of Marawi for five months. In 2019, the Bangsamoro autonomous entity was created to resolve an ongoing insurgency in the region.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

The Philippines ranks 136 in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#) and 113 in the [2019 Corruption Perception Index](#). The Philippines is among the 20 % of countries most exposed to climate change risks. Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 caused the loss of 6 300 lives, the displacement of over four million people and US\$2 billion in damage. As average sea temperatures rise, the Philippines' vulnerability to such extreme weather events is predicted to increase. Extensive mangrove deforestation has been [noted](#) as a factor that exacerbates this risk.

EU involvement


Its colonial history has made the Philippines the most westernised country in southeast Asia. Catholicism is the main religion, English is a widely used second language, and the political system is modelled on that of the United States. Together with its Member States, the EU is the Philippines' largest aid donor. For the 2014 to 2020 period, the EU allocated [€325 million](#) of development aid, focusing on two areas: the rule of law and inclusive growth (promoting renewable energy). Since 1996, the EU has also provided nearly [€125 million](#) in humanitarian aid, helping the country to respond to conflicts and natural disasters. The EU-Philippines Partnership and Cooperation Agreement came into force in 2018, and a free trade agreement is currently under negotiation. At present, the Philippines enjoys duty-free access to EU markets for most of its exports under the GSP+ scheme. Since 2016, EU criticism of extrajudicial killings has sparked an angry response from President Duterte, but in most areas cooperation has not been affected.

Tunisia


Tunisia ranks 38 in the Normandy Index. It is considered less at risk than the MENA average. Its performance is weaker than the MENA average for the indicator measuring energy insecurity, but stronger on all other indicators.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Since the removal of President Ben Ali during the Jasmine Revolution of 2011, Tunisia has undergone a range of democratic reforms. The fallout from the 2011 revolution has, however, pushed country up the [Fragile States Index](#), from 118th place in 2010 to 95th in 2020, scoring low for factionalised elites and state security apparatus. In February 2020, Tunisia's Parliament approved prime minister-designate Elyes Fakhfakh's new coalition government, ending months of political deadlock that had delayed the enactment of policies seen as critical to revive the country's sluggish economy. Unemployment has remained high throughout the past decade at 15 % and reforms, such as justice and security sector reform were abandoned between 2015 and 2019. In 2015, the country suffered two major terror attacks on tourist hotspots, leading to a drastic decline in the tourist economy. In 2020, three people died in a suicide bombing attack near the US embassy. Tunisia ranked 51 in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#), with 12 incidents in 2018.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

In 2008, Tunisia ranked 143 out of 173 in the [Press Freedom Index](#), but since the 2011 revolution it has risen to 72nd place on the 2020 Index. The country confirmed its commitment to the free flow of information by supporting the International Declaration on Information and Democracy in 2018. Energy insecurity has led to a degree of instability in Tunisia. The country [currently sources](#) approximately 85 % of its needs from domestic oil and gas. Energy is heavily subsidised, yet these reserves are expected to decline, leading to a sharp rise in energy prices.

EU involvement



The EU-Tunisia association agreement was signed in 1995. The 2011 revolution marked a turning point in [EU-Tunisia relations](#) and led to the establishment of a privileged partnership in 2012. In 2016 the two launched the EU-Tunisia youth partnership. Between 2011 and 2017, EU assistance to Tunisia amounted to €2.4 billion. The EU and Tunisia are also currently negotiating a free trade agreement. The 2018 EU-Tunisia strategic priorities guide cooperation, [focusing](#) on areas including socio-economic development, democracy, good governance and human rights, security, and terrorism. From 2017 to 2020, the EU's bilateral assistance to Tunisia under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which averages €300 million per year, focused on good governance and the rule of law; sustainable economic growth and jobs; and social cohesion. Tunisia is also eligible for funding under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and Erasmus+. The EU deployed an [election observation mission](#) for the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Turkey

Turkey ranks 122 in the Normandy Index, a ranking that reflects substantial security threats. The country scores lower than the European average in nine of the eleven indicators, especially in violent conflict, terrorism and democratic processes.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The failed [military](#) coup in 2016 was followed by constitutional reform and strengthening of the presidential regime, [repression](#) of political opposition and participation in foreign conflicts. All this is reflected by Turkey's weak performance in indicators relating to traditional sources of conflict. Globally, Turkey has the sixth lowest score in violent conflict, owing largely to lasting conflicts in its south-eastern regions. Participation in the Syrian war has also affected the country's weapons of mass destruction score negatively. Turkey ranked 16th in the world on impact of terrorism in the [2019 Global Terrorism Index](#), despite a 50 % reduction in attacks from 2017 to 2018. This ranking is the result of attacks by ISIL/Da'esh and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish separatist group.



New security and hybrid threats

Turkey is faced with major insecurities, having been involved in foreign [military interventions](#) in Syria in September 2019 and in Libya in January 2020. The country's resilience to disinformation score is amongst the lowest globally, reflective of its ranking of 154 in the [Press Freedom Index](#). This is primarily due to severe censorship of criticism towards the government and threats against journalists, Turkey being the world's biggest jailer of professional journalists. In addition, as a net importer of energy, its energy insecurity score is amongst the weakest 10 % globally.

EU involvement


Turkey has been in a [customs union](#) with the EU since 1995 and an [accession country](#) since 2005. In the 2014-2020 period, around €4.5 billion was allocated to Turkey, of which approximately €3.5 billion from the [Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance \(IPA\)](#). Relations between Turkey and the EU have deteriorated in recent years. In 2017, the co-legislators agreed to cut pre-accession funds owing to failing democratic standards. In 2020, following Turkey's military action in Syria and Libya, illegal drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean and the decision to open its borders with Greece, fuelling a new refugee crisis, the Commission made clear that Turkey would receive no pre-accession funds in the 2021-2027 period. Against the backdrop of the migration crisis, the [EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis](#) created in 2014 allocated around €500 million to Turkey for refugees. Turkey has also received EU aid of approximately €6 billion under the [EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey](#) launched in 2016. In 2020, to alleviate the burden of the coronavirus pandemic, small-scale health infrastructure and equipment worth €90 million was procured under the Facility. The EU [Global response to Covid-19](#) allocated €800 million for the western Balkans and Turkey.

Ukraine


Ukraine ranks 126 in the Normandy Index, illustrating that peace in the country is at risk. It scores below the Eurasian average, owing not least to Russia's on-going hybrid war against the country.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

In 2013, the decision by the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovich, not to sign an association agreement with the EU sparked major pro-European protests in Ukraine. In February 2014, the Ukrainian parliament voted to impeach Yanukovich, who fled Kyiv. Russia responded by annexing Crimea in March 2014, in violation of international law, launching an unprecedented hybrid war against Ukraine, including military aggression in eastern Ukraine – that has so far claimed around 12 800 lives, with over 1.5 million people displaced – and, more recently, in the Sea of Azov. Against this backdrop, Ukraine has a high terrorism score and the 14th poorest score in violent conflict globally. Despite this, Ukraine scores well regionally in democratic processes, and holds regular and competitive elections, most recently, the 2019 presidential elections.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Since 2014, Russia has used a wide range of hybrid tactics against Ukraine, including cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, energy coercion, economic pressure, religious pressure and Moscow offering citizenship to all Ukrainians. Ukraine has the [second lowest GDP per capita in Europe](#) and experiences high levels of unemployment and poverty. However, it has a well-developed industrial base and highly trained labour potential, indicating that sound economic improvement is possible. Ukraine performs better than the regional average on media freedom. Despite recent reforms, bans on Russian media and blacklisting of journalists have affected media freedom negatively.

EU involvement


An [association agreement](#), including a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine, was signed in 2014. The EU supports the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty and sees the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements as the basis for a sustainable political solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Diplomatic restrictions against Russia were first imposed in March 2014. Since then, the EU has gradually increased these measures, with targeted sanctions against individuals. A first package of economic sanctions targeting cooperation with Russia was announced in 2014. The EU's economic sanctions against Russia are explicitly linked to fulfilment of the Minsk agreements. Since 2014, the EU has allocated almost [€142 million](#) in financial assistance to the most vulnerable, and €15 billion in support of Ukraine's reform process (to which the European Parliament's democracy support activities have [contributed](#) significantly). The EU has also conducted trilateral talks on trade and energy-related issues with Russia and supported political engagement including through discussions in the Normandy format (France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia) and the Trilateral Contact Group (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ukraine and Russia).

United States


The US ranks 45 in the Normandy Peace Index. It poses and faces new threats in the WMD domain as it withdraws from various treaties designed to keep nuclear arsenals in check and has seen a rise in right-wing and lone wolf terrorism.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The United States ranked 128th out of 163 countries in the [Global Peace Index](#) in 2019, its ranking falling every year since 2016. Large military expenditure relative to GDP, continued engagement in external conflicts, high levels of weaponry imports and exports, and high levels of incarceration all contribute to the low level of peacefulness. The US has the highest rates of gun-violence of all high-income countries. In 2017, it averaged over [14 500 firearm homicides](#), or 4.5 firearm homicides per 100 000 population, per year. By 2019, this figure had risen to [15 347 firearm homicides](#). Gun ownership, estimated at 120.5 firearms per 100 people, the highest gun ownership rate in the world, provides an enabling environment.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

The US is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, however the country's recent withdrawal from the [Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty](#) (INF) with Russia is alarming. Both countries will now be able to reengage in the stationing of nuclear-capable missiles banned by the treaty, considered to be particularly [dangerous for crisis stability](#). Furthermore, the [New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty](#) (START) treaty between the two is [set to expire in February 2021](#). If New START expires without being renewed, there will no longer be any legally binding limits on the world's two largest nuclear powers to expand their arsenals, for the first time in almost 50 years. The US has seen an overall decrease in the threat from terrorism since 2002, but is suffering from an increase in far-right and lone-wolf terrorist activity. In 2018, of [the 57 confirmed terrorist events](#) in the US, 28 were committed by [far-right extremists](#), quadrupling in number since 2016.

EU involvement


The US is a strategic [partner](#) of the EU in the promotion of peace and security globally. Together, the two provide approximately 65 % of official development assistance worldwide. In 2011 the US signed a [framework partnership agreement](#) on participation in CSDP operations and it has contributed to EULEX Kosovo. US-EU cooperation also takes place through NATO in the areas defined by the [NATO-EU joint declaration](#). The US and EU NATO-members have cooperated in Afghanistan, Libya and in eastern Europe. On counter-terrorism, bilateral agreements include: an [operational agreement](#) between the US and Europol, the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) [Agreement](#), and the EU-US Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement. The EU-US [Umbrella Agreement](#) signed in June 2016 provides a framework of rules governing transatlantic data exchange in the context of counterterrorism. At parliamentary level, the EU and US hold a regular dialogue on global peace and security, the [Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue](#).

Venezuela


Venezuela ranks 99 in the Normandy Index and is considered more at risk than the South American average. It performs worse on every indicator except economic crises and energy insecurity at regional level, with international sanctions exacerbating the situation in this domain.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Since 2010, Venezuela has seen an economic and political [downturn](#) caused by a heavy reliance on oil exports and excess national spending. Massive nationwide anti-government protests have featured violence among both the military and the protesters. The stability of the state and its democratic processes has deteriorated since the onset of the downturn. President Nicolás Maduro was re-elected in May 2018, but the election was contested owing to irregularities in the way the results were announced. Claims to the presidential seat have been disputed. From 2018 to 2020 Venezuela fell by 18 places in the Fragile States Index, largely as a result of decreased state legitimacy and increased group grievances. Venezuela has one of the highest homicide rates globally at 57 per 100 000.



Threat comparison



New security and hybrid threats

Despite a low percentage of non-performing loans, the national performance indicator for economic crisis, Venezuela's economy has been mired in hyper-inflation, resulting in food and supply shortages. Migration away from Venezuela has reached massive levels, creating a humanitarian crisis in the region, with the number of Venezuelans abroad rising from under 700 000 in 2015 to 5 million in March 2020 according to the [International Organization for Migration](#) (IOM). Venezuela has the largest known oil reserves in the world, and for decades was a major exporter. However, international sanctions and a deteriorating infrastructure make it difficult to access the oil, even within the country.

EU involvement

The EU has helped Venezuela in the fight against [drugs](#) by supporting the implementation of the country's national anti-drugs plan. Venezuela is eligible for EU cooperation under the 2014-2020 [Multiannual Indicative Programme](#) for Latin America, which covers the security-development nexus, environmental sustainability and the fight against climate change. In the context of the current political and economic crisis, the EU supported the failed dialogue efforts between the government and the parliamentary majority, and reiterated the need for free and transparent [elections](#). It also imposed [targeted sanctions](#) and an embargo on arms and related material that could be used for internal repression. [EU assistance](#) in the refugee and migrant crisis totals over €170 million for measures both internally and outside Venezuela, including €15 million for stability and peace. The EU promoted an [International Donors Conference](#) to help Venezuelan refugees and migrants on [26 May 2020](#). It also established an [International Contact Group](#) on [Venezuela](#), with the agreement of some Latin American countries, that is working to [facilitate conditions](#) for a peaceful political process leading to new presidential elections and to enable the rapid delivery of [humanitarian aid](#).

5. ANNEX – The Normandy Index: Methodology

This annex explains the components and the methodology of the index developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace.

Normandy Index of the European Parliament – Methodology

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The Normandy Index Methodology

Background

Humanity is now facing challenges unparalleled in its history. The 2020 Covid-19 pandemic has caused an immediate crisis globally and crystallised the interconnectivity of a globalised world. This is occurring in the backdrop of “mega trends” caused by climate change, ever-decreasing biodiversity, depletion of the earth’s fresh water, and overpopulation. All of these are occurring in a socio-political time of great uncertainty, with shifting power dynamics amongst global superpowers, the breakdown of traditional alliances and a widespread crisis of democracy.

Such challenges, whether they be short or long term, call for global solutions and require cooperation on a scale unprecedented in human history. In a hyper-connected world, the sources of many of these challenges are multidimensional, increasingly complex and span national borders.

These challenges, if not addressed, increase the strain on resources, infrastructure and society, all of which can affect levels of peace in nations and the world. The United Nations and World Bank *Pathways for Peace Report* released in 2018 recognised the interconnectivity of these challenges and called for risks to be considered multi-dimensional in nature ([World Bank & United Nations, 2018](#)).

To contribute to the field between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy seeks to produce the ‘Normandy Index’ (NI) on an annual basis, starting with the 2019 initial launch. The purpose of the NI is to produce a measurement tool to allow policy makers and civil society be able to grasp different aspects of the threats facing the globe. It aims to capture threats to peace and offer insights into the multidimensional risks faced by countries. Annual updates will allow the tool to track how dynamics shift from year to year and assess positive and negative changes in risks.

The NI has three main aims:

1. To assess the state of conflict and potential for conflict in each given country considering the current state and potential future state
2. To provide a tool for measuring and monitoring trends across time
3. To provide a mechanism to link the aforementioned categories of threats with an actual ranking of “state and risk of conflict” that can be quantified and used for policy-making purposes.

Text Box 1: The Normandy Index in context

The NI is intended to contribute to the field in being to identify different factors that the EU Parliament believes pose threats to peace in the coming years. As such, the NI is capturing and conveying a unique angle to existing composite indices such as the Institute for Economics and Peace’s (IEP) Global Peace Index (GPI).



The GPI produced annually by IEP, ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peace as defined by the absence of violence and absence of fear of violence ([Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a](#)). It is as such a measure of levels of *negative* peace today. IEP also explores the *positive* aspects of peace in its Positive Peace Index (PPI), which measures the levels

within the 163 countries of the attitudes, institutions and structures that are known to create and sustain peaceful societies ([Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019c](#)).

Both the GPI and PPI are measuring levels of peace in the world *today*. The NI however is capturing *threats* to peace in the world today making it a useful contribution to the suite of tools used for quantitative analysis of peace and security.

In its inaugural launch, the NI covers 137 countries and regions. The EU is considered one bloc and is given the average score of each country member.

Normandy Index 2020
0 = Most at Risk, 10 = Least at Risk



Methodology Overview

In the EU Global Strategy 2016, the EU has prioritised a number of domains as being threats to peace in the coming years ([European Union, 2016](#)).

Each domain is in and of itself a complex system with multiple, interconnecting dimensions that are hard to quantify. Recognising this, the NI seeks to simplify many of these domain concepts by selecting one key representative indicator, rather than delving into the more complex and subjective exercise of selecting, weighting and aggregating multiple indicators for each domain.

The indicators that were selected for each domain were done so based on current academic and policy literature, data availability, and in consultation with the European Parliament.

Table 1 presents the indicators selected to capture these domains.

TABLE 1: NI Indicators

IEP research is directly relevant to the Normandy Index (NI).

Domain	Indicators	Definition	Source	Number of Countries Covered	Latest Year of Data
Climate Change	INFORM Global Risk index	INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters.	United Nations	193	2019
Cybersecurity	Cybersecurity Index	The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a survey measure capturing the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity in order to raise awareness. It is the only open source Cybersecurity Index that can be found.	International Telecommunication Union	199	2017
Democratic Processes	Participatory democracy index	A measure of the extent that the ideal of participatory democracy achieved within a country.	VDEM	179	2018
Economic Crises	Financial Vulnerability - Non-performing loans as % of total loans	Nonperforming loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.	World Bank	136	2018
Energy Insecurity	Energy Imports	Energy imports, net (% of energy use). Banded to 0 if country is a net exporter of energy.	World Bank	187	2015
Fragile States	Fragile States Index	The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data — quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation — are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI.	Fund For Peace	177	2019
Crime	Homicide Rate per 100 000	Homicide Rate per 100 000 - used as a proxy for crime	UNODC	137	2017
	Perceptions of Criminality Banded	Assessment of the level of perceived criminality in society, ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.	EIU	163	2019
Resilience to Disinformation	Resilience to Disinformation	A measure of how often domestic and foreign Governments and Political Parties use social media and advertising to spread disinformation within the country.	VDEM	179	2018

Terrorism	Global Terrorism Index	A composite score in order to provide an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by terrorism.	Institute Economics for Peace	163	2019
Violent Conflict	Conflict sub-indicators of the Global Peace Index	Average of the following 6 indicators from the Global Peace Index: (1) Intensity of Internal Conflict, (2) Deaths from Internal Conflict (3) Number of Internal conflicts, (4) Intensity of External Conflict, (5) Deaths from External Conflict (6) External of Internal Conflicts This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries that are signatories to Non-Proliferation Treaties are scored better in this indicator	Institute Economics for Peace	163	2019
WMD	Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Indicator from the Global Peace Index.		Institute Economics for Peace	163	2019

The EU Global Strategy 2016 also discusses the importance of *hybrid threats* in coming years. Hybrid threats combine conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific political objectives. They can range from cyber-attacks on critical information systems, through to the disruption of critical services such as energy supplies or financial services, to the undermining of public trust in government institutions or the deepening of social divisions. Given the combined nature of hybrid threats, it is not possible to capture the risk posed to a country in any one measure. By capturing the potential components of hybrid threats in the NI domains, no separate 'hybrid threat' domain is calculated.

Detailed Domain and Indicator Descriptor

Domain 1 – Climate Change

Indicator: INFORM Global Risk index – Natural Disaster Risk Sub-indicator ([European Commission, 2019](#))

Full Description: The INFORM Global Risk Index gives an annual per country score between zero and ten, where ten is "very high risk".

Rationale: INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters, based on three dimensions of hazard & exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity. It recognises climate change and the risks associated with it as having both natural and man-made components, and that the risk resulting from climate change is also dependent on how countries are able to cope with the effects of climate change.

Source: INFORM, 192 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2019.

URL: <http://www.inform-index.org/>

Domain 2 - Cybersecurity

Indicator: Global Cybersecurity Index ([International Telecommunication Union, 2017](#))

Full Description: The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a measure of the commitment of Member States of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to cybersecurity, assessed along five dimensions: legal measures; technical measures; organizational measures; capacity building; and, cooperation.

Rationale: The threat from cybersecurity can only be countered by a systemic and cross-sectoral regulatory approach grounded in technological capabilities. If a country is not currently taking active steps to protect financial and physical infrastructure, personal or government data, it leaves itself open to attacks. Examining the action and measures a country takes to try and minimize threats from cyber-attacks, via this GCI, is a viable, open source quantified measure of future threat.

Source: ITU, 193 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2017

URL: <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/global-cybersecurity-index.aspx>

Domain 3 – Democratic Processes

Indicator: Participatory democracy Index ([University of Gothenburg, 2020](#))

Full Description: The Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database is a set of country level indicators of political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; the state; and the body politic.

The Participatory democracy Index used in the NI is a measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy achieved within a country.

Rationale: Democratic processes are widely recognised as contributing to peace. Well-functioning democracies themselves have institutions to deal with societal grievances in a non-violent way. It is also believed democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict with other democracies. Democratic countries on average have the highest levels of peace globally in the Global Peace Index ([Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a](#)). Furthermore, with the exception of relatively infrequent ‘black swan’ political or conflict events, a country’s current democratic status tends to be a good predictor of future democratic status.

Source: VDEM, 179 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2019

URL: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>

Domain 4 – Economic Crises

Indicator: Financial Vulnerability- Non-performing loans as % of total loans ([World Bank, 2020](#))

Full Description: Nonperforming loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.

Rationale: Sovereign debt crisis have been found to be correlated with civil unrest (Reinhart, 2010), and some have argued that sovereign debt crisis followed by extreme austerity measures were a contributing factor to the outbreak of World War II in Germany, and genocide in Rwanda ([Goldmann, 2012](#)). Non-performing loans are a good predictor of financial crises, with broader social consequences. Most immediately, high levels of debt may affect the state's ability to provide basic public services, which in turn is a key source of legitimacy for a government. Excess borrowing, particularly external debt, means increased exposure to global market risks, and creditor decisions, both of which can make a state vulnerable to external economic shocks ([Weltwirtschaftsforum & Zurich Insurance Group, 2019](#)). Unsustainable borrowing and debt may exacerbate underlying societal cleavages, particularly if real or perceived inequalities grow.

Source: World Bank, 136 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2018

URL: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS>

Domain 5 – Energy Insecurity

Indicator: Energy Imports ([World Bank, 2020](#))

Full Description: Energy imports, net (% of energy use).

Rationale: Energy independence, that is self-reliance on domestic sources of energy including oil, natural gas, other minerals as well as clean energy sources, has been a defining component of energy security since at least the oil price crisis of October 1973 ([Cohen et al., 2011](#)). Although it is but one aspect of energy security, along with measures such as source diversity and distance to consumption, it is a measure for which open source, comparable data exists at a global scale, and is hence minimally sufficient to capture the conceptual threat of energy insecurity.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 185 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2015

URL: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/eg.imp.cons.zs>

Domain 6 – Fragile States

Indicator: Fragile States Index ([The Fund For Peace, 2020](#))

Full Description: A score between 0 and 120, where 120 is the highest level of fragility. Each country is scored annually based on 12 conflict risk indicators grouped into four dimensions: cohesion, economic, political and social.

Rationale: The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework – known as 'CAST' – that was developed by FFP nearly a quarter-century ago for assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse. The CAST framework was designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, and continues to be used widely by policy-makers, field practitioners, and local community networks. The methodology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data, and produces quantifiable results.

Source: Fund for Peace, 178 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2019

URL: <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/>

Domain 7 – Criminality/Homicide

Indicator: Homicide rate ([United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020](#))

Full Description: Country Homicide rate per 100 000 population

Rationale: High homicide rates are associated with high risks to security of persons within a country and reflects a diminished capacity of government to perform its duties to protect people within its borders.

The EU Global Strategy highlights trans-border crime as a significant potential threat to peace in the world. Transnational organised crime, by its very nature, affects all countries. The nature of trans-border crimes vary greatly, from Class A drug smuggling to human trafficking. Crime recording varies from country to country, and so there is no one database that captures interdictions of trans-border crimes. While UNODC publish a 'transnational organized crime threat assessment', these are meant to be applied at the local level and do not provide a platform to be able to create a globally comparative ranking of countries.¹ Further complicating the issue is that the factors which enable trans-border crime also enable all other types of economic activity: communications, trade, interconnectedness, globalisation and new technologies.

In the absence of a relative country measure for transnational/transborder crime, the NI uses a countries homicide rate per 100 000 as a proxy for levels of crime. While this is a crude measure, the link between homicide and organised crime is widely explored,² it has been used in the literature as an indicator of organised crime in a country.³

Source: UNODC, 137 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2017

URL: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics.html>

¹ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010)

² (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011)

³ (Alberto Alesina, 2019)

Indicator: Perceptions of Criminality ([Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a](#))

Full Description: Assessment of the level of perceived criminality in society, ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the Economic Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Country Analysis team. Country analysts assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

Rationale: Perceptions of Criminality in a society affect citizens' sense of security and identity with broader implications to businesses, security spending and security policies. Perceptions of high levels of criminality can have a destabilising effect on the social contract between a Government and its population. The Institute for Economics and Peace has found that the cost of violence containment, which is influenced by perceived threats, costs around US\$1 800 per person per year ([Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a](#)).

Source: IEP, 163 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2019

URL: <https://visionofhumanity.org>

Domain 8 – Resilience to Disinformation

Indicator: Resilience to Disinformation ([University of Gothenburg, 2020](#))

Full Description: The Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database has four indicators of the presence of disinformation:

- Government dissemination of false information domestic: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?
- Party dissemination of false information domestic: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?
- Foreign governments' dissemination of false information: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?
- Foreign governments' ads: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

Each country is ranked on a Likert scale of (0) Extremely often to (4) Never, or almost never. The Resilience to Disinformation indicator used in the NI is the country average of each of these four indicators.

Rationale: There is a growing concern over the ability of both state and non-state actors to not only restrict the free flow of information, but also to actively interfere in the functioning of civil society through the use of disinformation campaigns. Research into resilience to disinformation is a relatively new field of quantification with a number of emerging sources in recent years ([Eurasian States in Transition Research Center, 2018; Global Disinformation Index, 2020](#)). The NI will continually monitor the literature to build on these measures in forthcoming releases.

Source: VDEM, 179 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2019

URL: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>

Domain 9 – Terrorism

Indicator: Global Terrorism Index Score ([Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b](#))

Full Description: A composite score that provides an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by terrorism

Rationale: This is a core indicator of the multidimensional impact of terrorism on a country. This is the most reliable and consistent data source, available across more than 163 countries and updated on an annual basis, starting in 2001.

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index Reports, 163 Countries, Latest Year of Data: 2019

URL: <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

Domain 10 – Violent Conflicts

Indicator: Violent Conflict ([Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b](#))

Full Description: A composite indicator of the number, intensity and fatalities of both internal and external violent conflicts.

Rationale: The Institute for Economics and Peace in its annual Global Peace Index measures the following four indicators relating to violent conflict:

Number and Duration of Internal Conflicts

This indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a specific country's legal boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset.

Number of Deaths from Organised Internal Conflict

This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict. UCDP defines conflict as: 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.' Statistics are compiled from the most recent edition of the IISS ACD, which has the following definition of armed conflict-related fatalities: 'Fatality statistics relate to military and civilian lives lost as a direct result of an armed conflict'.

Number, Duration and Role in External Conflicts

This indicator measures the number and duration of extraterritorial conflicts a country is involved in. Information for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding all individual conflict scores where that country is involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries. Conflicts are not counted against a country if they have already been counted against that country in the number and duration of internal conflicts indicator.

Number of Deaths from Organised External Conflict

This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year'. When no data were provided, several alternative sources have been used: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database; the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, and the EIU.

Each of these are scored out of 1-5. The NI uses the average score across all of these indicators for the Violent Conflict domain.

Source: IEP, 163 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2019.

URL: <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

Domain 11 – Weapons of Mass Destruction

Indicator: Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Indicator and Non-Proliferation Score ([Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b](#))

Full Description: This indicator is based on two scores

- The Global Peace Index Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Score (**HWC**): a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries are given a score of 1 for low military capabilities. Nuclear countries are scored 5.
- Non-Proliferation Score (**NPS**): If a country is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons they are given a score of 1. If they are not they receive a score of zero.

The final WMD score used in the NI is calculated by **HWC – NPS**.

Rationale: This indicator is a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons, including only those of government, and its commitment to non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons.

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, 163 countries, Latest Year of Data: 2019

URL: <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

Data Availability and Imputation

The methodology developed has been designed to be in line with other prominent global indicators, and substantial effort has been made to populate the index with the best existing country information. However, the major challenge to developing a harmonized composite index is in attempting to overcome the paucity of consistent and comprehensive data across very diverse countries around the world. They vary significantly not just in terms of demographic and geographic characteristics, but also in terms of socio-economic characteristics which often times can impact data collection and quality.

The issue of data gaps is a common challenge to creating an index. The OECD recommend a number of statistical techniques for dealing with data imputation to fill in data gaps ([OECD et al., 2008](#)). Table 2 lists the approaches used in the NI. Using the combination of these techniques, the NI represents the use of the best possible data without an overly complex methodology.

TABLE 2: Data Imputation methods

Method	Description	Application in NI
Cold Deck Imputation	Replacing the missing value with a value from another source.	The NI uses this either when it uses the most recent data point in a series as the current data point, or uses additional country statistics to fill in gaps.
Hot Deck Imputation	Replacing the missing value with a KNN imputation. KNN is an algorithm that is useful for matching a point with its closest neighbours in a multi-dimensional space. It can be used for data that are continuous, discrete, ordinal and categorical which makes it particularly useful for dealing with missing data. The NI fills in data gaps using the 5 most similar countries to impute a value.	The NI uses hot deck imputation for data that is not available for all countries.

Weighting the Indicators

As the EU Global Strategy 2018 does not rank domains in order of priority, the NI uses ***an equal weight of 1*** across all domains, simplifying the calculation of the final NI score.

The only NI domain with more than one indicator is that of *Crime* which includes *Intentional homicides (per 100 000 people)* and *Perceptions of Criminality Banded* which are weighted at 0.75 and 0.25 respectively.

Domain Calculations

This section illustrates how each indicator, and hence each domain is treated. The Domain process is in two stages 1) data collection and 2) imputation and banding.

Banding data in the case of the NI is a way of dealing with comparing otherwise incongruous information. It takes each indicator and scales them to a score between 0 and 1 relative to the whole data set. To do this, appropriate minimum and maximum values for the data set are decided such that anything below the minimum is assigned zero, and anything above the maximum is assigned 1,

and everything else is scaled evenly between the two. Therefore, in year y , after data imputation, the banded score is calculated for indicator i by Equation 1.

Equation 1: Banding Equation

$$Banded_i = \frac{\text{Country Indicator Value in Year } y_i - \text{mininum cutoff}_i}{\text{maximum cutoff}_i - \text{mininum cutoff}_i}$$

Banding this way indicates the implicit assumption that higher levels of the indicator are better. However, higher levels of some indicators, such as the Global Terrorism Index score, represent a less desirable case for countries. In such cases, the banded score is reverse and is calculated by Equation 2.

Equation 2: Reverse banding equation

$$Reverse\ Banded_i = 1 - \frac{\text{Country Indicator Value in Year } y_i - \text{mininum cutoff}_i}{\text{maximum cutoff}_i - \text{mininum cutoff}_i}$$

The banded indicator score for each country is then the domain score, as each domain is measured by only one indicator. Each domain score lies between zero and one.

An integral part of this process is to set appropriate minimum and maximum cut off values for the banded scores. There are empirical and normative methods available for doing this. While some data may be distributed normally and therefore lend itself well to standard and well defined mathematical techniques such as defining outliers as those greater than three standard deviations from the mean, other data sets do not follow well behaved trends. The final choice of which technique is used must depend on a number of considerations: the nature of the data, the underlying distribution, the purpose of the index, what information is being conveyed, etc. Upon investigation of the global datasets used in the YDI, very few of the distributions can be classified as normal. The presence of outliers affects not only the average, but the variance, skewing both the min and max.

To account for this, IEP in some instances set artificial minimums and maximums to ensure results are not too heavily influenced by outliers. In the cases where outliers are present, the lower bound set for the banding process are set as the lowest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range below the first quartile (where the interquartile range is defined as the distance between the first and third quartiles). Similarly the upper bound set for the banding process are set as the largest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile.

Aggregating Domain Scores to Final NI Score

Since each domain is weighted equally in terms of threat significance, the final aggregated NI score can be calculated as the average of the eleven domain scores. Thus the final NI score is a value between zero and ten for each country in each year.

$$NI\ Score = 11 \times \frac{\sum_{i=D1}^{D11} \text{Country Indicator Banded Score}_i}{11}$$

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The Normandy Index, now in its second year, aims to measure the level of threat to peace, security and democracy around the world. It was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2020 exercise, and explains how the index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 40 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

The paper forms part of the EPRS contribution to the Normandy World Peace Forum 2020. It is accompanied by two studies, one on the EU's contribution to peace and security in 2020, the other on EU support for peace in the Sahel.

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