



Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide

Normandy Index
2021



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Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide

Normandy Index 2021

The 'Normandy Index', now in its third year, aims to measure the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world. It was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2021 exercise and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 51 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

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The Normandy Index is also available in an [online version](#). The present paper was finalised in June 2021. It updates and expands the [2019](#) and [2020](#) Normandy Index, also available on the European Parliament's Think Tank website.

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Foreword



The past year has made clear the multiple consequences of protracted crises in our neighbourhood, but also new global challenges such as the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic and social consequences. Beyond claiming millions of lives, the pandemic has resulted in an estimated global economic loss of €3.5 trillion, accompanied by job losses equivalent to 147 million full-time positions. The health crisis has reminded us that peace, stability and prosperity are not only challenged by isolated threats, but by complex and multifaceted ones. Health, climate and cybersecurity are likely to continue to occupy a central place in international policy-making in 2021. Such threats have severe long-term impacts on the global economy, welfare system and democratic processes, but also on individual livelihoods and well-being. In conflict zones and fragile states, the combined impact of these threats has exacerbated existing conditions of violence, poverty and hunger. But even in the developed world, the pandemic has challenged democracy by

fuelling known risks such as disinformation, authoritarian tendencies and information manipulation. The complex nature of these challenges will undoubtedly define the future of the international security landscape, and require stable and sustainable responses.

Traditional threats lamentably still persist. Recent events in our eastern neighbourhood remind us of that all too clearly. In addition, while some positive developments seem to be visible in Libya, bringing peace and promoting security to counter the arc of crises in our southern neighbourhood, remains high on the EU's agenda. The pandemic is also testing the resilience of our neighbours, and we must be vigilant to that.

In the face of these challenges, peace and security are on the EU agenda – and on the European Parliament's agenda – more strongly than ever. A renewed commitment to multilateralism, to the United Nations, which celebrated its 75th anniversary in 2020, and new commitments within the Union's new Multiannual Financial Framework to instruments that aim to boost the resilience of the EU and its neighbours against threats to peace and to security are reasons for optimism. The EU is also forging partnerships which aim to cement a more peaceful world based on cooperation. President Joe Biden's new administration in the United States opens up opportunities to strengthen transatlantic cooperation, including on issues of global health, climate change and the promotion of democracy and human rights. New multilateral initiatives, such as the G20 global call for debt relief have emerged; the Leaders' Summit on Climate which took place in April made clear the collective determination to counter the great existential crisis of our times – climate change – and COP26 in November this year will offer an opportunity to make further concrete steps in that

direction. In this, the EU leads by example, through the European Green Deal and climate diplomacy. In facing the global challenge to health security, the COVAX initiative is a demonstration of solidarity in the face of the global pandemic, while more work needs, and continues, to be done to address the imbalance of vaccine distribution and its impact on developing countries – ultimately, its impact on their peace and security.

It has never been clearer that for the EU to achieve its aims of promoting peace and security, it needs to work continuously to prevent, mitigate and resolve threats, starting with identifying them. It is not a coincidence that the emphasis on foresight is growing, including in the European Parliament and specifically in the European Parliamentary Research Service. The work undertaken to produce the Normandy Index is part of this context. In a global environment comprising both direct, indirect, imminent and long-term threats, the Normandy Index provides a tool to measure and understand how these challenges compound and exacerbate each other. Such an understanding is key to finding sustainable peaceful solutions to security challenges, and crucial for the EU to be able to support conflict prevention and conflict resolution across the globe in the spirit of 'concrete solidarity', so important for the EU founding fathers.

This year, resilience at global, national and local levels has proven more important than ever, alongside the continued belief in the complex task of working towards peace and stability. Several challenges still lie ahead, in terms of both internal security and external action, as well as solidarity and development. Internally, the EU will have to recover from the severe health, social and economic impacts of the pandemic, and build resilience to better mitigate similar crises happening in the future. Externally, the EU continues to learn how best to navigate a constantly changing security environment. But one thing is clear: in today's geopolitical world, the biggest threats are better faced collaboratively than unilaterally.

As the second year of the global pandemic, 2021 is therefore a year for greater cooperation, better preparedness and continued resilience. In its continued commitment to promoting multilateralism, peace and democracy, the European Parliament welcomes the Normandy Index, now in its third year, as a tool which continues to inform policy-makers and legislators and to build knowledge, supporting our work for peace, security and democracy.

David Maria Sassoli

President of the European Parliament

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1. Pursuing peace in a more connected, contested and complex world

The European Union's [foreign policy](#) has long been the subject of varied and contested academic debate – on subjects ranging from the Union's capacity and legitimacy to act, to its need for a strategy, vision and objectives. In response, in part, to some of those questions, the 2016 [Global Strategy](#), launched by the then High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini, set out a structured and coherent vision for European Union (EU) foreign policy in an increasingly complex geopolitical and socioeconomic global environment. Building on the provisions of the founding Treaties of the EU – and more specifically the [Treaty of Lisbon](#) – the Global Strategy raises the EU's level of ambition as a foreign policy actor in pursuit of the objectives defined in the Treaty. Key among those is the pursuit of peace, both in the EU and globally.

While the Global Strategy is not a classic [threat assessment](#) exercise, it captures in its approach a number of threats to global peace and security and goes beyond traditional understandings of security by including in those threats traditional and emerging issues that challenge peace. It also draws on the crucial links between developments that hold the potential to exacerbate, catalyse and magnify the threats identified. Thus, with regard to health security – without doubt the most notable security threat of 2021 – while the strategy did not analyse the EU's approach to pandemic preparedness explicitly, it did state that the EU will redouble efforts 'on prevention, monitoring root causes, such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change – which is a threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement'. It also committed to working 'more effectively for the prevention, detection and response to global pandemics' through global governance structures.

Following the logic of the interconnectedness of threats, the Normandy Index, a product of a 2018 memorandum of understanding between the region of Normandy and the European Parliament, aims to provide a holistic picture of the world – regions and countries – through the prism of the pursuit of peace, measured against threats explicitly defined in the Global Strategy. Its objective is to provide a tool to help EU policy-makers design targeted external action instruments. It is deliberately framed to be concise and easy to understand, in order to serve as a communication tool for the wider public – in terms both of understanding threats across the world, and also of providing information about EU external action. It complements the annual [Peace and Security Outlook](#) produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service.

1.1. Measuring peace

The modern definition of peace [refers](#) not only to 'an absence of war', but also includes elements of well-being: people demand and expect more from peace. This positive dimension of peace is difficult to measure as it is a continuum, stretching from inter-state war to positive public perceptions. This [continuum](#) includes international violence (i.e. wars, hybrid conflicts) and intra-national violence (i.e. gang or police violence, forced displacements). Therefore, any measure of peace has to take numerous dimensions into account.

Another way to measure peace is to take into consideration the level of threats to peace, in order to address them and avoid possible deterioration. To be sure, several states in the world are faced with multiple threats that not only affect peace individually but can also merge to create new challenges – and hybrid threats. The coronavirus pandemic is an [example](#) of such a threat: a health

security threat in essence, the pandemic has brought about economic insecurity, offered grounds for a considerable increase in disinformation and cyber-attacks, exacerbated food scarcity in parts of the developing world and threatened democracy by giving authoritarian regimes around the world justification for further control and surveillance. According to a [report](#) by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the pandemic is likely to have a negative impact on most of the indicators used to calculate rankings such as the Global Peace Index and the Positive Peace Index.

A timely example of the link between indices and policy-making is the 2019 [Global Health Security Index](#), which indicated limited global capacity to deal with a large scale epidemic or pandemic, and that every country – including high-income countries – had major gaps to fill in health security. Overall average global preparedness for epidemics and pandemics scored 40.2 out of 100. While high-income countries report an average score of 51.9, the Index shows that collectively, international preparedness for epidemics and pandemics remains very weak. Even though the Covid-19 crisis struck before the issues highlighted in the study were addressed, a renewed look at its component indicators, namely prevention, detection and reporting, health systems, rapid response, risk environment and compliance with global health norms can help guide policy decision to prepare for the next health crisis. In this way, indices and indicators can support the work of policy-makers.

Recognising the interconnectedness of threats, the rationale behind the Normandy Index is twofold. First, the Index focuses on the realm of EU external action, by selecting and measuring those threats perceived as such by the EU, and that EU action aims to tackle, prevent, resolve or address. Second, the Normandy Index aims to monitor the probability (or existence) of conflict (or destabilisation of peace and security) in a given country on the basis of the aggregate level of these threats.

1.2. Identifying threats and shaping policy: Indices and policy-making

Indices can be [used](#) as early-warning systems and are designed to give policy-makers insights into potential risks and developments in economic, social, environmental, security and political factors. Depending on their make-up, indices can quantify possibilities of an event occurring in the near/foreseeable future, thus acting as foresight tools. Foresight, as defined in the [Global Trends to 2030](#) report from the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) is 'an intellectual exercise where we imagine different alternatives of the future ... tracing how we end up there'. In that sense, foresight is a tool to help determine and choose a path for action; it is 'an organising yet selective principle'. Part of the European Commission's [stated](#) rationale for embedding strategic foresight into policy-making is 'to build and use collective intelligence to anticipate developments and prepare for new opportunities and challenges earlier and more effectively'. Composite indicators (or indices) can bring together this collective intelligence to provide policy-makers with '[the big picture](#)', crucial in shaping policy.

An index can also offer a comprehensive overview of a situation made up of a basket of contributing factors. Existing indices relating to peace and security present differing versions of such baskets, taking into account selected variables to build their measurements of conflict and peace. Some function as [conflict trackers](#), focusing specifically on the prevention of deadly violence and its particular relevance for a region or country's foreign policy. [Others](#) aim to be broadly informative about the levels of a multitude of factors such as societal safety and security, domestic and international conflict and degree of militarisation. A third category, including the [Fragile States Index](#) (FSI), highlights areas of vulnerability contributing to the risk of state fragility.

The limits to policy implementation are naturally marked in terms of resources, time and politics. Yet, even in hindsight, indices can provide an understanding of the elements that contributed to a policy response's adequacy to face critical events. For example, the [Global Health Security Index](#) indicated limited global capacity to deal with a large scale epidemic or pandemic, and that all countries had important gaps to address in health security.

Overall, these indices aim to measure the comparative level of pre-defined variables across a region or the world; to make political risk assessments for the future; and to contribute to the work of policy-makers and other foreign policy actors. The vision of the Normandy Index is to perform these functions in the service of EU foreign policy, in a way that is consistent with its objectives and aims. This is particularly timely, given the ongoing [Strategic Compass](#) process, which aims to guide the EU's strategic culture and to define its level of foreign policy ambition, on the basis of a collective threat assessment exercise that took place in late 2020. The Strategic Compass should lead to better alignment between the EU's strategic objectives and capabilities, while continuing to ensure complementarity between EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defence planning processes. However, beyond security and defence, the EU consistently aims to develop capabilities to promote peace, security and resilience internally and abroad. The pandemic has demonstrated that these capabilities go far beyond traditional understandings of security, to include, for example, progress towards a [European Health Union](#) and the [European Green Deal](#) to counter climate related security threats, among other things.

2. The Normandy Index

The Normandy Index differs from other indices in that it adopts an approach tailored by and to the action of the EU. It also defines conflict and the numerous stages between perfect peace and total war (*conflictualité*) as a product of factors linked to the main threats identified by the EU in its external action strategy. As described in EPRS's [2021 Peace and Security Outlook](#), the [EU Global Strategy](#) identifies the following 11 threats as the main current challenges to peace and security.

| | | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|
| terrorism | hybrid threats | economic crises | climate change |
| energy insecurity | violent conflicts | cybersecurity | disinformation |
| fragile states | trans-border crime | weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) | |

The index uses 9 of these 11 threats as factors assigned equal weight in the final result for 137 United Nations (UN) countries (with the EU-27 counted as one).¹

In addition, the Normandy Index includes a composite indicator on crime. While no solid dataset measuring trans-border crime on a global scale is currently available, given the enormous methodological hurdles this would involve since there are thousands of dyads (borders separating two countries) in the world, the level of criminality in the 137 entities measured is assessed by means of a component indicator. This indicator consists of a global measurement of organised crime: the number of homicides (75 % of the composite indicator) and an indicator on perceptions of criminality (25 %).


The threat category [hybrid threats](#) is excluded from the Normandy Index, as hybrid threats are, by their very nature, multi-faceted, comprising a combination of factors (see Figure 1). The index therefore assesses hybrid threats indirectly by examining the accumulation of their various dimensions (energy insecurity, economic crises, disinformation, cyber-attacks) but, to avoid duplication, does not explicitly include a 'hybrid threat' category. In its [online version](#), the Normandy Index allows the user to view a ranking of the 137 entities based on the basket of threats that together constitute 'hybrid'.

Quantifying or even estimating the level of [disinformation](#) in a given country remains a contentious issue among specialists, as new knowledge about this field continues to be generated. For this reason, the initial, 2019, version of the Normandy Index used a measure of 'press freedom' in its place, in spite of the recognition that the media landscape is merely one of many factors affecting resilience to disinformation. As of 2020, data on the spread of misleading views and false information by governments and political parties have become available through the [VDEM](#) (Varieties of Democracy) project. While not exhaustive of all sources of disinformation, the data collected by VDEM has been used for the measurement of the disinformation threat in the Normandy Index.²

¹ See Methodological Annex.

² Note that the 2021 Normandy Index has been retroactively calculated to include new indicators on economic crises as well as a more precise calculation of other indicators, such as energy insecurity. Retroactive calculations have been used in all graphics included in this publication. For more on the methodological approach, see the annex to this study. For the revised 2019 and 2020 data, visit the [Normandy Index website](#).

Figure 1 – Means of hybrid warfare



Source: [CEPA, 2021](#)

The Normandy Index adds to the above 10 factors the quality of the democratic process, as democracy support is a core dimension of EU external action. In addition, there is a strong correlation between weak democratic processes and threats to peace and security. Given the complex and multidimensional nature of the domains, the methodology chosen for the Normandy Index is based on the selection of key representative indicator(s) for each domain, based on current academic and policy literature and the data available.

Table 1 – Summary of domains, indicators and sources

| Domain | Indicators | Definition | Source | No of countries covered | Latest year of data |
|----------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| Climate change | INFORM Global Risk Index | INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters. | United Nations | 191 | 2021 |
| Cybersecurity | Cybersecurity Index | The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a survey measure capturing the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity in order to raise awareness. It is the only open source cybersecurity index available. | International Telecommunication Union | 195 | 2017 |
| Democratic processes | Participatory Democracy Index | A measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy is achieved within a country. | VDEM | 179 | 2019 |
| Economic crises | Financial vulnerability – non-performing loans as a % of total loans and annual inflation rate. | The non-performing loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality. This dataset has been supplemented with inflation data from the World Bank and Trading Economics. Over the period six countries experienced greater than 50 % inflation. Commonly classified as hyperinflation, the following countries have been given the maximum Economic Crisis score for 2020: Lebanon, Venezuela, Sudan, South Sudan, Suriname and Zimbabwe. | World Bank, Trading Economics | 139 | 2019 |
| Energy insecurity | Energy imports | Energy imports, net (% of energy use). Banded to be 0 if the country is a net exporter of energy. | World Bank, Enerdata | 187 | 2019 |
| Fragile states | Fragile States Index | The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on the proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach of the Fund for Peace. Based on a comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data – quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation – are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. | Fund For Peace | 177 | 2020 |
| Crime | Homicide rate per 100 000 | Homicide rate per 100 000 – used as a proxy for crime | UNODC | 137 | 2018 |

| | | | | | |
|------------------|---|---|-----------------------------------|-----|------|
| | Perceptions of criminality banded | Assessment of the level of perceived criminality in society, ranked from 1 to 5 (very low to very high) by the Economist Intelligence Unit's country analysis team. Country analysts assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March. | Economist Intelligence Unit | 163 | 2020 |
| Disinformation | Disinformation | A measure of how often domestic and foreign governments and political parties use social media and advertising to spread disinformation within a country. | VDEM | 179 | 2019 |
| Terrorism | Global Terrorism Index | A composite score in order to provide an ordinal ranking of countries for the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries and property damage caused by terrorism. | Institute for Economics and Peace | 163 | 2020 |
| Violent conflict | Conflict sub-indicators of the Global Peace Index | Average of the following six indicators from the Global Peace Index: (1) intensity of internal conflict, (2) deaths from internal conflict, (3) number of internal conflicts, (4) intensity of external conflict, (5) deaths from external conflict, (6) external or internal conflict. | Institute for Economics and Peace | 163 | 2020 |
| WMD | Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities indicator from the Global Peace Index. | This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using data from a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries that are signatories to non-proliferation treaties score better in this indicator | Institute for Economics and Peace | 163 | 2020 |

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace & EPRS.


The Normandy Index is therefore a tool to be used by EU policy-makers to assess countries most at risk in the world according to the EU's Global Strategy, and to target EU action. It is not a ranking of countries according to their peacefulness but a ranking of specific threats to peace per country. As new data become available, the expectation is that the Normandy Index will evolve in accuracy, geographical spread and precision, thus serving policy-makers and analysts ever more effectively in their work. In addition, events such as the current coronavirus crisis may cause security strategists around the world to reconsider the magnitude and relevance of pandemics when it comes security and peace. As events unfold, the Normandy Index will adapt as the EU's strategic approach to peace and security evolves, with the potential inclusion of new threats in future versions.

The comparisons across regions, countries and time offered by the online version of the Normandy Index will enable EU policy-makers to grasp which areas need to be given greater consideration when assisting partners all over the world at national and regional levels, while also potentially monitoring improvement (or absence of improvement) in resilience to those threats in countries where the EU is already engaged.

2.1. The Normandy Index 2021: Findings and functions


For each of the 136 countries and the EU-27, the Normandy Index uses the 11 threats to peace and compares them to the same 11 dimensions for other countries in the same region (or to the world), as regional environment is assumed to play a major role in countries' resilience to threats.

Figure 2 – EU-27 Peace profile for 2020 and 2021



Source: Normandy Index, 2020 and 2021.

For each dimension, 10 represents no risk and 0 a major threat. In the examples shown above, in 2020 and 2021, the EU appears less at risk in 9 out of 11 dimensions, while being more at risk in the area of energy security than the rest of the world and equally threatened by WMDs as the world average.



Data source: Normandy Index.

The comparison between the two years indicates that for the EU-27, as opposed to other countries and regions, there is no significant change in the peace profile between the two years.³ Similarly, the global peace profile remains almost unchanged between 2020 and 2021.

The [online version](#) of the Normandy Index also offers the possibility for comparison between countries, individual countries and regions and across time. In addition, rankings of countries on the basis of one or more threats are also available, using the source indicators.

³ Note that health security is not included in the Normandy Index, as the threat is not explicitly referred to in the EU Global Strategy.

The results of the 2021 Normandy Index (Figure 3) indicate a stable average of around 6 (on a scale of 1 to 10) of world threats, suggesting that the threats to peace and security included in the dataset have not changed, despite the coronavirus pandemic and other crises. Furthermore, in focusing on the top 10 and lowest 10 scoring countries (Figure 4), it is evident that change is absent or marginal for the highest and lower performers. This indicates that the process of transformation in peace and security takes place across a generally longer interval than the single-year period observed here. An additional observation is that there is no significant evolution or change among those countries scoring lowest compared to those that demonstrate high levels of peace and security. However, the explanation could differ: high scorers are by default more resilient and build on their success in a process of positive reinforcement, whereas low scorers may remain stable due to a negative

Figure 4 – Highest and lowest scoring countries

| Top 10 | | | | Lowest 10 | | | |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| country | rank 2020 | rank 2021 | rank change | country | rank 2020 | rank 2021 | rank change |
| Norway | 1 | 1 | → | Chad | 128 | 128 | → |
| Switzerland | 2 | 2 | → | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 129 | 129 | → |
| Australia | 2 | 3 | ↓ | Sudan | 130 | 130 | → |
| Canada | 4 | 4 | → | Pakistan | 131 | 131 | → |
| Iceland | 5 | 5 | → | South Sudan | 133 | 132 | ↑ |
| New Zealand | 6 | 6 | → | Yemen | 132 | 133 | ↓ |
| Oman | 7 | 7 | → | Afghanistan | 134 | 134 | → |
| Uruguay | 8 | 8 | → | Somalia | 135 | 135 | → |
| Mauritius | 9 | 9 | → | Central African Republic | 136 | 136 | → |
| Singapore | 10 | 10 | → | Syria | 137 | 137 | → |

Data source: Normandy Index, 2020 and 2021.

feedback loop that is difficult to overcome through internal reform or external aid. This observation further justifies the EU's focus on building resilience, both internally, in its neighbourhood, and beyond.

It is perhaps even more interesting to focus on those countries that exhibit the biggest positive or negative movement in their ranking. For example, in the 2021 rankings, Zimbabwe and Venezuela are notable for falling by 21 and 14 places respectively, while Eritrea or Côte d'Ivoire's change in ranking indicates positive developments (Figure 5). An examination of the individual factors that lead to these changes in position (for example a stark change in a specific indicator or merely a


Figure 5 –Rising or slipping behind? Main changes in ranking

| country | rank 2020 | rank 2021 | rank change | country | rank 2020 | rank 2021 | rank change |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| Eritrea | 109 | 100 | ↑ | Brazil | 77 | 83 | ↓ |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 68 | 61 | ↑ | Mexico | 80 | 86 | ↓ |
| Uganda | 85 | 80 | ↑ | Palestine | 98 | 104 | ↓ |
| Philippines | 107 | 102 | ↑ | Malawi | 32 | 39 | ↓ |
| Guinea-Bissau | 83 | 78 | ↑ | Nicaragua | 100 | 107 | ↓ |
| Equatorial Guinea | 116 | 111 | ↑ | Lebanon | 120 | 127 | ↓ |
| Senegal | 52 | 48 | ↑ | Chile | 27 | 36 | ↓ |
| Honduras | 111 | 107 | ↑ | Benin | 60 | 72 | ↓ |
| Peru | 33 | 29 | ↑ | Venezuela | 111 | 125 | ↓ |
| Ghana | 35 | 31 | ↑ | Zimbabwe | 101 | 122 | ↓ |

Data source: Normandy Index, 2020 and 2021.

relative lack of change compared to other countries), can be carried out through a meticulous deconstruction of the component indicators on the Normandy Index website, as well as qualitatively through the production of individual country studies, such as the 40 examples included in this study.

Figure 6 – Normandy Index, 2021



3. The Normandy Index and its relevance for the European Parliament

According to a Eurobarometer [survey](#) conducted in 2016 and then [repeated](#) in 2018, the majority of European citizens would like to see increased EU involvement in all policy areas relating to peace and security. While EU foreign and security policy remains in the intergovernmental sphere to a much larger extent than other policy areas, the Lisbon Treaty has contributed to a considerable increase in the EU supranational institutions' [contribution](#) in this area. For the Parliament, the most relevant provisions relate to consultation, oversight, accountability and budgetary functions.

Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), obliges the HR/VP to consult Parliament regularly on the main aspects and choices relating to common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) and to keep Parliament [informed](#) of policy developments, requiring that Parliament's views be taken 'duly into consideration'. The European Parliament therefore holds annual debates on the state of play of the CFSP and of the CSDP, on the basis of annual progress reports on the implementation of these policies. Parliament also votes on two annual own-initiative reports (INI) on the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP respectively, asks questions of the HR/VP, and makes recommendations to the HR/VP and to the Council on related matters. Parliament exercises authority in security and defence matters through its function as budgetary authority. Most notably perhaps, the Parliament oversees civilian aspects of CSDP that are financed by the EU budget ([Article 41 TEU](#)).

The Normandy Index aims to contribute to the European Parliament's role in foreign policy oversight. It offers Members of the European Parliament a measure of threats to peace throughout the world that is consistent with the EU's Global Strategy. Consequently, it serves as a tool in response to increased demand for accountability from actors involved in CFSP and CSDP, as well as an empirical argument in support of demand for attention to regions and countries at risk.

At a time of growing demand for EU institutions to demonstrate greater legitimacy and transparency, the gradually growing involvement of the European Parliament in CFSP has helped increase democratic accountability in this policy area. Although Parliament's formal powers in CFSP are relatively limited, it nonetheless has growing influence as a ['norm entrepreneur'](#) in human rights and democracy, both through its close relationship with the HR/VP and as a diplomatic player through its delegations, mediation activity and parliamentary diplomacy.

4. The added value of case studies


In order to illustrate the use and potential of the Normandy Index, 51 case studies have been singled out in the following pages. For each case study, the reader will find an analysis of traditional sources of instability and threats to peace, a graphic representation of the situation in the country compared with other countries from the same region, and notable points of interest regarding the country's performance in the index. In addition, there is a focus on new sources of insecurity, and an analysis of the EU's contribution and assistance in building [resilience](#) through its involvement with the country in question. The latter can take many different forms (development cooperation, support for democracy and human rights, cooperation within the European Neighbourhood or regional cooperation, pre-accession assistance, peacekeeping, trade agreements etc.) and varies from country to country, depending on the degree and type of cooperation put in place with the country concerned. The case studies have been chosen to represent key EU partners (strategic partners or trade partners); countries in which the EU operates military or civilian missions; countries that are part of the G20; and countries with notable vulnerabilities or achievements in one or more of the Normandy Index variables. New case studies have been added to the 40 published in 2020, which have also been updated, the aim being to increase their number every subsequent year. All case studies are made available in interactive form on the [Normandy Index website](#). The website provides users with the possibility to produce comparative graphs for each of the 137 entities studied.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan ranks 134th in the Normandy Index. Although the country has seen some improvement in economic stability and growth, it continues to face conflict and security challenges, including increasing levels of crime, all this further compounded by the effects of climate change.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The Cold War period saw an unsuccessful and protracted invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, which ended in Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989 after 10 years of war. Nevertheless, the conflict between the Soviet-backed Afghan government and the Mujahedeen continued, leading to the [rise of the Taliban](#), who took power in 1995, on the promise of bringing peace. The events of 11 September 2001 and the Taliban's response to this attack, reignited an intensely violent conflict in the country, as United States (US) forces invaded in a bid to oust the Taliban. Although the US signed a peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020, it is still considered [extremely fragile](#). The deal led to a decrease in civilian casualties, which in the first nine months of 2020, reached the [lowest number since 2012](#). However, the start of [intra-Afghan peace talks](#) between the Afghan government and the Taliban in September 2020 has significantly raised levels of violence, as each side tries to gain leverage through the use of force. In the last quarter of 2020, civilian casualties [increased by 45 %](#) compared to the same period in 2019.



New security and hybrid threats

Afghanistan is increasingly suffering from the effects of climate change, which exacerbate existing tensions. It is the tenth most vulnerable country to climate change on the [2020 Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index](#). Since 2018, the country has faced several climate-related disasters such as [extreme drought](#) and [flash floods](#), both significant drivers of displacement and food insecurity. Climate disasters led to the internal displacement of [30 000 Afghans](#) in the first half of 2020, and around [11 million](#) people remained food insecure in the latter half of 2020, putting added pressure on scarce resources. In 2020, the UN Environment Programme estimated that [80 %](#) of conflict in Afghanistan concerned land, water and resources. Afghanistan also continues to face the threat of violent crime, with an intentional homicide rate of [6.7 per 100 000 people](#) in 2019.

EU involvement


The EU has supported peace in Afghanistan for several decades and has made a significant difference in the country by improving health and education, creating governance frameworks and laying the foundation for nation-building. The EU has committed more than [€5.1 billion in development aid](#) to Afghanistan since 2002; the country is the largest beneficiary of EU development assistance in the world. Since 1994, the EU has also supported [humanitarian operations](#), with over €1 billion assistance to date, including to address the [Covid-19 pandemic](#). An [EU-Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement](#) on Partnership and Development was concluded in 2017.

Albania

Albania ranks 30th in the Normandy Index. Since the end of the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s, it has made significant progress on political and economic reforms, to the extent that it has joined NATO (in April 2009) and opened talks with the EU on accession (in March 2020). Albania is a good example of religious tolerance and diversity. Despite this, the country still faces significant economic and democratic hurdles, as well as challenges linked to irregular migration.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Enmeshed in the Balkan Wars of 1990 to 1993, Albania continued to suffer from [domestic civil unrest](#) erupting in 1997 in the 'pyramid crisis', alongside ongoing military involvement in the Kosovo conflict against Serbia. Albania is also a hub for organised crime, with one of the highest human trafficking rates in Europe. The clandestine nature of human trafficking, however, means that Albania lacks reliable [data](#). Nevertheless, Albania has been ranked by Eurostat among the top 10 countries in terms of numbers of trafficking victims for several years in a row. More recently, the scale of [drug trafficking](#) in Albania was estimated to be so high that the value of marijuana trafficking alone, US\$4 billion a year, is equal to about half of Albania's gross domestic product (GDP).



New security and hybrid threats

Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. In 2019, Albania suffered another [downturn in growth](#) due to falling electricity exports and an earthquake in November 2019 that left 17 000 homeless. According to the World Bank, the Albanian economy contracted by 10.2 % in the second quarter of 2020, due to the compounded consequences of the earthquake and the Covid-19 pandemic, resulting in increased unemployment and an expected rise in poverty. [Democratic backsliding](#) has been evident since elections held in 2017 were deemed fraudulent, leading to

outbreaks of anti-government protest throughout 2018 and 2019.

EU involvement


Albania was identified as a potential [candidate](#) for EU membership as early as the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003. On 25 March 2020, accession talks were [opened](#) and Albania took part in the EU-Western Balkans Summit on 6 May 2020. The EU is the largest provider of [financial assistance](#) for the country. Following the coronavirus outbreak, the European Commission [announced](#) over €3.3 billion of EU financial support on 29 April 2020, [mobilised](#) jointly with the European Investment Bank for the benefit of Western Balkan citizens, including citizens of Albania. On 6 October 2020, the Commission approved a comprehensive [Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans](#), with a budget of €9 billion.

Algeria


Algeria ranks 61st in the Normandy Index, with a score above the average for Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. Algeria is the wealthiest country in the region by [GDP per capita](#). An Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member since 1967, Algeria is one of Africa's largest hydrocarbon producers, with oil and gas revenues historically comprising about half of the national budget and 90 % of export earnings. However the country remains weak in 'democratic processes'.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

For the past two years, Algeria has suffered from internal political instability and a protest movement demanding greater democracy and a transparent political system. In November 2020, the Algerian Presidency announced that the 2020 constitutional referendum was successful, with an approval rate of 66.8 %. Although constitutional reform was one of the key demands of the 'Hirak' [protest movement](#), the perceived lack of consultation with protesters' representatives, many of whom remain detained, is likely to reinforce protesters' perception of the government's unwillingness and inability to meet their demands of wholesale change to the political system.



New security and hybrid threats



Standard and Poor's Global [noted](#) that Algeria's oil and gas production in 2020 was 143 million tons of oil equivalent, a decline of 8 % since 2019, due the pandemic and slow economic growth. Algeria, a major supplier of oil and gas to Europe, has exhausted nearly 62 % of its proven reserves, and the remainder will only be enough to cover internal demand until 2040. To [respond](#) to these challenges, the government has set a target of deriving 27 % of electricity generation from renewable sources by 2030 and increasing generation capacity from renewables to 37 % by the same year. Due to its geographical position and climatic characteristics, Algeria is highly vulnerable to climate change. National authorities have [launched](#) several initiatives to combat desertification, including the 'green

dam' – a green belt to halt its advance.

EU involvement



The EU-Algeria [Association Agreement](#) (AA) entered into force in 2005. The EU and Algeria adopted new [Partnership Priorities](#) on 13 March 2017, in the framework of the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy. Together with the joint assessment of the implementation of the AA, the Partnership Priorities identify the joint areas of cooperation and guide dialogue between the EU and its Member States and Algeria up to 2020. The EU and Algeria also continue high-level dialogue on energy and security sectors, as well as an informal dialogue on migration. A revised strategy for the [Southern Neighbourhood](#) was adopted on 9 February 2021, accompanied by an [Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours](#); the plan will support Algeria in the area of climate and energy efficiency. Together with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the EU has [supported](#) Algeria's efforts to curb Covid-19. The EU has funded three projects under its [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#) (IcSP) in Algeria, including in the area of counter-terrorism.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 66th in the Normandy Index, considerably more at risk than the European average. It performs significantly less well than the European average in cybersecurity and fragile states, but nevertheless scores well in terrorism and energy insecurity.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced armed conflict between 1992 and 1995, triggering several international peacekeeping missions. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement resulted in a decentralised government system, dividing the country into two semi-independent federal units, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This decentralised governance is partly the reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina having the second lowest [Fragile States Index](#) score in Europe. Efficient cooperation among the country's constitutional entities is impeded by mistrust among ethnic groups and political parties and also differing foreign policy orientation. Between the October 2018 elections and November 2019, the country remained without a government, as the three members of the presidency were unable to reach a consensus on the NATO membership. The country is [heavily dependent on coal](#), at 54 % of total electricity production, but is investing in renewable energies, with vast hydro and non-hydro renewable energy potential.



New security and hybrid threats

Bosnia and Herzegovina has some vulnerabilities to new security threats, owing to resources still being allocated to rebuilding following the conflict and a highly decentralised state structure. The country ranked 118th out of 175 countries in 2018 for cyber-defence, as its constitutional entities lack the expertise and resources to build a coherent and solid [cybersecurity](#) strategy; the country is also highly vulnerable to disinformation and ranks 58th out of 180 countries in the [2020 Press Freedom Index](#). [Undocumented migration](#) has put local and state authorities under stress, especially in the areas that have been shouldering most of the burden of migration management. While growth in

GDP has stagnated somewhat since 2008, some areas of the economy have grown significantly and offer opportunities to build resilience to these threats.

EU involvement



Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential EU membership [candidate](#). Since 2004, the EUFOR [Althea](#) mission has been supporting the country's efforts to secure peace after the [Dayton Agreement](#). In its opinion on Bosnia's EU membership application of May 2019, the European Commission recommended moving towards opening EU accession negotiations. Other priorities include the need to ensure effective coordination of border management and migration management capacity, and to ensure the functioning of the asylum system. The EU is [assisting](#) with a number of building and twinning programmes. It is also supporting environmental and climate transition through the [Pre-accession Instrument](#). The EU has committed [over €80 million](#) to tackle pandemic-related challenges in the country, including disinformation.

Bolivia

Bolivia ranks 42nd in the Normandy Index. It has been challenged by democratic instability since the results of the 2019 presidential elections were nullified, as a result of and resulting in significant social unrest, which has continued even after the most recent presidential elections in October 2020.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Bolivia has a history of conflict between its indigenous population, peasant farmers, and those considered to be of Spanish colonial descent, including rich agro-business owners. Land and natural resources rights and tenure have been the main drivers of tensions and [conflict](#). Beyond this, power and identity issues connected to the land as a productive and social good have fuelled [land conflict](#). The marginalisation of Bolivia's 36 groups of [indigenous inhabitants](#) also has a long history, with indigenous rights not being formally recognised until [1994](#). This changed dramatically with the election of Evo Morales in 2005, the first indigenous democratic President in South America. Morales introduced land redistribution and rights reforms, which brought conflict and clashes, as land was reallocated away from non-indigenous Bolivians and [commercial farmers](#).



New security and hybrid threats

Bolivia's most immediate security threat is from democratic instability. Presidential elections held in October 2019 were marred by accusations of fraud and corruption, as President Evo Morales claimed victory for an unprecedented fourth term. Although [these accusations](#) remain contested, the elections ignited a bout of social unrest, protests and demonstrations, not seen in Bolivia since Morales first came to power in [2005](#). Violent clashes between pro- and anti-Morales protesters left more than 30 dead in the four weeks following the election, before Morales bowed to domestic and international pressure and [resigned](#). After the military-backed opposition government that took interim power

postponed the elections scheduled for May 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic, renewed [public protests](#) erupted across the country. The general election's repeated adjournment due to [Covid-19](#) has further eroded Bolivians' trust in democracy. General elections were ultimately held peacefully on 18 October 2020, and resulted in the victory of Morales' party candidate [Luis Arce](#). Like much of the region, Bolivia [demonstrates](#) high vulnerability to cyber-attack, and also faces [disinformation](#) issues.

EU involvement



The EU cooperates with [Bolivia](#) in the fields of human rights, freedom of expression, conflict prevention, migration, the fight against drugs, terrorism, regional integration, and prevention and response to [emergencies](#) and disasters. It has become one of the [country's main donors](#), assisting with €281 million in 2014-2020. Bolivia also benefits from the EU's regional cooperation programmes, which have the [security-development nexus](#) among their priorities. It is also a beneficiary of the EU GSP+. The EU [IcSP](#) is funding four ongoing projects in Bolivia (€10 800 000 in total, shared with other countries), three of which are related to migrants and the Covid-19 response. In a 28 November 2019 [resolution](#), the European Parliament condemned the violence in the country following the October elections.

Brazil

Brazil ranks 83rd in the Normandy Index, deteriorating significantly from 2019. It performs lower than the South American average for the indicators measuring crime, democratic processes and disinformation.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Brazil has the 20th lowest score for weapons of mass destruction. While it is not a nuclear power, the country has a [large arsenal](#) of tanks, armoured vehicles and combat-capable aircraft. Brazil's deep economic recession from 2014 to 2017 exacerbated deep-rooted social inequalities, translating into a steep rise in homicides: the country has the 12th highest [homicide rate](#) globally, with 29.53 per 100 000 people in 2021. This is more than four times the global average of around 7 people per 100 000. The high levels of homicide and violent crime are also connected with [organised crime](#), with most homicides occurring near the main drug smuggling routes. Brazil scores well on democratic processes, with the 26th highest score globally.



New

security and hybrid threats

At global level, Brazil's performance is above average for every indicator relating to new security and hybrid threats. Recognising [the high level](#) of cybercrime and cyber threats in Brazil, the Brazilian government and legislators have been working intensively on this issue. Brazil adopted its [first cyber-security strategy](#) in February 2020, but experts believe it lacks effectiveness. A [2018 law](#), inspired by the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), entered into force in [September 2020](#) and will further enhance national cybersecurity by addressing concerns about digital privacy. However,

penalties for non-compliance with this law has been postponed until 2021, [raising](#) some concern. While the spread of [disinformation](#) in the country has been an issue of parliamentary investigation, a draft for a new [disinformation](#) and 'fake news' bill has raised concerns among human rights groups. [Amazon deforestation](#) also poses a risk, as it would induce climate change, thus increasing the burdens on Brazil's armed forces and endangering Brazil's energy and water security.

EU involvement



The EU and Brazil entered a strategic partnership in 2007. Through a large array of [sector dialogues](#), the EU [supports](#) Brazil in addressing the pervasive social inequalities that fuel the country's high homicide rate. EU projects are aimed, among other things, at strengthening the protection of [human rights defenders](#) and the human rights of particularly vulnerable groups such as the [homeless](#), and at countering violence, notably [domestic violence](#) against [women](#). EU [projects on fake news](#) seek to enhance Brazilians' resilience to disinformation. The EU fosters transparency in areas such as [public procurement](#). The EU's [Partnership Instrument](#) funds a wide variety of sustainability projects in Brazil. Moreover, Brazil benefits from the EU programme for Latin America [EUROCLIMA+](#), addressing climate change. In June 2019, the EU and the four founding members of Mercosur, including Brazil, reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive [trade agreement](#). However, there are concerns that the agreement could negatively affect climate and land use change. Brazil currently participates in [three IcSP projects](#) related to Covid-19 and vulnerable populations.

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso ranks 87th in the Normandy Index. It faces significant threats from violent extremist activity, as regional terrorist groups infiltrate the country taking advantage of local grievances. This has led to Burkina Faso being ranked the 12th most impacted by terrorism in the world, according to the 2020 [Global Terrorism Index](#).

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Burkina Faso enjoyed a period of relative security and stability under the authoritarian leadership of Blaise Compaoré between 1987 and 2014. Compaoré played a key role in negotiating peace deals in neighbouring countries (for example between the Tuaregs and Malian government in 2012) and kept armed groups at bay. The country's stability came at the [price](#) of a narrow democratic space and widespread security sector abuses that eventually boiled over into popular protest and the overthrow of the dictator in 2014. Since then a weakening of the state security apparatus has created an enabling environment for increased violent extremist activity.



New security and hybrid threats

Burkina Faso faces an overwhelming threat of violent [extremism](#). Jihadist groups based in Mali, such as the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims – an umbrella coalition of al-Qaeda-affiliated movements, and domestic terror groups such as Ansar ul Islam, flourish and perpetrate an increasing number of attacks. From March 2020 to March 2021 alone, Burkina Faso [recorded](#) 1 781 fatalities from violent extremist activity and the state's response to it, up from only 80 fatalities attributed to violent extremist activity in 2016. This increase has occurred despite investment by regional and international actors in a military-heavy

counter-terrorism approach in the Sahel. By the end of 2020, severe insecurity had forced one million people to leave their home and is a major threat to economic recovery after the [contraction](#) caused by the coronavirus pandemic last year.

EU involvement



The EU supports Burkina Faso through a mix of national and regional initiatives, some focusing on security, and others with a broad development objective, with a view to achieving durable peace and security. As one of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, Burkina Faso benefitted from [€623 million](#) in assistance under the European Development Fund (EDF) from 2014 to 2020, with good governance being one of the three main objectives pursued. It has also been one of the beneficiaries of projects funded by the [EU ICS](#), to strengthen peacebuilding initiatives and security forces. A [new strategy for the Sahel](#) was adopted in April 2021, which strengthens the political dimension of EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Burkina Faso and the emphasis on sustainable development beyond military engagement. In 2019, the European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) condemning human rights violations perpetrated by extremist groups.

Canada

Canada ranks 4th in the Normandy Index, indicating low levels of risk. It performs better than the world average in nearly every indicator, and scores notably well in democratic processes.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Canada has a long-standing democratic tradition in the form of a parliamentary system, enhanced by strong levels of education and a high GDP per capita. In the [2020 Human Development Index](#), it ranked 16th out of the 189 countries measured. In the Economist Intelligence Unit's [Democracy Index](#), Canada comes fifth with regard to political freedom, culture and participation. In addition, it is the world's fifth most stable country according to the Normandy Index, as measured by the fragile states' indicator. This is largely due to strong perceptions of state legitimacy, effective public services and low levels of external intervention. Canada performs well on most indicators of traditional conflict and it moved down two rankings to 56th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). Although the country experienced 10 terror-related deaths in 2018, no deaths were recorded in 2019.



New security and hybrid threats

Canada has high levels of both economic development and human capital, with the 10th largest economy and most stable economy globally, as measured by the economic crises indicator. Canada is one of only a few developed countries to be a net exporter of energy. Canadian society enjoys a high level of press freedom, ranking 16th in the [Press Freedom Index](#). This is due to [varied media coverage](#) and freedoms grounded in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enshrined in the Constitution Act of 1982. [Cybercrime](#) in the form of online fraud and attempts to steal personal, financial, and corporate information continues to be the most significant threat to Canada's cybersecurity.

[Human Rights Watch](#) report 2020 noted that there remain considerable challenges to undoing decades of structural and systemic discrimination against Indigenous people in Canada.

EU involvement



Canada has been a formal [strategic partner](#) for the EU since 2016. Since then, the partners have strengthened their [foreign policy and sectoral cooperation](#), with a view to upholding their joint commitment to advance democratic principles and human rights and to work together to strengthen international peace and security and rules-based multilateralism. Canada is one of the steadiest contributors to the CSDP, having taken part in 10 missions and operations to date. The EU and Canada have also concluded a security of information agreement for the exchange of classified information. The agreement aims to facilitate further CSDP cooperation, and cooperation on counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and sanctions. Canada and the EU are also strong economic partners. In 2017, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement ([CETA](#)) between the EU and Canada provisionally entered into force, and aims at setting a high standard for sustainability chapters in trade agreements. The EU and Canada have joined forces as leaders in the international fight against climate change, including by co-convening a [Ministerial on Climate Action](#) (MoCA) with China in 2018. Through its New Frontiers Research Fund ([NFRF](#)) [International stream](#), Canada will allocate up to €33 million (over five years) to support Canadian participation in international teams funded through Horizon Europe.

Central African Republic

At 136th, the Central African Republic ranks as the second least peaceful country on the 2021 Normandy Index. The constitutional republic has struggled through ongoing episodes of civil war since 2003.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Despite numerous ceasefire and peacebuilding efforts, including the Brazzaville Agreement in 2017 and the democratic election of President Faustin-Archange Touadera in 2016, violence between armed groups remains common and the country is de facto partitioned between the Anti-Balaka in the southwest and ex-Séléka in the northwest. In 2020, the Central African Republic ranked sixth globally on the [Fragile States Index](#), reflecting the weakness of the central elected government. The security vacuum that has emerged as a result has contributed to the country's high violent conflict score. The Central African Republic was the 17th country most impacted by terrorism on the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). The general elections of December 2020 only exacerbated instability across the country, as armed groups mobilised along political fault lines and [disrupted the electoral process](#).



New security and hybrid threats

Limited central government capacities and authority make the Central African Republic vulnerable to the emerging threats that affect weak states, including problems with cybersecurity and press freedom. These shortcomings are behind the country's low score for democratic processes. Attacks on the media are common and the central state authority is often opposed to media criticism, leading to a [World Press Freedom Index](#) ranking of 132nd, below the sub-Saharan African average. The Central African Republic is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change in Africa, leading to

massive population displacement and violent conflict between [farmers and herders](#) over water and pastures.

EU involvement


The EU helped the Central African Republic (CAR) government to draw up the [2017-2021 national recovery and peacebuilding plan](#) and the EU comprehensive approach in the country is in line with this plan. The EU has committed to [support implementation of the peace deal](#) signed in February 2019 between the CAR government and armed groups. One military mission, [EUTM RCA](#), is currently operating in the country, to help restructure national forces. A civilian advisory mission [EUAM RCA](#) was launched in August 2020, to support the reform of the internal security forces. The CAR benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything But Arms](#)'. In the context of the [ACP-EU partnership](#), EU development aid to the CAR has been financed by the [European Development Fund](#) (EDF) with up to [€442 million](#) for 2014-2020. In addition, the [EU Békou Trust Fund](#) (€243 million in 2019, mostly from the EU budget and the EDF), aims at better coordination of EU donors and CAR approaches and at reducing aid fragmentation. EU humanitarian aid to the CAR amounted to €22.7 million in 2020. In December 2020, the EU mobilised a further €14 million to support the CAR's response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

Chad


Chad ranks 128th in the Normandy Index. The country suffers from the spillover effects of Boko Haram activity, particularly around Lake Chad. This is further compounded by climate fragility and food insecurity.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Chad has a turbulent [history](#) of civil war, coups and democratic suppression. Libyan involvement in the country has further exacerbated instability. While Idriss Déby took power in a coup in 1990 and won the first multiparty presidential elections in 1996, rebellions nevertheless continued. Déby's regime turned to repressive tactics to stifle opposition, including alleged human rights abuses by security forces and electoral fraud. A new Constitution expanding presidential powers was adopted in 2018. [President Déby's death](#) soon after his re-election in April 2021 and his unconstitutional replacement by his son, risks exacerbating political unrest in 2021. Chad is classified as a 'not-free state', scoring 17/100 in the [2021 Freedom in the World index](#).



New security and hybrid threats



As well as internal strife, Chad has been involved in conflicts along its border regions. The Darfur conflict caused mass refugee movements into Chad and attacks by rebel groups. Chad took a lead in the regional response to violent extremism activity in the region, notably within the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with Niger and Nigeria. Following one of the deadliest Boko Haram [assaults](#) ever experienced by Chad, in March 2020, the Chadian military has continued efforts to fight terrorism across the Sahel, but it remains characterised by [lack of internal cohesion](#), which may ultimately threaten these operations. Chad ranks at the very bottom of the [2020 Global](#)

[Hunger Index](#), with close to 40% of Chadians undernourished. The country's economy [remains](#) fragile and vulnerable to several risks. Increased [pressures on natural resources](#) owing to climate change and population displacement from neighbouring countries have led many to turn to Boko Haram as a source of income.

EU involvement



The EU adopted a [new strategy for the Sahel](#) in April 2021. Beyond military engagement, the new strategy strengthens the political dimension and the emphasis on sustainable development of EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Chad. Chad benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for 'Everything But Arms'. The [European Development Fund](#) earmarked up to €542 million in assistance for Chad (2014-2020), to consolidate the rule of law and support food security, rural development and sustainable management of natural resources. In addition, the EU allocated nearly €10 million in assistance through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) from 2015 to 2020. The [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €113 million since 2016 for governance, migration management, resilience and economic projects. In 2020, the EU provided more than €30 million in [humanitarian aid](#) for Chad. Chad also benefits from Team Europe support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

China

China ranks 103rd in the Normandy Index and is considered more at risk than the Asia-Pacific average. Since the economic reforms of 1978, China has experienced significant economic growth, becoming the world's second largest economy in terms of nominal GDP.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

China is still entangled in border disputes with India and Bhutan. Moreover, China's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan and several maritime features in the East and South China Seas have been heavily contested. In support of these claims, China fields the [world's largest army](#) and second largest [defence budget](#). China also possesses active nuclear weapons. China ranks 86th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with particularly weak scores in the human rights and state legitimacy categories. This is largely a result of the Chinese government's [increasing repression](#) of democratic movements in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and its oppression of the Tibetan and the Uyghur Muslim minority in Xinjiang province, which some states have labelled as [genocide](#).



New security and hybrid threats

China's rapid economic growth has had a negative impact on its natural resources and environment, severely undermining water quality and leading to erosion and widespread pollution. China's [deployment of coal](#) has dangerous implications for the environment and human health, coal combustion being the single-largest source of air pollution-related health impacts in the country. Nevertheless, in September 2020, President Xi Jinping [announced](#) plans to become CO₂-neutral by 2060. China relies on new technologies for its authoritarian model of social surveillance and conformity, which it portrays as an alternative to liberal

governance models. It consequently ranks 177th in the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#). A one-party state, it scores far below other Asia-Pacific countries when it comes to democratic processes.

EU involvement


EU and China established a strategic partnership in 2003 through more than [60 dialogue formats](#), including on non-proliferation and disarmament. These have contributed to the implementation of the [EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation](#). Cooperation on [climate change](#), including [emissions trading](#), and on [sustainable development, energy, urbanisation, water](#) and the [circular economy](#) is high on the agenda. The regular EU-China [human rights dialogue](#) also raises issues such as freedom of expression and of religious belief, although with limited progress on these issues. In 2019, the European institutions issued a joint communication on [EU-China – A strategic outlook](#), in which China is simultaneously described as a 'cooperation partner [...], an economic competitor [...]' and a systemic rival'. In December 2020, the EU and China concluded, 'in principle', a [Comprehensive Agreement on Investment](#) (CAI), which awaits European Parliament consent and approval by Council. In March 2021, the EU imposed [sanctions](#) on Chinese officials accused of perpetrating human rights abuses against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. In response, China imposed counter-sanctions targeting several Members of the European Parliament. In a May 2021 [resolution](#), Parliament resolved to 'freeze' the process of consenting to the CAI, subject to removal of the counter-sanctions.

Colombia


Colombia ranks 89th in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the South American regional average, and performs below the regional average for crime, terrorism and violent conflict.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Colombia has struggled with organised crime and the impact of terrorism. A peace agreement between the government and the biggest terrorist group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), was signed in 2016. However, an [estimated](#) 2 500 FARC dissidents remain active. From January to November 2020, over 21 000 people became internally [displaced](#), with the major causes of displacement being armed confrontation and homicides, often related to FARC violence. Another major armed group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), is also behind significant violence and displacement, both in Colombia and neighbouring Venezuela, and ceasefire negotiations with the government [have failed](#) to date. It is likely that organised crime and terrorist groups will continue to pose a threat to peace in Colombia. This includes knock-on effects in other aspects of



society, such as homicides. As of 2021, the [homicide rate](#) in Colombia is the 15th highest in the world.



New security and hybrid threats

Colombia performs below the South American regional average for new security threats. However, the country does show resilience in a number of areas, including energy insecurity, being a net exporter of energy. It also performs higher than the South American regional average in cybersecurity. Colombia performs relatively poorly in press freedom and access to information. The country ranks 130th in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#), largely owing to high numbers of death threats towards journalists and the resulting self-censorship.

EU involvement



The EU has [supported](#) the Colombian peace process with an overall investment of more than [€645 million](#). This includes actions such as the Peace Laboratories and the Peace Territories project, the [Trust Fund](#) for Colombia (to which 21 EU Member States and Chile have pledged [€125 million](#)); European Investment Bank loans; and the IcSP, which mobilised an [extra €40 million](#) for critical elements of the peace process, such as transitional justice. EU cooperation covers areas such as victims' rights, reintegration of ex-FARC guerrillas into civilian life, de-mining, rural development, land restitution, environment, conflict resolution, peace post-conflict projects, and the establishment of a [special investigation unit](#) in the prosecutor-general's office to combat crime and protect activists. Eamon Gilmore, special EU envoy between 2015 and 2019, considered the EU's role in the peace process a success and a [model](#) for EU external policy. [Development cooperation](#) between EU and Colombia totalled €127 million for 2014-2020. The EU has a [Comprehensive Trade Agreement](#) with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, applied provisionally since 2013. Regional cooperation between the EU and the Andean Community aims to help cement regional ties in Colombia's neighbourhood. On 26 April 2021, the European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) on the 5th anniversary of the peace agreement in Colombia, requesting increased EU political and financial support for the process.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica ranks 19th in the Normandy Index, indicating relatively low levels of risk. In contrast to several other countries in the Central America and Caribbean region, Costa Rica has high levels of peace and political stability. Costa Rica enjoys a stable and uninterrupted democracy, with 14 presidential elections since 1948.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Costa Rica abolished its military in 1948, following the end of an intense civil war. This has had positive ramifications for its violent conflict and weapons of mass destruction scores. There is a limited threat of armed conflict within the country, and it enjoys good relations with neighbouring states. Additionally, it ranks among the countries suffering the lowest impact from terrorism. Costa Rica ranks [eighth](#) globally in terms of electoral integrity, and this is reflected in its high score on democratic processes. While it performs well on other indicators of traditional conflict, Costa Rica has relatively high levels of homicide. High homicide rates are attributed to [organised crime](#), which also affects many other countries within the Central American and Caribbean region.



New security and hybrid threats

Costa Rica has a relatively high level of resilience to new security threats. It has a long-standing and stable democracy and benefits from high levels of press freedom and human rights. It ranks 7th in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#), owing to low levels of violence against journalists and state interference. As such, it performs above the regional average for the indicators measuring democratic processes and fragile states. Although Costa Rica performs better than the regional average for climate change, it ranks 52nd among the countries most [vulnerable to climate change](#), with 181 being the most vulnerable. Costa Rica is aiming to be carbon neutral by 2021, and is the only country to have met all five of the UNDP's

environmental stability measures.

EU involvement



The EU has traditionally maintained strong political relations with Costa Rica. Both parties played an active part in the [San José dialogue](#) of 1984, in support of the peace process and democratisation efforts in Central America. Cooperation agreements were concluded in 1985 and 1993, and a political dialogue and cooperation agreement in 2003. The [3rd EU-Costa Rica High Level Dialogue](#) was held in November 2019. [Costa Rica](#) is also a signatory to the EU-Central America Association Agreement concluded in 2012. Under the 2014-2020 financial exercise, Costa Rica benefits from the EU thematic cooperation lines, the regional programmes for Latin America and the [sub-regional programme](#) for Central America, including cooperation on security and impunity. The EU also supports new regional approaches through triangular cooperation schemes; for instance, it is working with Costa Rica, Colombia and Mexico on [strengthening restorative justice](#). The EU has also funded [projects](#) in citizen security, fighting discrimination against vulnerable groups, border security, and the Central American security strategy. It is currently participating in four IcSP projects, related to vulnerable populations and Covid-19. Costa Rica is aligned with the EU in international fora on many issues, including regional peace and security.

Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire ranks 61st in the Normandy Index, indicating lower levels of risk than for the region to which it belongs – sub-Saharan Africa. The country is exposed to climate change risks, while terrorism and violent conflict remain issues of serious concern.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Côte d'Ivoire was one of Africa's most stable and prosperous countries in the first decades after independence. After the death of its first president, Dr Félix Houphouët-Boigny, in 1993, the country plunged into a spiral of instability and violent conflict between the Christian south and the Muslim north. The 2010 electoral victory of current president Alassane Ouattara, who needed the backing of UN and French troops to assume the function, put an end to the civil conflict. However, the country remains deeply polarised, with the opposition and much of the [population](#) in the south repeatedly [boycotting](#) elections. Côte d'Ivoire has a mostly equatorial climate and is potentially exposed to floods.



New security and hybrid threats

After the civil war, the government initiated efforts for national reconciliation, but these have remained in part [ineffective](#). Ouattara's [candidature](#) for a third presidential term, in breach of previous promises and possibly of [constitutional norms](#), as well as measures by the government to [stifle](#) political opposition, have undermined trust. The participation of all political forces in the March 2021 parliamentary elections, for the first time since 2010, is an encouraging sign for political normalisation. However, the [acquittal](#) in first instance of former president Koudou Gbagbo Laurent at the International Criminal Court and his plans to return to the country could give rise to polarisation.

The country has not previously been exposed to terrorism, but over the last five years the risk of terrorist attacks stemming mainly from Malian-based groups Ansar al-Dine (AAD) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has become significant, with a [risk](#) of local radicalisation present as well. The country experienced its first major terrorist [attacks](#) in 2016, in the beach resort of Grand-Bassam. In June 2020, jihadists attacked a security post near the northern border with Burkina Faso. Due to its geographical position, the country is vulnerable to organised crime, particularly trafficking in human beings and drugs, as well as to [maritime piracy](#) in the Gulf of Guinea. Côte d'Ivoire has started exploiting offshore [gas and oil](#), with significant potential still untapped, which should ensure its energy independence.

EU involvement


The EU provided [development aid](#) to Côte d'Ivoire in 2014-2020 under three priorities: strengthening the state and peace-building (€60 million); agriculture and food security (€60 million); and energy (€139 million). The EU has assisted democratic consolidation in the country, sending electoral observation missions to the disputed elections in 2009 and 2010. It has [engaged](#) with civil society organisations recognising their role in supporting transparency and human rights. Since 2016, Côte d'Ivoire has been one of only two countries in West Africa to implement an [Economic Partnership Agreement](#) with the EU, which aims at liberalising commercial exchanges and encouraging economic diversification and development in Côte d'Ivoire.

Democratic Republic of the Congo


The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ranks towards the bottom of the Normandy Index at 129th. The republic remains mired in the effects of a profound political and security crisis triggered in 1997, when President Joseph Kabila seized power and which continues today under President Félix Tshisekedi's rule.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Despite the ongoing efforts of the UN MONUSCO mission and the successful – yet contested – election of President Tshisekedi in January 2019, the DRC ranks 5th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#) and performs lower than the regional average for democratic processes. The DRC ranked 9th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). The country's terrorism score continues to deteriorate as the ungoverned eastern regions of the DRC host a number of extremist groups and militias, which have shown the capacity and resolve to engage both DRC government forces and UN peacekeepers. Currently, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Cooperative for Development of Congo (CODECO) [constitute](#) the most deadly armed groups in the region, mainly targeting civilians and humanitarian workers.



New security and hybrid threats



President Kabila's unconstitutionally long term of office took its toll on democratic processes and on press freedom, with reportedly regular threats and physical attacks and occasional killings of journalists. DRC now ranks 150th out of 180 countries in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). However, President Tshisekedi's dissolution of the coalition with Kabila in December 2020, and a new parliamentary majority may point to a shift away from previous forms of governance. Nevertheless, the country is still considered at-risk on several aspects, with particular vulnerability when it comes to threats to its energy supply and infrastructure.

EU involvement

The EU deployed two military missions and three civilian missions in DRC, to help stabilise the country and reform the police and armed forces, the latest ending in June 2016. Relations between the EU and the DRC are strained on account of [sanctions](#) against several Congolese perpetrators of human rights violations, including a number of former President Kabila's relatives.



DRC benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for 'Everything But Arms'. EU development aid to the DRC has been financed primarily by the [European Development Fund](#), with €620 million for 2014-2020, of which one quarter has been dedicated to strengthening governance and the rule of law. In addition, the EU allocated €54 million through the IcSP from 2015 to 2020. The EU's [humanitarian aid](#) to the DRC amounted to more than €40 million in 2020. The DRC also benefits from Team Europe support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

Egypt

Egypt ranks 113th in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the average for MENA countries. Street protests in 2011 forced long-term President Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak to resign. President Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi was elected in 2014 and re-elected in 2018. Security issues, and the Islamic terrorist threat within the North Sinai governorate, remain high.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Egypt ranks 35th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with particularly high scores for the human rights and factionalised elites indicators. The [military](#) remains the predominant political force in the country and has demonstrated its capacity to influence the political direction of the country. Since 2014, the [terrorist group](#) Wilayat Sinai, or 'Sinai Province', the Islamic State's local branch in the Sinai Peninsula, has conducted a prolonged insurgency against Egyptian authorities. The group was responsible for 457 deaths in 2017 alone – the main reason for Egypt ranking 14th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#).



New security and hybrid threats

The vast majority (98 %) of Egypt's population of approximately 95 million people are concentrated around the arable Nile valley and delta, which represents only 3 % of the country's total landmass. [Soil salinisation](#) also threatens 15 % of the country's farmland. The pipelines from Port Said and other energy infrastructures are affected by Islamic terrorist attacks, presenting additional security and economic vulnerabilities. Egypt's [ongoing internal security threats](#) have led to the detention and sentencing of journalists and political opponents of the government. Censorship intensified during the 2018 presidential elections. The country is one of the biggest jailers of journalists, ranking 166th out of 180 countries in the 2020

[Press Freedom Index](#). In 2017, Egypt launched a national cybersecurity strategy.

EU involvement



The [European Union](#) stands by the Egyptian people in their ongoing efforts to achieve socio-economic development, as well as democracy, respect for human rights, social justice and security. The 2001 Association Agreement, which entered into force in June 2004, forms the legal basis of EU-Egypt relations. Relations were further strengthened through the jointly agreed [EU-Egypt action plan](#) adopted in 2007, which helped to develop bilateral relations in the political, social and economic realms. In the context of [the revised European Neighbourhood policy](#), the EU and Egypt have adopted [partnership priorities](#) that guided the partnership in 2017-2020. The EU's [assistance](#) to Egypt will now focus on economic modernisation, energy sustainability and the environment; social development and social protection; as well as governance. In February 2021, the EU adopted a [new agenda for the Mediterranean](#), including an Investment Plan for the region worth €7 billion. In April 2021, Coptic Pope Tawadros II [signed](#) three declarations to support family planning and combat violence against women at an event under EU support for Egypt's national population strategy project. Finally, Egypt has been allocated a total of 4.5 million doses of vaccines through the Covid-19 [Vaccines Global Access](#) (COVAX) initiative co-financed by the EU.

Eritrea

Eritrea ranks 100th on the Normandy Index. Despite the historic peace deal signed with Ethiopia in 2018, Eritrea continues to have little tolerance for press freedom and democratic practices.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia reignited in 1998 over a border dispute. The 20 years to 2018 have been termed a state of 'frozen war'. Despite the peace deal signed with Ethiopia in 2018 and other indications that Eritrea was emerging from international diplomatic isolation, domestic repression has remained as intense as ever. Any hopes that Eritreans had of a relaxation of the security state and opening up of personal freedoms have faded, leading many citizens to [voice their criticism](#) in public places. The revolution in neighbouring Sudan in 2019, which toppled Omar al-Bashir, a dictator with 30 years in power, and subsequent democratic reforms (although not unproblematic), have led some to suggest that a similar [popular uprising](#) could take place in Eritrea and that President Isaias Afwerki is concerned about such a possibility.



New security and hybrid threats

Under the guise of defending Eritrea from its enemies, President Afwerki has clamped down on opposition groups, the judiciary, free press and civil society. Eritrea ranks 178th out of 180 on the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#), just above Turkmenistan and North Korea. Eritrea's dire score in the democratic processes domain reflects a total [lack of political freedom](#). Its low score in energy insecurity results from its dependency on oil imports. Less than half of the country's population have [access](#) to electricity. Meanwhile, Eritrean troops have reportedly been involved in the conflict in the Tigray region in neighbouring Ethiopia, forcibly returning Eritrean refugees and committing possible crimes against humanity towards civilians in Tigray.

EU involvement

In the framework of its [comprehensive strategy for the Horn of Africa](#), the EU promotes regional cooperation on migration and displacement, security, and the fight against violent extremism. Three CSDP missions are operating in the region, including the EUNAVFOR naval force against piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The EU and Eritrea are part of the [EU-Horn of Africa migration route initiative](#), a policy dialogue on the fight against migrant smuggling. Following the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal in 2018, the EU and Eritrea redefined priority cooperation areas in support of peace, regional integration and sustainable development.



Eritrea benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for ['Everything But Arms'](#). The new [Development Cooperation Strategy for 2019-2020](#) focused on infrastructure and energy (€125 million); job creation in the agricultural sector (€30 million); economic governance (€5 million); and the promotion of Eritrean culture and heritage (€15 million). The EU allocated €10.7 million in funding through the IcSP in 2015-2020, for crisis response and preparedness projects. The [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €151 million since 2016, for better governance and conflict prevention, and support for resilience and economic projects. Eritrea also benefits from Team Europe support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

Ethiopia

Ethiopia ranks 123rd in the Normandy Index, and is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average. Despite Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's efforts to both resolve ongoing disputes with Eritrea and introduce wide-ranging political and economic reforms, the breakout of armed conflict in the Tigray region in November 2020 has severely affected the risk levels in the country.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

A federal parliamentary republic, with significant power vested in the prime minister, Ethiopia ranks 21st in the 2020 [Fragile States Index](#), with particular vulnerabilities arising from demographic pressures and group grievances. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has attempted to resolve ongoing disputes with Eritrea following the 1998-2000 war and [received](#) the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, for his efforts to achieve peace. However, conflict with Eritrea and among ethnic and religious groups has given rise to terrorist violence and Ethiopia ranks 28th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). Anti-terror measures are particularly harsh and cause for concern for many human rights organisations.



New security and hybrid threats

Ethiopia ranks 99th in the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#), up from its previous ranking (110). The declared states of national emergency in 2016 and 2018 were used to silence dissenting voices and [renewed](#) concerns about media freedom emerged in late 2019. While it scores well on energy insecurity, the country [plans](#) to increase production, to make electricity available to everyone by 2030. Ongoing disputes with Egypt and Sudan over the filling of the [Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam](#) on the River Nile remain a point of tension. Violence erupted in regions across the country in late 2020, leading to a strong increase in threat levels related to violent conflict. Following rising political tensions between the federal government and the northern Tigray

region, violence broke out in November 2020 between the federal military and Tigray regional forces. The conflict has reportedly resulted in around 2.2 million displaced people and 50 000 killed. There is no willingness to cease fighting on either side.

EU involvement



Ethiopia is a key partner for the [EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa](#), owing to its economic potential, its military capacity and its ability to retain refugees. Ethiopia benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for 'Everything But Arms'. The EU aid to Ethiopia has included up to €815 million from the 2014-2020 [European Development Fund \(EDF\)](#) and the EU has also financed projects worth €250 million by means of the [EU Trust Fund for Africa](#), as well as €10.7 million through the IcSP 2015-2020. However, due to the conflict in Tigray, the EU [suspended](#) its €88 million budget support to Ethiopia. On 19 December 2020, the EU increased humanitarian funding for Tigray by €23.7 million, bringing the total [humanitarian support](#) for Ethiopia in 2020 to €63.2 million; an additional €2 million will support refugees in neighbouring Sudan.

Georgia

Georgia ranks 34th on the Normandy Index. It performs better than the Eurasian regional average in indicators including crime, terrorism, violent conflict, and democratic processes.

Traditional indications of conflict

Ever since Georgia became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, its central government has faced strong resistance in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In August 2008, Russia fought a war with Georgia on the pretext of protecting separatists. Although fighting ended after a few days, the causes of the conflict have not been resolved; most of the international community and the EU recognise the two territories as part of Georgia, but they remain effectively under Russian occupation. The country has experienced relatively low levels of terrorism in the past five years, ranking 100th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). In 2019, it [adopted](#) a new counter-terrorism strategy, given that events in the Middle East could have an impact on the Caucasus region. Democracy is threatened by a prolonged political crisis resulting in allegations of vote-rigging and a boycott of parliament; nevertheless, the country still scores well in the democratic processes indicator compared to its region.



New security and hybrid threats

Georgia has the region's third best score on the economic crisis indicator, and its economy, although hard-hit by the pandemic, is relatively resilient. [Reform](#) over the past 15 years has focused on globalising the business sector and boosting economic growth. Over the past decade, Georgia has diversified its trade. While neighbouring countries Russia, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Turkey remain the main export destinations, it has expanded its ties with China and boosted links with the EU through an Association Agreement (AA), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), and committed to the NATO Response Force. Georgia has

also increased its resilience in other areas and now has the highest score for cybersecurity in the Eurasian region.

EU involvement



Although Georgia lives with a Russian [military](#) presence in two regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), it ranks as the most resilient [Eastern Partnership](#) (EaP) country. An EU monitoring mission ([EUMM](#)) has been deployed in Georgia since 2008. The country is committed to deepening relations with the EU, with the ultimate goal of applying for EU membership in 2024. With the EU-Georgia [AA/DCFTA](#), the EU is supporting the modernisation of the Georgian economy and the strengthening of state institutions and policies. The EU is also working to offer Georgian citizens new travel, study and business opportunities. Since the entry into force of the visa-free regime in 2017, Georgian citizens holding biometric passports can enter the Schengen area visa-free and remain for up to 90 days in any 180-day period. Since then, more than 900 000 Georgians have travelled to the EU. In 2019, 1 850 students and academic staff took part in the Erasmus+ programme for the purpose of teaching or studying in the EU or Georgia. European Neighbourhood Instrument funding for Georgia in 2017-2020 totalled €453 million, including €183 million to help tackle the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic; in 2020, the EU also approved €150 million in macro-financial assistance (low-interest loans) for Georgia.

India

India ranks 120st on the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than average for southern Asia. India's relatively low ranking is largely the product of a number of unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, both of which are also nuclear-armed powers, as well as vulnerabilities relating to climate change and terrorism. Inter-religious disputes are on the increase.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Despite high-level economic success since the 1990s, the country has been challenged by ongoing inter-religious, inter-caste and inter-ethnic disputes. India has struggled in particular with endemic poverty, both rural and urban. An [estimated](#) 86.8 million Indians live in extreme poverty. India meanwhile ranked eighth in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#), with 558 incidents and 277 fatalities. The [Naxalite Communist Party of India](#) is the deadliest terrorist actor in the country and has been active for several decades. India's tensions with Pakistan, particularly over ownership of the Jammu-Kashmir region, have also given rise to a number of Islamist terrorist groups operating from within Pakistani territory. India is opposed to signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty ([NPT](#)) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ([CTBT](#)).



New security and hybrid threats

Government efforts to limit 'anti-national' thought have led to India ranking 142nd in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). The risks posed by flooding, rising temperatures and declining rainfall, make India's agricultural sector vulnerable to climate change. India has a much stronger cybersecurity infrastructure than average for southern Asia, while its energy consumption is set to grow faster than that of any other major economy; the country will nevertheless remain dependent on imports. India is among countries worst affected by climate change. India was ranked the 7th worst-hit country in the [Global Climate Risk Index 2021](#).

EU involvement



India and the EU have been strategic partners since 2004. In November 2018, the EU adopted a new [strategy on India](#) to relaunch the partnership. India is not eligible for bilateral assistance from the EU's Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), however it can still [benefit](#) from DCI-funded thematic and regional programmes for Asia. Delhi is also a beneficiary of the [South Asia regional project](#) to strengthen community resilience to Covid-19 (€ 1 250 000 funding). When it comes to research and innovation (R&I), EU-India cooperation has expanded significantly. At their last summits, the EU and India agreed on an [agenda for action 2020](#) and stated their joint commitment to cooperation on [terrorism](#), [clean energy and climate change](#), [water partnership](#), [urbanisation](#), [information and communication technology](#), [circular economy and resource efficiency](#), and [global peace and security](#). At the [May 2021 summit](#), they agreed to resume negotiations on a free trade agreement, and to start negotiations on a stand-alone investment protection agreement and a separate agreement on geographical indications.

Indonesia

Indonesia ranks 33rd in the Normandy Index. Significant economic growth in this populous country has raised its political prominence in the region. This rise has not been without issues: growing Islamic fundamentalism, sectarian unrest, corruption and terrorism each pose significant challenges.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Indonesia has faced a number of separatist and militant movements since its independence in 1949, and ranks 37th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). A long-running insurgency continues in Papua; however, in Aceh a 2005 agreement granting special autonomy brought peace, while the former Portuguese colony of East Timor (occupied by Indonesia since 1975) gained independence in 2002. Indonesian counter-terrorist forces have been mostly effective in containing Islamist movements such as Jemaah Islamiyah.



New security and hybrid threats

Despite its success in instituting democratic practices, including the conduct of the 2019 general election, Indonesia ranks 119th in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#) and 96th on the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with a particularly high score in the group grievances category. This is largely due to ongoing unrest in the province of Papua, where media access is restricted. The 2004 Aceh earthquake and tsunami, in which over 160 000 people were killed, demonstrated Indonesia's vulnerability to environmental and climate factors. Increasing drought frequency is [predicted](#) to threaten Indonesia's monsoon-based agricultural practices and lead to food shortages, while rising ocean levels are forecast to threaten

approximately 42 million low-lying households. During the pandemic, Indonesia saw more deaths and infections relative to the size of its population than most other Asian countries.

EU involvement



Although the EU and Indonesia are geographically far apart, they have common values, such as a commitment to democracy, human rights and multilateralism. Both are pluralistic societies, with a motto of 'unity in diversity'. In 2014, Indonesia became the first south-east Asian country to sign a [partnership and cooperation agreement](#) with the EU, and a free trade agreement is currently being negotiated. As a middle-income country, Indonesia no longer receives EU bilateral [aid](#), except for programmes pre-dating 2014, but it continues to participate in programmes such as [Erasmus+](#) for higher education; EU funding also supports Indonesia's foreign trade through the [ARISE Plus](#) facility. The EU and Indonesia conduct a wide range of policy dialogue on topics such as [human rights](#) and [security](#). As a regional leader, Indonesia is key to the EU's new strategic partnership with the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Iran

Iran ranks 110th in the Normandy Index. The country is facing an economic crisis, largely as a result of US economic sanctions, re-imposed at the end of 2018, and the subsequent impact on oil exports, inflation and unemployment. The situation is exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Tensions around Western interference in Iranian domestic affairs date back to the early 1900s, when the British government took control of Persian [oil production](#). The overthrow, with CIA backing, of democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953, set off a wave of unrest that ultimately led to the revolution of 1979 and subsequent [US hostage crisis](#). Since then, Iran has found itself embroiled in several conflicts in neighbouring countries, beginning with the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, and continuing to this day in the conflict in Yemen. The country came under increasing [international pressure](#) over its WMD capabilities and intentions, which were held in check by the Iran [nuclear deal](#) (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), signed in 2015, until the USA withdrew from the agreement in 2018, and reimposed wide-ranging economic sanctions.



New security and hybrid threats

Since the reimposition of [US economic sanctions](#) on Iran in November 2018, Iran has suffered tremendous economic and social consequences. The country is in its third consecutive year of [recession](#), due to the combined effects of sanctions, the oil market collapse and the coronavirus pandemic. In 2019-2020, Iran's real GDP [contracted by 6.8 %](#), and while it has since slightly increased, the country remains in severe economic crisis. Following the targeted assassinations of Major General [Qasem Soleimani](#) in January 2020 (by a US drone) and of top nuclear scientist [Mohsen Fakhrizadeh](#) in November 2020 (allegedly by Israel), Iran has further [ramped up its nuclear programme](#) and entrenched itself in regional conflicts.

EU involvement



The EU played an important role in facilitating the [nuclear agreement](#) between Iran and the EU3+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom, plus China, Russia and the USA). Following the [endorsement](#) of the JCPOA in July 2015, the EU established an [Iran Task Force](#), to coordinate the different strands of action in relations with Iran (including the implementation of the JCPOA and the development of bilateral relations). After the USA [withdrew](#) from the JCPOA in 2018, the EU put several initiatives to save the agreement in place, notably the [Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges](#) (INSTEX) and the update of the [Blocking Regulation](#). The EU continues to [facilitate](#) efforts to bring the USA and Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA, which would imply the USA lifting economic sanctions and Iran respecting agreed limits on uranium enrichment. In 2021, the EU scaled up [assistance to Iran](#) to address the [coronavirus pandemic](#), including the provision of urgent medical, [protective](#) and [testing equipment](#), and the delivery of [vaccines](#).

Iraq

Iraq ranks 126th in the Normandy Index. As the country continues to be impacted by regional and domestic terrorism, it also faces persistent political instability in the wake of country-wide protests against corruption that began in October 2019.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Iraq has a [history of military coups and revolutions](#) beginning in 1958. When Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979, Iraq began a new chapter of brutal authoritarianism, becoming embroiled in a series of conflicts to establish regional hegemony, starting with the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. In 1989, Iraq invaded neighbouring Kuwait, beginning the first Gulf War. In the aftermath of this, the international community, led by the USA, continued to impose devastating economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on the country, to which Saddam Hussein responded with increasing domestic repression. In 2003, claiming Iraq had WMD capabilities, the USA once again invaded the country and began a conflict that continues today. This conflict has embroiled the entire region, with state and non-state actors such as ISIL/Da'esh still active in the conflict arena. Some [1.3 million civilians](#) remain internally displaced; of these, roughly 330 000 people live in camps across the country.



New security and hybrid threats

Iraq faces a continued threat of terrorism, as the second most terrorism-impacted country in the world, according to the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#), ranking behind Afghanistan. In addition, Iraq faces increasing [political instability](#), exacerbated by underlying sectarian tensions and worsening economic conditions. The violent repression of public [protests](#) led to the [resignation of the Iraqi prime minister](#) in December 2019. A new Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who finally took office in May 2020, has not managed to [lead](#) the country towards more political stability, confirming [doubts over](#) the prospects for long-term structural political change in a system designed to

share power between ruling elites from several ethnic factions. Iraq is also considered one of the Arab countries most [vulnerable to climate change](#), and will likely face decreased [water and food availability](#) and extreme temperatures in the future.

EU involvement


Under the 2018 [EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement](#) (PCA), the EU [cooperates](#) with Iraq in many areas, including humanitarian assistance, stabilisation, reconstruction, human rights, migration, security, and the political, social and economic reform agendas. The EU adopted an [EU strategy for Iraq](#) in January 2018, to respond to the specific challenges Iraq faces following the territorial defeat of ISIL/Da'esh. Iraq has benefited from over €1 billion in EU assistance since 2014. In October 2017, the Council set up a CSDP mission – [EUAM Iraq](#) – to assist the Iraqi authorities with the implementation of its national security strategy.

Israel

Israel ranks 92nd in the Normandy Index, with an above-average score for the MENA region. While Israel is a relatively stable democratic country and scores high in resistance against crime, cybersecurity and economic crises, its continued occupation of Palestinian territory remains a significant weakness, as does the country's possession of WMD.


Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Since the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine in 1947, followed shortly after by the unilateral declaration of an independent state of Israel, Israel has been embroiled in [conflicts](#) with the Palestinians and its other Arab neighbours. Following earlier peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), Israel [normalised](#) relations with four other Arab states in 2020. Israel is categorised as a free country in the [2021 Freedom in the World Index](#), with an overall score of 76 out of 100. However, in 2020, Israeli continued its decade-long occupation of the West Bank, creating an ['increasingly coercive environment'](#) for Palestinians. Israel ranks 40th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#), with ISIL/Da'esh-affiliate, the Sinai Province of the Islamic State, the deadliest terrorist group in Israel and the Palestinian territories.



New security and hybrid threats

Israel is ranked 69th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with highest fragility scores for factionalised elites, group grievance and human rights. Israel is [not party](#) to any of the major treaties governing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The country has signed, but not ratified, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Israel has a policy of non-transparency regarding its nuclear capabilities, but it is widely estimated that it possesses a sizeable nuclear weapons arsenal as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Its position in a high conflict region makes WMD a significant threat. Israel scores high in energy insecurity, partially due to its [over-reliance on oil](#).



EU involvement



EU-Israel relations are governed by the 2000 [EU-Israel Association Agreement](#) and focus mainly on strengthening economic and social cooperation, as well as regular political dialogue. The [European Neighbourhood Policy](#), the main framework guiding political and economic relations with Israel, aims at promoting Israel's integration into European policies and programmes. [EU funds](#) are predominantly used to support the approximation of Israeli norms and standards in public administration with those of the EU. The EU also supports civil society initiatives that promote human rights. The EU continues to [advocate](#) for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including an end to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Lebanon

Lebanon ranks 127th in the Normandy Index. The collapse of the country's currency and economic upheaval have fostered social discontent since October 2019. The massive explosion that destroyed large parts of Beirut in August 2020 epitomises the decline of the country's public and political institutions since its civil war ended in 1990.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Lebanon's history of conflict dates back at least to the civil war that erupted in 1975. A small state, Lebanon is at the centre of regional power struggles led today by Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the 2005 Syrian-assisted assassination of the prime minister, Rafik Hariri, ongoing Iranian support for Hezbollah, and the spill-over of fighting and millions of refugees from the current Syrian crisis, among other events, have not only ensured [continued political and violent conflict](#) in the country, but have also led to deep economic crisis. Around 1.5 million Syrian refugees (one quarter of Lebanon's population) have sought refuge in the country since 2011.



New security and hybrid threats

Lebanon is facing an economic crisis not seen since independence in 1943. Since October 2019, when nation-wide protests broke out against the deepening economic crisis and perceived corruption, the situation has deteriorated steadily. The currency is at an all-time low, having lost around 90% of its value. A deadly explosion, attributed to negligence, ripped through the port of Beirut in August 2020, killing hundreds, injuring thousands and causing extensive damage to the capital. The country remains in a [political deadlock](#), after six months of failed efforts to form a [new government](#), amid [continuing protests](#) over the worsening economic situation. Grievances include low levels of energy

security, with the electricity supply being notoriously poor and uncertain for the past several decades. As the economic crisis has worsened, 55% of the population is [reportedly](#) trapped in poverty and struggling to pay for bare necessities.

EU involvement



The EU recognises the importance and supports the efforts of Lebanon as the country with the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world. The EU has allocated more than €2.4 billion in [assistance](#) to Lebanon since 2011, both for bilateral assistance (€670.3 million) and specifically in response to the Syrian crisis (over €1.8 billion). Bilateral assistance has been allocated under the [European Neighbourhood policy](#), to cover local social and economic development, investment in infrastructure and support to civil society, inter alia. The EU also provides direct [humanitarian assistance](#) to Syrian refugees, as well as [resilience assistance](#) to both Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees, to create long-term perspectives for both. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU has scaled up [assistance](#) to [Lebanon](#) to help fight the [pandemic](#).

Libya

Libya ranks 124th in the Normandy Index, with a score below the average for the MENA region. Since the Berlin conference on Libya (January 2020) and approval of the interim government (February 2021), there is a certain hope that December 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections might bring the country closer to reconciliation and democratic transition.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Libya has been divided into [rival military and political camps](#) since 2014, based respectively in the capital, Tripoli, and in the east. Libya's third civil war in a decade began when Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an offensive on Tripoli in April 2019. Fayez al-Sarraj, leader of the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) turned to Turkey for military help in an effort to remain in power. In February 2021, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) agreed on democratic transition and the gradual reconstruction of the country.



New security and hybrid threats

Crime and violent conflict remained high in Libya, and also affect the economy. The UN estimates [economic losses](#) in Libya due to the civil war at €400 billion; [rebuilding costs](#) were assessed at €500 billion. Despite the cessation of violence, tens of thousands of foreign military personnel and mercenaries remain in Libya, supporting both sides. They were due to leave by the end of January 2021 and the UN Security Council (UNSC) is considering a resolution on

whether to add mercenary monitoring to the mandate of the United Nations' Support Mission to Libya ([UNSMIL](#)). In March 2021, the [President of the UNSC](#) stressed the importance of a credible and effective Libyan-led Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism under UN auspices and called for 'full compliance' from all parties with the UN arms embargo.

EU involvement


The EU is committed to the [Berlin Process](#) under the auspices of the UN. Following the January 2020 [Berlin conference on Libya](#), the EU launched a new military mission [Operation Iirini](#), with the goal of implementing the UNSC imposed arms embargo. Libya has received support under the Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, as well as under the EU [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) (EUTF Africa). Particular attention was dedicated to full compliance with the UN arms embargo and support for the most vulnerable people – migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. A revised strategy for the [Southern Neighbourhood](#) was adopted on 9 February 2021, marking 25 years since the Barcelona Declaration and 10 years since the Arab Spring. Under the [IcSP](#), the EU has funded and continues to fund projects worth over €65 million, which aim to contribute to stability and peace. Following the onset of the coronavirus crisis, the Commission has [mobilised](#) over €66 million through its instruments to support immediate, health-related and socio-economic needs in the country.

Mali

Mali ranks 109th in the Normandy Index. The country faces continued threats from violent Islamist extremist activity as well as climate change-related challenges, including increased resource scarcity. With a deteriorating security situation in central and northern Mali, UN peacekeeping forces continue to suffer repeated attack and significant losses, while some large towns live under constant threat from armed groups.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Mali enjoyed relative economic, social and political stability in a region otherwise beset by conflict and insecurity until 2012. The Arab Spring triggered a large-scale insurgency and rebellion in [Mali's north](#), launched by the Tuareg Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and followed by civil war. The 2013 intervention of French forces to drive back the insurgency created a dependency on international military resources that continues to this day, with over 15 000 [UN peacekeeping personnel](#) operating in the country. Mali has significantly more negative scores than the sub-Saharan average in the violent conflict and terrorism domains, due to attacks from various groups, notably the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). Mali



deteriorated from 79th to 16th most [fragile State](#) between 2012 and 2020. Political unrest erupted in the second half of 2020. Following public protests over electoral irregularities, military officers overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta's government in August 2020. The interim government has scheduled democratic presidential elections for March 2022. The impacts of the pandemic, compounded by the socio-political crisis resulting from the coup, plunged Mali into [economic recession](#).


New security and hybrid threats

The actions of transnational criminal organisations, terrorist groups and armed militia continue to target civilians, with over 40 000 [having fled](#) their homes in 2020. Resource-related conflicts are expected to [spread from northern Mali](#) into the

central region around Bamako. The combination of [climate change](#) and resource-scarcity with increasing insecurity and displacement is leading to a severe humanitarian crisis.

EU involvement

The EU adopted a [new strategy for the Sahel](#) in April 2021. Beyond military engagement, the new strategy strengthens the political dimension and the emphasis on sustainable development in EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Mali. Mali hosts two EU CSDP missions: [EUCAP Sahel Mali](#) – a capacity building mission in support of national security policies in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania – and [EUTM Mali](#) – a training mission for the G5 Sahel armed forces. Mali benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything But Arms](#)'. The [European Development Fund](#) allocated €665 million to Mali (2014-2020), mainly to support peace consolidation. In addition, the EU allocated €57 million in assistance through the IcSP (2015-2020). Since 2016, the [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €220 million towards better governance, migration management, resilience and economic projects. In 2020, the EU allocated more than €29 million to the country in [humanitarian aid](#). Mali also benefits from Team Europe support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).





Mauritania

Mauritania ranks 105th in the Normandy Index, lower than the world average. It is considered more at risk in crime, energy insecurity and state fragility, while it is at low risk in terms of terrorism.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Mauritania ranks 33rd in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#). [Failure to eradicate slavery](#), despite its abolition in 1981, explains the country's particularly low score in state legitimacy. In recent decades, Mauritania's political life has been marked by several military coups, the most recent led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2008, followed by his election in 2009. In June 2019, Mauritania saw the first peaceful transfer of power since it became independent in 1960, with the election of the ruling party candidate and former defence minister, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. Mauritania ranks 134th in the [2020 Corruption Perceptions Index](#). In February 2020, the national Parliament formed a committee of enquiry to investigate [alleged corruption cases](#) during the former president's mandate. Despite increasing numbers of attacks in the Sahel, Mauritania has proved to be remarkably [resilient](#) against jihadism, and has suffered no terrorist attacks since 2011.



New security and hybrid threats

Mauritania faces the second highest risk of drought according to the INFORM [Global Risk Index](#), as it experiences recurring cycles of drought that exacerbate resource scarcity and food insecurity. Despite substantial renewable energy resources, three million people remain without power across the country and Mauritania scores low on energy security. The country passed its first data privacy laws in 2017, but is still at the early stages of addressing cybersecurity, ranking 145th in the [Global Cybersecurity Index](#). Mauritania fell from 72nd to 97th place in [the World Press Freedom Index](#) between 2018 and 2020. Repressive laws on defamation and

disinformation notably led to the arrest of several journalists during the 2019 presidential campaign. In 2020, however, President Ghazouani appointed a national commission for press reform, in view of [consolidating press freedom](#).

EU involvement

The EU adopted a [new strategy for the Sahel](#) in April 2021. Beyond military engagement, the new strategy strengthens the political dimension and the emphasis on sustainable development of EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Mauritania. In 2019, the EU reinforced and moved its [Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell](#) for the Sahel to Mauritania, where the G5 Sahel permanent secretariat is based. Mauritania benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for ['Everything But Arms'](#). The [European Development Fund](#) provided up to €160 million during 2014-2020 for food security and sustainable agriculture; the rule of law; and improvement of the health system in Mauritania. Since 2017, the EU [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed [€79 million](#) for conflict prevention projects in the country. In 2019, the EU allocated €9 million in [humanitarian aid](#) to Mauritania. Mauritania also benefits from Team Europe support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).



Mexico

Mexico ranks 86th in the Normandy Index. Despite significant progress made in combating organised crime, Mexico has seen an increase in violent crime and homicide that has affected civilians and politicians alike.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Mexico has suffered

from large-scale organised criminal activity including drug-trafficking, kidnapping and extortion since at least the 1980s, when Mexico's crime groups started coordinating and assigning distinct regional areas of control and establishing trafficking [routes](#). The ensuing violence emanated not only from inter-cartel competition, but also the Mexican State's officially declared 'War on Drugs' in 2006. It is estimated that [some 80 000 people](#) have disappeared in drug-related crime since [2006](#).



New security and hybrid threats

The overall level of peacefulness in Mexico has deteriorated for four years in a row since 2016, driven by an upsurge in the [homicide rate](#), at 19.26 per 100 000 people in 2021. The rate of [organized crime](#) rose by over 24 % in 2020, compared to the previous year. Gun violence is also on the rise, with the firearms crime rate doubling from 13.6 per 100 000 people in 2015 to 29.6 in 2019. The violent crime rate has increased by 39.8 % since 2015, with sexual assault rising 60 % and femicide increasing by 164 % during that period. Mexico's geography, situated between two oceans, makes it [vulnerable](#) to severe weather events and climate change. In rural areas, extreme temperatures and erratic rainfall damage crops and livestock (which represent 80 % percent of weather-related financial losses since 1990). The

country has had a climate change [law](#) since 2012 (last reformed in [2020](#)).

EU involvement


The EU has a long-standing comprehensive partnership with Mexico, established through the European Union-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in December 1997 and entered into force on 1 October 2000. This 'Global Agreement', also includes a free trade agreement, which is currently being [updated \(an agreement 'in principle' has been reached\)](#). It was the first EU agreement to create a free trade area and the first partnership agreement with a country in Latin America. The Global Agreement established a political dialogue and broad cooperation between the parties. In 2008, the EU agreed a [strategic partnership](#) with Mexico that introduced new high-level dialogue issues, such as on security, law enforcement and human rights. The EU is stepping up cooperation with Mexico on combatting organised crime. [Negotiations](#) concluding a working arrangement between Mexican authorities and Europol began in February 2020, and an agreement entered into force in [July 2020](#). Mexico participates in four IcSP projects, mainly related to Covid-19 and vulnerable populations (totalling €12 800 000).

Morocco

Morocco ranks 60th in the Normandy Index, with a score above the average for MENA region and lower comparable to the EU-27 as regards several indicators. While Morocco is a relatively stable country and scores high in resistance against crime and terrorism, irregular migration remains a significant weakness, as do the country's energy insecurity and democratic processes.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The Moroccan government announced a US\$12.8 billion [Economic Relaunch Pact](#) on 6 August 2020. Combined with the planned austerity measures as part of the 2021 Finance Bill, the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to increase social discontent and localised protests due to economic losses, especially among the most impacted sectors. Protests and strikes organised by healthcare and transport unions have occurred throughout 2020, and are likely to continue. Nationwide protests similar to those in 2017-2018 are unlikely, but the pandemic will further highlight longstanding issues, including access and capacity in the healthcare sector and regional disparities.




New security and hybrid threats

In 2020, Morocco slipped into its first recession since 1995, with GDP [decreasing by 7%](#) due to drought, which has decreased agricultural revenue, and to the impacts of Covid-19. Moroccan nationals abroad are a source of remittances, estimated at €3.3 billion annually. However, irregular migration through and from Morocco remains a sensitive issue, with four main migratory routes: via the Mediterranean to mainland Spain, through Spanish enclaves Melilla and Ceuta and through the Canary Islands. Negotiations on an EU-Morocco readmission agreement began in the 2000s, but have still not produced results. Finally, there are concerns that [Islamic jihadist members](#)

could access the EU via illegal migration routes, despite anti-terrorism cooperation with the EU.

EU involvement

EU-Morocco relations are based on the [Association Agreement](#) which entered into force in 2000, creating a free trade area between the EU and Morocco. The Association Council, which brings together the EU and Moroccan ministers, frames the EU-Morocco relationship, including the political dialogue and cooperation priorities. The last (14th) [Association Council](#) meeting took place on 27 June 2019, and adopted a [Joint Declaration](#), which gave new impetus to the strategic, multidimensional and privileged EU-Morocco relationship. A revised strategy for the [Southern Neighbourhood](#) was presented on 9 February 2021, marking 25 years after the Barcelona Declaration and 10 years after the Arab Spring. Morocco is the largest recipient of EU funds in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). For 2014-2020, €1.6 billion in assistance were allocated to the country.





Mozambique

Mozambique ranks 94th in the Normandy Index. Its level of fragility has significantly worsened over the last decade. Today, the country faces significant threats from violent extremism, lack of political participation and inclusion, and climate change.

Traditional sources of conflict

Since its independence in 1975, Mozambique has experienced persistent internal conflict. Between 1977 and 1992, the country was ravaged by a guerrilla war led by Frelimo – today the main opposition party – against the governing Renamo party, which established a one party socialist system following independence. A 1992 [peace agreement](#) temporarily put an end to this war, launching political and economic opening. Frelimo still governs the country, without a break since independence. The opposition is politically and economically marginalised and has repeatedly criticised elections, usually won, with large majorities, by Frelimo. Two further peace agreements, the latest in [2019](#), were signed after Renamo had reverted to violence to validate its claims for a share of political and economic power. Mozambique is one of the [poorest countries](#) in the world by per capita GDP.



New security and hybrid threats

Since 2017, an [Islamist insurgency](#) has destabilised the Northern province of Cabo Delgado, causing numerous civilian casualties, significant displacement and disruption to the economy. The militarist approach adopted by the government has proved largely ineffective and risks alienating the local population. The insurgency threatens the exploitations of recently discovered offshore gas reserves, which the government hopes to use to improve the dire state of public finances. The country is exposed to extreme climate events (cyclones, floods and droughts), which in [2019](#) and [2020](#) took a heavy toll on the local economy and exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis, have led to [food insecurity](#).

economy and exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis, have led to [food insecurity](#).

EU involvement


From 2014 to 2020, EU's cooperation and [development aid](#) to Mozambique was framed under three main [objectives](#): democracy and the rule of law, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, and promoting investment. Mozambique ratified the [EU-SADC economic partnership agreement](#) in 2017, enjoying additional safeguards to protect it from disruptive trade liberalisation. In November 2020, the EU [committed](#) to providing €100 million of budget support to deal with the impact of Covid-19, marking the resumption of this type of aid, after a four year break following a huge debt scandal involving the country's government. In autumn 2020, the EU [responded](#) favourably to Mozambique's request for assistance to fight the northern insurgency, promising support with regard to humanitarian assistance, security and development, but demanding 'verifiable commitments' from the Mozambican security forces to respect human rights in their operations. In its [April 2020 conclusions](#), the Council expressed EU commitment to supporting the 2019 peace agreement and called for an approach to the Islamist insurgency that takes local grievances into account.

Myanmar

Myanmar ranks 101st in the Normandy Index, but this score pre-dates the February 2021 military coup, which has brought violence and chaos. The country has long been plagued by poverty, ethnic conflicts and severe human rights abuses.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Tensions between the Bamar majority and over 130 ethnic groups caused decades of instability. Conflicts between ethnic armed groups and government forces cost thousands of lives and displaced hundreds of thousands. Some 50 years of military rule have seen horrific human rights abuses and grinding poverty. Constitutional reforms that began in 2008, and the election of a civilian government in 2015, looked like positive developments. However, ethnic conflicts continued in several parts of the country with little progress towards a national ceasefire. In 2016 and 2017, military 'clearance operations' killed thousands from the persecuted Rohingya minority, resulting in a mass exodus of refugees, and genocide charges against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice.




New security and hybrid threats

A February 2021 military coup ended five years of uneasy co-existence between the civilian government and the still-powerful armed forces. Civilian leaders were imprisoned and the country descended into chaos following violently repressed protests against military rule. Political instability already hampered economic growth even before the coronavirus pandemic, and Myanmar remains one of the poorest countries in Asia. Strikes led by the anti-junta Civil Disobedience Movement have brought entire sectors of the economy to a halt, disrupting supplies of food and energy. With many healthcare workers on strike, efforts to contain the pandemic are also at risk. The outlook for the country remains extremely

uncertain. In 2008, [Cyclone Nargis](#) hit the country, killing nearly 100 000 people and causing damage that affected millions – a reminder of the threat posed to Myanmar by climate change.

EU involvement

The EU adopted economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Myanmar in the 1990s. Following democratic reforms, the economic sanctions were lifted in 2013, although the arms embargo remained in place. For 2014-2020, the EU allocated €688 million in development aid. It also gave Myanmar exports duty-free access to EU markets under the '[Everything But Arms](#)' preferential trade scheme, triggering a boom in the country's textile sector, which employs nearly one million workers. The EU already re-imposed some sanctions against military officers in 2018, following massacres of the Rohingya, and is currently considering broader measures, including against military-owned companies. Some development projects have also been suspended. However, there are no plans to withdraw Myanmar's trading privileges under 'Everything But Arms'.





Niger

Niger ranks 115th in the Normandy Index. Regional instability has led to the proliferation of violent extremist groups, causing a surge in numbers of refugees and internally displaced people. For Niger this compounds the already dire effects of climate change on access to resources, a further trigger of conflict.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Niger currently ranks 19th most fragile out of 178 countries in the [Fragile States Index](#) for 2020, and 189th (bottom) in the [2020 UN Human Development Index](#). The country's riches still overwhelmingly benefit foreign uranium mining interests and a handful of politically connected elite, triggering conflict notably with Tuareg groups. Niger has also suffered from increasing [regional instability](#), consequently its own conflict environment increased from 10 conflict events in 2011 with 25 fatalities, to 424 conflict events and 1 114 fatalities in 2020. In December 2020, the jihadist group Boko Haram killed over 27 civilians in the south east of the country, in one of the deadliest attacks in years.



New security and hybrid threats

Niger's most immediate security threats come from the rapid spread of terrorism and violent extremist groups throughout the Sahel region. Deaths from [violent incidents](#) related to extremist groups in the Sahel reached 4 000 in 2019, a five-fold increase since 2016. Niger's ranking on the Global Terrorism Index has risen from 40th most impacted in 2011 to 24th in 2020. Niger has also been overwhelmed by an increase in [internally displaced people and refugees](#) fleeing neighbouring countries, particularly Mali. This displacement compounds the impact of climate change, which is affecting Niger more than most Sub-Saharan African countries, heightening the competition for scarce resources, in particular between traditional [farmers and herders](#).

EU involvement



The EU adopted a [new strategy for the Sahel](#) in April 2021. Beyond military engagement, the new strategy strengthens the political dimension and the emphasis on sustainable development of EU's partnership with the G5 Sahel countries, including Niger. The EU civilian mission [EUCAP Sahel Niger](#) is aimed at strengthening the capacities of the Nigerian, Burkinabe, Chadian and Mauritanian forces to fight terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration. Niger benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything But Arms](#)'. The [European Development Fund](#) allocated €686 million in assistance to Niger in 2014-2020, to help deliver social services, food security and resilience, and road infrastructure for regions at risk of insecurity and conflict. In addition, the EU has allocated €45 million in funding to Niger through the IcSP 2015-2020. Since 2016, the [Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) has contributed €279 million to improving governance, migration management and to supporting resilience and economic projects. In 2020, the EU allocated over €30 million to Niger in [humanitarian aid](#). Niger also benefits from Team Europe support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

Nigeria

Nigeria ranks 119th in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average and is particularly vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. Ethnic tensions date back to colonial times. While the 1967-1970 civil war was primarily concerned with the equitable distribution of oil revenues between ethnic groups, more recent conflict has assumed more sectarian overtones.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Despite an overall improvement on the previous year, Nigeria ranked third in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#), with 411 recorded incidents and 1 245 fatalities. Boko Haram, an ISIL/Da'esh-affiliated Islamist insurgency operating since 2002, was responsible for most of these deaths. Tension between Christian farmers and Islamic Fulani herdsmen has also escalated into violent conflict, with the latter carrying out several terrorist attacks claiming numerous victims. The country's federal model provides a large degree of state autonomy between the predominantly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south, but endemic corruption has prevented the country from reaping the full benefits of its enormous oil wealth. The southern Niger Delta, where extraction is concentrated, suffers the environmental [effects](#), but profits little from the oil boon, which drives popular discontent. Nigeria ranks 14th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with particularly high scores in the factionalised elites and group grievances indicators.



New security and hybrid threats

Despite being Africa's biggest economy by nominal GDP, Nigeria has a fragile economic situation owing to its over-reliance on oil. In 2020, because of the Covid-19 crisis, it experienced its deepest [recession](#) since the 1980s. Public protests by young people against police brutality and impunity broke out in several cities across the country in October 2020, indicating growing discontent both with security forces and the government. Africa's most populous country ranks 115th in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). While internationally supported elections allow for a high degree of political competition, they are often witness to large-scale disinformation campaigns.

EU involvement



The EU has supported numerous initiatives to increase Nigeria's resilience to violent conflict and other threats. To help fight terrorism, the EU has [funded](#) an initiative grouping several Lake Chad countries – the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – against Boko Haram. The [European Development Fund](#) provided over [€500 million](#) in [support](#) (2014-2020) to improve Nigeria's resilience in areas such as health and nutrition, electricity production, rule of law, and security. The EU has negotiated a regional [economic partnership agreement](#) with Nigeria and other West-African countries, aimed at liberalising trade and fostering regional integration and sustainable development, but Nigeria is reluctant to implement it. The [EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#) supports conflict prevention and relief measures, and greater economic and employment opportunities, to increase the resilience of communities in the areas most afflicted by conflict. The fight against terrorism and radicalisation will remain high on the [agenda](#) of the EU-Nigeria partnership.

North Korea

North Korea is 116th in the Normandy Index, below the Asia-Pacific average. Talks on reunifying the Korean peninsula have consistently failed since 1948. The Korean War (1950-1953) produced a ceasefire, but no enduring peace, and each party claims legitimate sovereignty of the peninsula.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

A vestige of its 'military first' policy, North Korea has the [third largest](#) active duty military in the world with [1.28 million](#) soldiers, supported by a reserve of [600 000](#) and paramilitary personnel. In 2013, this policy was replaced with the 'progress in tandem' policy, which emphasises economic progress and guaranteed security against South Korean or American incursion by nuclear development. The country has nuclear weapons and ballistic missile [programmes](#), and is believed to have chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In 2017, it successfully tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and claimed to have exploded a thermonuclear weapon. The country has used cyber-attacks and cyber theft to amass [up to US\\$1.3 billion](#) in foreign and virtual currency, circumventing international sanctions. North Korea ranks 30th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), with a particularly weak score for state legitimacy. Its authoritarian government ranks 170st in the [2020 Global Corruption Perceptions Index](#), and political prisoners are known to be interned in prison camps.



New security and hybrid threats

North Korea is bottom of the [2020 Global Press Freedom Index](#). The state security apparatus is extensive, maintaining control over citizens' residence, travel, employment, clothing, appearance, food and family life. Refugees [report](#) that the population is sorted by their 'Songbun' – a status system assessing a citizen's loyalty to the government – and granted opportunities accordingly. Furthermore, the shortage of skilled labour, energy, arable land and transportation has significantly impeded long-term growth and resulted in North Korea's ongoing difficulty in meeting development objectives, with a major impact on the agricultural sector and infrastructure.

EU involvement



The EU has a policy of 'critical engagement' towards North Korea, with a view to diminishing tensions in the Korean peninsula, upholding a nuclear non-proliferation regime and improving the human rights situation. It has applied [sanctions](#) against Pyongyang, implementing the UN Security Council Resolutions and adopting autonomous restrictive measures. Meanwhile, since 1995, it has contributed over €135.7 million in [aid funding to North Korea](#) – mostly on food assistance, but also on disaster relief and poverty alleviation. EU-North Korea trade in goods fell dramatically after 2013. In 2019, it amounted to a mere [€7 million](#) (0.2 % of North Korea's external trade). The EU has maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea since 2001, but has no delegation; its local representation is ensured in turn by one of the six Member States with embassies in the country (Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Poland, Romania and Sweden).

North Macedonia

North Macedonia ranks 43rd in the Normandy Index. Although it performs less well than the European average on most indicators, it outperforms the global average for democratic processes, cybersecurity and crime indicators.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

North Macedonia gained independence from former Yugoslavia in 1991. Today, the country scores within the top quartile of countries in the democratic processes' indicator. The current government, led by the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) since May 2017, has improved relations with the EU and, in particular, with Bulgaria and Greece. Through the Prespa Agreement (June 2018), the country changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia in exchange for Greece ending its veto on its EU and (NATO) accession. In March 2020, following the signing of North Macedonia's accession protocol in February, the country officially joined NATO as the alliance's 30th member.



New security and hybrid threats

Since independence, North Macedonia has made progress in developing a westernised, open-market economy. This has included reforms such as registering property, gaining credit access and protecting minority investors. North Macedonia is the only middle-income country to rank among the top 20 countries globally when it comes to ease of doing business, [as ranked by the World Bank](#). Its progress on economic reforms is demonstrated in its strong economic crisis score. However, North Macedonia ranks just below the world average, and second lowest in the European region on press freedom: 92nd in the 2020 [Press Freedom Index](#). To foster the development of safe, secure, reliable and resilient

digital environment, the government adopted a '[National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan 2018-2022](#)' in 2018.

EU involvement



North Macedonia was the first Western Balkan country to sign a stabilisation and association agreement with the EU (in 2004); just one year later, it became a candidate country. On 26 March 2020, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia. To prepare the country for membership, the EU allocated [€664 million](#) of funding for 2014-2020, focusing on the areas of institutional building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resources and rural development. The EU is supporting the [strengthening of transport and energy connectivity](#) within the Western Balkans and with the EU through a new connectivity package, road improvements and the implementation of the regional rail strategy, through the [Western Balkans Investment Framework](#). The EU also helped to establish the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), modelled on the Franco-German Youth Office, created in 1963 to boost cooperation between young French and German citizens. The RYCO promotes student exchanges with the EU and in the region to foster reconciliation. On 20 April 2021, the European Commission announced the conclusion of agreements for the delivery of Covid-19 vaccines to the Western Balkan countries. In addition to some 260 000 vaccines already supplied under the Covax facility, another 651 000 BioNTech-Pfizer doses will be delivered to the region. Under this arrangement, North Macedonia has received 119 000 vaccine doses.

Pakistan

Pakistan ranks 131st in the Normandy Index. Relations with terrorist groups, the military power's interference, strained relations with India, separatism, vulnerability to climate change and a critical financial situation contribute to the instability of a country affected by religious intolerance.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Pakistan, home to the world's second-largest Muslim population, was the first [Islamic republic](#). The country has undergone phases of military rule and political instability. Pakistan ranks 25th most fragile among 178 states in the 2020 [Fragile State Index](#). The chronic dualism between political and military power – with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency playing a controversial role – has prevented civilian institutions from taking direct control of the state. This has impacted areas such as relations with Pakistan's neighbour India, which remain strained and volatile, despite a rapprochement in early 2021, due in particular to the unresolved Kashmir territorial conflict in the north-western Indian subcontinent. Pakistan is accused of being an active sponsor of terrorism and a safe haven for terrorist groups. The [Global Terrorism Index](#) has placed the country among the 10 countries most impacted by terrorism without interruption since 2003; in 2019, it ranked 7th.



New security and hybrid threats

Pakistan faces further separatist threats: the most critical situation is in the south-western province of Balochistan. Balochistan is also a province where working for a media outlet is quite risky, as witnessed by the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#) ranking Pakistan 145th and underlining the ISI's pressure on journalists. The country is particularly [vulnerable](#) to the effects of climate change, as it is repeatedly hit by extreme weather events. In 2020, this was among the reasons for a high level of food price inflation, contributing to political unrest. The [Financial Action Task Force](#) (FATF) – the global anti-money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog – put Pakistan on its [grey list](#), hampering the country's access to international financing to address the post-coronavirus economic recovery.

EU involvement



The EU and Pakistan have strengthened political and security relations through the 2019 EU-Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan ([SEP](#)), which also build up on the 2004 [cooperation agreement](#). The fifth [strategic dialogue](#) held in November 2020 agreed on a [Joint declaration on Afghanistan](#). A new EU-Pakistan Security dialogue, including on the fight against terrorism, is scheduled in 2021. The [EU-Pakistan Joint commission](#), which includes a sub group on [Democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights](#), held its 10th session in November 2019. The partners regularly hold a [political dialogue](#). Since 2014, Pakistan benefits from [GSP+](#) under the condition that it continues to ratify and effectively implement 27 core international conventions. In April 2021 the [European Parliament](#), concerned at the continued abuse of blasphemy laws in Pakistan, proposed to review the country's eligibility for GSP+ status. Islamabad is also a beneficiary of the '[South Asia Regional Project](#) to Strengthen Community Resilience to Covid-19'.

Russia

Russia ranks 99th in the Normandy Index, performing better than the Eurasian regional average in terms of energy insecurity and cybersecurity indicators, but worse in the overall score. This is largely owing to weak performance on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism and violent conflict indicators.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia rebuilt or altered many of its institutions. However, democratic processes are weak, and the regime has become increasingly authoritarian. Russia inherited the whole of the Soviet Union's huge nuclear arsenal, and now has nearly 7 000 warheads, [almost half](#) of the world's nuclear weapons. Russia also has the highest [homicide rate](#) in the Eurasian region, at 10.82 per 100 000 people in 2021. This is significantly higher than the global average of 7.03 per 100 000.



New security and hybrid threats

Russia has high levels of energy security and it also scores high on the cybersecurity indicator, ranking ninth globally. Climate change brings positive changes, such as a longer growing season for farmers, but also more extreme weather (such as droughts) and melting permafrost, a threat to Arctic buildings and infrastructure. Online disinformation campaigns and restrictions on independent media companies have had a severe impact on the spread of reliable information. Russia's [repression](#) of opposition political voices is also a significant concern, leading to its categorisation as 'not free' in the [Freedom in the World Index](#). Russia's relations with the EU and NATO have been deteriorating for

over a decade; the 2014 annexation of Crimea marked the beginning of a particularly tense phase, which shows no signs of ending.

EU involvement



EU-Russia [relations](#) took a sharp downturn after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and its [involvement](#) in separatist rebellions in eastern Ukraine. The EU has applied [sanctions](#) against Russia for its violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity, and also for cyber-attacks, use of chemical weapons and [human rights violations](#). In retaliation to EU economic sanctions, Russia has banned imports of EU agricultural products. Tensions have also arisen from Russia's interference in EU democratic processes as well as the attempted assassination and imprisonment of opposition leader Alexey Navalny. EU funding for Russia is limited to four areas: research cooperation (Horizon 2020), cross-border cooperation, education (Erasmus+) and support for civil society.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia ranks 56th in the Normandy Index. It is enmeshed in several regional conflicts, most directly that in Yemen, and is facing increasing opposition, both domestically and internationally, to its limited democratic space.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Saudi Arabia has been engaged in [a decades-long proxy war with Iran](#) since the Iranian revolution of 1979. The new Shia Iranian regime, headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, encouraged other Shia Muslims in neighbouring countries to overthrow their rulers as well; a call that the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia took up unsuccessfully. This proxy war for regional hegemony has played out [in several conflicts in the Middle East](#), including in Lebanon, Iraq and perhaps most directly, in Yemen. The conflict in Yemen started out in 2014, as a domestic Iranian-backed Houthi rebel uprising against a repressive Sunni-led government. The cause of the Yemeni government in fighting the rebels was quickly taken up by Saudi Arabia, which led a coalition of international forces, including the USA, to take back control. In the six years up to the end of 2020, an estimated [112 000 people](#) were killed in Yemen, at least 12 600 of whom were civilians killed in targeted attacks.



New security and hybrid threats

Besides the ongoing war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia faces longer-term challenges from its very limited democratic space. After Mohammed Bin Salman was appointed Crown Prince in 2017, he instituted several economic and social reforms, which many had hoped would also lead to greater democratic freedom. That has however [failed to materialise](#). The Kingdom, which has a poor human rights record, has repeatedly come under scrutiny for its [treatment of dissidents](#), including the execution of 37 pro-democracy activists in April 2019, and the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The country permits no independent media and ranked

170th in the [2021 World Press Freedom Index](#). Under President Biden, the USA, a long-time ally, is expected to adopt a more [critical stance](#) towards the Kingdom.

EU involvement



In 1988, the EU entered into a [cooperation agreement](#) with the Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), which comprises Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A regular EU-GCC dialogue aims to strengthen the stability of countries in the strategically important Gulf region, broaden economic and technical cooperation and strengthen existing cooperation on energy, industry, trade and services, agriculture, fisheries, investment, science, technology and the environment. There is no formal [bilateral relationship](#) between the EU and Saudi Arabia. The EU, and the European Parliament in particular, have been critical of Saudi Arabia's human rights record and have condemned and expressed grave concerns over [Saudi Arabia's role in Yemen](#).

Serbia

Serbia ranks 56th in the Normandy Index, with a score in line with the Western Balkans regional average. Despite displaying reduced threat from terrorism or violent conflict, the country is facing urgent challenges, such as the normalisation process with Kosovo,⁴ and democratic processes.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The 1990s breakup of the former Yugoslavia remains a source of fragility in Serbia today, as it continues to affect relations with neighbours. Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations, as a basis for resolving bilateral problems, including the [Belgrade-Pristina dispute](#), are pre-conditions for Serbia's EU accession. Although Belgrade and Pristina have been engaged in the EU-mediated dialogue since 2011, comprehensive normalisation of relations is still out of reach, despite some encouraging developments, such as the [appointment](#) of the EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák in April 2020, and the commitments declared in the 'Washington Agreement' of September 2020.



New security and hybrid threats

[Strategic competition](#) and [disinformation campaigns](#) between global powers are on the rise in Serbia. Russia is a traditional geopolitical ally of the country and has provided diplomatic support to Belgrade, backing Serbia's position on non-recognition of Kosovo. In 2020, Russia provided vaccines, investment, economic and military aid. In return, Serbia [resisted](#) EU pressure to apply sanctions on Russia over its aggression in Ukraine. In addition, Serbia is a founding member of the [16+1 initiative](#), led by China. Due to insufficient political dialogue between the ruling

coalition and the opposition, the country [democracy rating](#) has also fallen; the 2020 Democracy Index gave Serbia its lowest grade since 2006.

EU involvement

Serbia officially applied for EU membership on 22 December 2009. Serbia's [accession negotiations](#) began in 2014. To date, Serbia has opened 18 chapters and provisionally closed 2 chapters. Serbia will not be able to close any new chapters before fulfilling all the interim benchmarks concerning the rule of law, i.e. Chapters 23 and 24 within Cluster 1 – 'Fundamentals', because, if there is no progress in that segment, there will be no progress in any other area of accession negotiations. [Pre-accession support](#) for Serbia and other countries amounts to €12.9 billion for 2021-2027 (IPAIII funds). On 20 April 2021, the European Commission and Austria [announced](#) the conclusion of agreements for the delivery of Covid-19 vaccines for the Western Balkans countries. The 651 000 BioNTech/Pfizer doses are funded by the Commission and will be shared with the assistance of Austria. Serbia will receive 36 000 vaccines under this programme.



⁴ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

Somalia

Somalia ranks 135th in the Normandy Index. It is significantly more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average and its performance is weaker for indicators including violent conflict, terrorism, resilience to disinformation, fragile state measures and climate change.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Somalia has struggled with the impact of civil war, which began in 1991, with the overthrow of dictator Jaalle Mohamed Siad Barre. The country is also responding to the jihadist and al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab insurgency that has been plaguing the country since 2008. In part as a result of this instability, the country is divided into autonomous and semi-autonomous regions. In the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#) Somalia recorded a 14 % decrease in deaths from terrorism, owing mainly to reduced activity by Al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, it still ranked as the country with the fifth highest impact of terrorism. Somalia ranks second in the [Fragile States Index](#). This highlights the weakness of the central government, which has little practical control over much of its territory, in particular, but not only, in the self-declared state of Somaliland.



New security and hybrid threats

In response to the weakness of the central government, Somalia has adopted a decentralised federal model. Somalia ranks 163rd in the 2020 [World Press Freedom Index](#), being one of the most dangerous countries in Africa for journalists. Somalia is highly vulnerable to climate change and ranks as the country least adaptable to climate change, at the very bottom of the [Notre Dame Adaptation Index](#). Extreme [climate events](#) such as droughts and floods are exacerbating existing issues such as intercommunal tensions and displacement.

EU involvement



Somalia is a major focus of the [EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa](#), which aligns various external policy programmes and instruments to tackle insecurity and its root causes in the area. Two EU military operations and one CSDP civil mission are based in Somalia: [EUNAVFOR operation Atalanta](#), [EUTM Somalia](#) and [EUCAP Somalia](#). While [EU direct naval action](#) has helped to secure the Coast of Somalia, international efforts to help improve Somali military and political governance, to which the EU has made a significant contribution, have yet to meet with success. Somalia benefits from a duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for '[Everything But Arms](#)'. EU aid to Somalia has been financed primarily by the [European Development Fund](#), with up to €286 million for 2014-2020, of which more than one third was dedicated to peace- and state-building. Peace-building efforts are also financed by means of the [EU Trust Fund for Africa](#), for projects worth €312 million, with a view to mitigating the root causes of irregular migration. The EU has allocated €63 million in funding to Somalia through the IcSP for 2015-2020. Somalia also benefits from Team Europe support in response to the [coronavirus pandemic](#).

South Africa

South Africa ranks 73rd in the Normandy Index, scoring higher than the sub-Saharan African average. While it is considered low-risk, and despite the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa still struggles with extremes of inequality and high crime rates.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

South Africa has consistently one of the highest income inequality indexes in the world and approximately 25 % of the country's population live below the poverty line. Despite South Africa's strong democratic processes and status as the second largest African economy, it therefore ranks 85th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#). South Africa's high violent crime rates also contribute to this fragility. The country's homicide rate, for example, is more than four times the sub-Saharan African average. South Africa also ranked 41st globally in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). In 1991, South Africa became the first country to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. Although South Africa, energy security is generally much better than the sub-Saharan African average, the country is facing an energy crisis, including rotational load shedding, due to mismanagement at the state-owned enterprise Eskom and an ageing generating capacity.



New security and hybrid threats

Owing in part to its pluralist political foundations, South Africa exhibits relatively strong resilience to disinformation. It ranks 31st in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#) and has a relatively high score on the cybersecurity indicator for the sub-Saharan African region. Climate change poses particular risks for South Africa, as heatwaves, drought and bushfires all threaten the country's agricultural and urban areas. Between 2015 and 2018, for example, Cape Town faced a severe drought, requiring water rationing. These rising temperatures could have severe economic consequences on the country in the long term.

EU involvement



The EU and South Africa have a strong relationship based, since 2007, on the [EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership](#) and [EU-SADAC Economic Partnership Agreement](#) (provisionally) in force since 2016. Although [EU development aid](#) for South Africa was reduced from €980 million (2007 to 2013) to [€241 million](#) (2014 to 2020), as aid was redirected to poorer countries, the EU collectively remained South Africa's second largest donor (after the USA) in 2016. EU-funded projects focused on [three sectors](#): employment creation, education, training, innovation, and efforts to enhance state capacity to provide public services. These areas are considered key when it comes to addressing the rampant inequality underlying South Africa's skyrocketing homicide rate and corruption, which weaken the state and undermine economic development and social progress.

Syria

Ranking 137th, at the bottom of the Normandy Index, Syria is the least peaceful country in the world. It performs worse than the global average in every indicator, especially in democratic processes, terrorism, resilience to disinformation and violent conflict.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Syria's low position on the Normandy Index is largely due to the ongoing impact of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011. This war is [estimated](#) to have resulted in over half a million deaths and has caused massive population displacement and destruction of infrastructure. Nearly 5.6 million Syrians are [registered as refugees](#) in neighbouring countries. The level of violence in the Syrian civil war has now receded, and deaths from terrorism in Syria decreased by 44 % to 517 in 2019, of which ISIL/Da'esh, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were responsible for 74 %. However, Syria still ranks 4th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#) and continues to suffer the long-term effects of instability as a result of the conflict.



New security and hybrid threats

The war and the extreme fragility of the Assad regime has devastated Syria and diminished the country's social and economic capital, all of which will impact post-war recovery. The economy is in a dire state, the local currency lost more than two thirds of its value in 2020, and food prices have increased two to threefold. Some 9.3 million people – 46 % of the population – are facing food shortages. Syria ranks 174th out of 180 countries in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#). In addition, despite having a weak cybersecurity score, the Assad regime has set up [special cybercrime courts](#) to target internet usage.

EU involvement



"The EU suspended cooperation with the Syrian government under European Neighbourhood policy in 2011, in response to the violent repression of anti-government protests. In parallel, the EU has adopted specific, targeted and measured restrictive measures against the Assad regime. However, the EU and its Member States are the largest contributors to the international response to the Syrian conflict, having mobilised over €20 billion since 2011, for humanitarian, stabilisation and resilience assistance to those affected by the conflict inside Syria and in the region (Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey), most recently in the context of the fifth Brussels Conference on ['Supporting the future of Syria and the Region'](#). Assistance has been adapted to respond to the [coronavirus outbreak](#), including the [delivery of vaccines](#). With a view to ending the civil war, the EU has [supported](#) the UN-led intra-Syrian negotiations towards a genuine political transition, and supported Syrian civil society organisations with a view to promoting a democratic form of governance and respect for human rights and freedom of expression. The EU is of the view that the [presidential elections](#) that took place in Syria on 26 May met none of the criteria of a genuinely democratic vote and do not contribute to the settlement of the conflict.

The Philippines

The Philippines ranks 102nd in the Normandy Index, lower than the Asia-Pacific average. It is one of the more democratic countries in the region, but faces a range of political, economic and environmental challenges. Crime rates are high, and thousands have died in a controversial war on drugs; there is also violence from rebel groups and terrorists.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The Philippines has a more pluralistic political system than most of its neighbours in Southeast Asia. However, it is among the top quarter of most fragile countries in the world. Ranking 54th in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#), it has a particularly high score in the security apparatus category. One of the reasons for this fragility is the relatively high level of terrorism. The Philippines ranks 10th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#). In 2019, despite a slight fall in terrorism activities, 348 incidents were recorded, with a total of 284 fatalities. The country has faced a number of insurgencies since independence, by Communist, Islamist, separatist and other movements. In 2016, ISIL/Da'esh-affiliated actors sought to establish an 'East-Asia province' in the country, occupying and holding the city of Marawi for five months. The violent crackdown on drug-related crimes launched in 2016 under President Rodrigo Duterte continues, despite the Covid-19 pandemic.



New security and hybrid threats

The Philippines ranks 136th in the [2020 World Press Freedom Index](#) and 34th in the [2020 Corruption Perception Index](#). Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 caused the loss of 6 300 lives, the displacement of over four million people and US\$2 billion in damage, highlighting the threat posed to the country by climate change. As average sea temperatures rise, the Philippines' vulnerability to such extreme weather events is predicted to increase. Extensive mangrove deforestation has been [noted](#) as a factor that exacerbates this risk. The Philippines was [harder-hit](#) by [coronavirus](#) than most other Asian countries, with high numbers of deaths and infections.

EU involvement



The Philippines' colonial history has made it the most westernised country in southeast Asia. Catholicism is the main religion, English is a widely used second language, and the political system is modelled on that of the United States. Together with its Member States, the EU is the Philippines' largest aid donor. During 2014 to 2020, the EU allocated [€325 million](#) of development aid, focusing on two areas: the rule of law and inclusive growth (promoting renewable energy). Since 1996, the EU has also provided nearly [€125 million](#) in humanitarian aid, helping the country to respond to conflicts and natural disasters. The EU-Philippines Partnership and Cooperation Agreement came into force in 2018; talks on a free trade agreement were launched in 2015, but have been stalled since 2017. At present, the Philippines enjoys duty-free access to EU markets for most of its exports under the GSP+ scheme. Since 2016, EU criticism of extrajudicial killings has sparked an [angry response](#) from President Duterte, but cooperation continues in many areas.

Thailand

Thailand ranks 77th in the Normandy Index. Rapid economic growth has lifted the country from the low-income to upper-middle bracket in just a few decades, but its development has been marred by political instability and recurrent military coups.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

A long-running insurgency in Muslim-majority southern Thailand has claimed [over 7 000 lives](#) since 2004. Violence has been on a downwards trend for several years, and 2020 was relatively quiet, although this was partly due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Peace talks between government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the main rebel group, have been ongoing since January 2020, but with no sign of a breakthrough. There is [little evidence](#) that ISIL/Da'esh has significant influence in southern Thailand. In the [Global Terrorism Index](#), Thailand comes in 21st place, with the worst score in the Asia-Pacific region. The deadliest terrorist incident in recent years was the 2015 [bombing](#) of the Erawan Shrine in Bangkok, which claimed 20 lives; two Chinese Uyghurs have been charged with the attack.



New security and hybrid threats

Recent years have seen frequent [clashes](#) between reformers and pro-monarchy conservatives. After five years of military rule, elections in 2019 installed a nominally civilian government, continuing the rule of the former junta. Since 2020, there have been large-scale but mostly peaceful protests demanding the resignation of the government and reform of the monarchy. Reflecting restrictions on freedom of expression, Thailand ranks 140th in the [2020 Press Freedom Index](#). A dynamic 'tiger economy' lifted millions out of poverty, but in recent years growth has stalled. The [2020 Fragile States Index](#) puts Thailand in 82nd place, with political instability and the role of the military identified as particular areas of weakness.

EU involvement


After the 2014 military coup, the EU broke off talks with Thailand on a partnership and cooperation agreement and a free trade agreement. The restoration of civilian rule in 2019 opened the door to [renewed engagement](#); talks have resumed on the partnership and cooperation agreement, and are expected to resume soon on the free trade agreement. Thailand participates in a number of EU international [programmes](#) such as Erasmus+ and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. EU bilateral aid includes projects supporting Thai exporters, refugees from Myanmar, and workers in the fisheries sector.

Tunisia

Tunisia ranks 41st in the Normandy Index. It is considered less at risk than the MENA country average. Its performance is weaker than the MENA average for the indicator measuring energy insecurity, but stronger on all other indicators.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Since the removal of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali during the Jasmine Revolution of 2011, Tunisia has undergone a range of democratic reforms. The fallout from the 2011 revolution has, however, pushed country up the [Fragile States Index](#), from 118th place in 2010, to 95th in 2020, scoring low for factionalised elites and state security apparatus. In February 2020, Tunisia's Parliament approved prime minister-designate Elyes Fakhfakh's new coalition government. However, Fakhfakh was replaced by [Hichem Mechichi](#) on 2 September 2020. Unemployment has remained high throughout the past decade at 15 % and reforms, such as in justice and security, were abandoned between 2015 and 2019.




New security and hybrid threats

In 2008, Tunisia ranked 143rd out of 173 countries in the [Press Freedom Index](#), but since the 2011 revolution it has risen to 72nd place on the 2020 Index. The country confirmed its commitment to the free flow of information by supporting the International Declaration on Information and Democracy in 2018. Energy insecurity has led to a degree of instability in Tunisia. The country [currently sources](#) approximately 85 % of its needs from domestic oil and gas. Energy is heavily subsidised, however these reserves are expected to decline, leading to a sharp rise in energy prices. The heterogenous regional development and gap between the north and south of the country is a permanent source of internal instability. A disillusioned youth, as well as an economically fragile population in the south, is inclined to

anti-government rebellion and also terrorist action. In 2015, the country suffered two major terrorist attacks in tourist hotspots, leading to a drastic decline in the tourist economy. In 2020, three people died in a suicide bombing attack near the US embassy. Tunisia ranked 49th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#), dropping two places since 2019.

EU involvement

The EU-Tunisia association agreement was signed in 1995. The 2011 revolution marked a turning point in [EU-Tunisia relations](#) and led to the establishment of a privileged partnership in 2012. The EU-Tunisia youth partnership was launched in 2016. Between 2011 and 2017, EU assistance to Tunisia amounted to €2.4 billion. The EU and Tunisia are also currently negotiating a free trade agreement. The 2018 EU-Tunisia strategic priorities guide cooperation, [focusing](#) on areas including socio-economic development, democracy, good governance and human rights, security, and terrorism. From 2017 to 2020, the EU's bilateral assistance to Tunisia under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which averages €300 million per year, focused on promoting good governance and the rule of law; sustainable economic growth and jobs; and social cohesion. Tunisia is also eligible for funding under the IcSP and Erasmus+. The EU deployed an [election observation mission](#) for the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections.





Turkey

Turkey ranks 118th in the Normandy Index, a ranking that reflects substantial security threats. The country scores lower than the European average in 10 of the 11 indicators, especially in violent conflict, terrorism and democratic processes.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The failed [military](#) coup in 2016 was followed by constitutional reform and strengthening of the presidential regime, [repression](#) of political opposition and participation in foreign conflicts. All this is reflected by Turkey's weak performance in indicators relating to traditional sources of conflict. Globally, Turkey has the 12th lowest score in violent conflict, owing largely to persisting conflicts in its south-eastern regions. Participation in the Syrian War has also negatively affected the country's weapons of mass destruction score. Turkey ranked 18th in the world on impact of terrorism in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#), despite a 50 % reduction in attacks from 2017 to 2018. This ranking is the result of attacks by ISIL/Da'esh and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish separatist group.



New security and hybrid threats

Turkey is faced with major insecurities, having been involved in foreign [military interventions](#) in Syria in September 2019, in Libya in January 2020, and in northern Iraq throughout 2020. The country's resilience to disinformation score is amongst the lowest globally, reflective of its ranking at 154th in the [Press Freedom Index](#). This is primarily due to severe censorship of the government and threats against journalists. In addition, as a net importer of energy, its energy security score is amongst the weakest 10 % globally. The signature of the November 2019 [Memorandum of Understanding](#) on delimitation of maritime zones between Turkey and Libya has increased instability in the eastern Mediterranean.

EU involvement

Turkey has been in a [customs union](#) with the EU since 1995 and an [accession country](#) since 2005. During 2014-2020, around €4.5 billion was allocated to Turkey, of which approximately €3.5 billion came from the [Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance \(IPA\)](#). Relations between Turkey and the EU have deteriorated in recent years. In 2017, the co-legislators agreed to cut pre-accession funds owing to failing democratic standards. In 2020, following Turkey's military action in [Syria](#) and [Libya](#) and illegal drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean, the EU decided to put Turkey's EU accession application on hold. The [EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis](#), created in 2014, allocated around €500 million to Turkey for refugees. Turkey has also received approximately €6 billion in EU aid under the [EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey](#), launched in 2016. In 2020, to alleviate the burden of the coronavirus pandemic, small-scale health infrastructure and equipment worth €90 million was procured for Turkey under the Facility. Two programmes under the Facility: The Emergency Social Safety Net and Conditional Cash Transfers for Education, were [extended](#) until 2022. The EU [Global response to Covid-19](#) allocated €800 million in assistance for the Western Balkans and Turkey to counter the pandemic.

Ukraine

Ukraine ranks 117th in the Normandy Index, illustrating that peace in the country is at risk. It scores below the Eurasian average, owing not least to Russia's ongoing hybrid war against the country as well as fragile internal political and social situation.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

In 2013, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich's decision not to sign an association agreement with the EU sparked major pro-European protests in Ukraine. In February 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to impeach Yanukovich, who fled Kyiv. Russia responded by annexing the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, in violation of international law, launching an unprecedented hybrid war against Ukraine, including military aggression in eastern Ukraine that has so far claimed around 14 000 lives, with over 1.5 million people displaced. Ukraine has a high terrorism score, [ranking 36th in the 2020 Global Terrorism Index](#) and the 17th poorest score in violent conflict globally. The continued military threat posed by Russia was most recently illustrated by events in spring 2021.



New security and hybrid threats

Since 2014, Russia has used a wide range of hybrid tactics against Ukraine, including cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, energy coercion and economic pressure. Ukraine has the [second lowest GDP per capita in Europe](#). The coronavirus pandemic further worsened the situation and risks leaving [9 million](#) people in poverty. The country's GDP decreased by [4.4%](#) in 2020. Ukraine has a well-developed industrial base and highly trained labour potential, indicating that economic improvement is possible. With a diversified media landscape, it performs better than the regional average on media freedom, but the necessity to counter fake news and foreign interference presents challenges for public freedoms. The country ranks 96th in the 2020 World Press

Freedom Index and is categorised as 'partly free' in the Freedom in the World Index. Despite the pandemic, Ukraine carried out [competitive](#) local elections in [October 2020](#).

EU involvement



An [Association Agreement](#), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine, was signed in 2014. The EU supports the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty and sees the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements as the basis for a sustainable political solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The EU's sanctions against Russia are explicitly linked to fulfilment of the Minsk agreements. Since 2014, the EU has allocated [€16.5 billion](#) in support of Ukraine's reform process (to which the European Parliament's democracy support activities have [contributed](#) significantly). This includes [€1.4 billion](#) to support tackling the Covid-19 pandemic and mitigation of its economic and social consequences. The EU supports [vaccination action](#) in Ukraine, as well as providing medical supplies and equipment. Through the IcSP, the EU has funded 26 projects worth over [€70 million](#), aimed at inter alia strengthening resilience, reintegration of veterans and combating disinformation. The European Parliament protested against [Russian military build-up](#) at the Ukrainian border, proposing a list of immediate sanctions in case of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

United States

The USA ranks 58th in the Normandy Index. It poses and faces new threats in the WMD domain, as it has withdrawn from treaties designed to keep nuclear arsenals in check and continues to experience a rise in right-wing and lone wolf terrorism.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

The United States ranked 121st out of 163 countries in the [Global Peace Index](#) in 2020, rising in rank for the first time since 2016. However, large military expenditure relative to GDP, continued engagement in external conflicts, high levels of weaponry imports and exports and considerable incarceration rates, all contribute to the continuously low level of peacefulness relative to other high-income countries. The USA has the highest rate of gun-violence amongst this group of countries. In 2020, [19 374 firearm homicides](#) and 611 mass shootings were committed inside the USA, the [highest number of gun-related fatalities in the past two decades](#). Gun ownership, estimated at 120.5 firearms per 100 people – the highest gun ownership rate in the world, provides an enabling environment.



New security and hybrid threats

The USA is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, however its 2019 withdrawal from the [Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty](#) (INF) with Russia was an alarming new development. Both countries will now be able to re-engage in the stationing of nuclear-capable missiles banned by the treaty, considered to be particularly [dangerous for crisis stability](#). Although the [New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty](#) (START) treaty between the two was [set to expire in February 2021](#), President Biden's new administration [extended the New START Treaty for another five years](#), alleviating a significant nuclear threat. The USA has seen an overall decrease in the threat from terrorism since 2002, but is suffering from an increase in far-right and lone-wolf terrorist activity. From

January to August 2020, right-wing extremists committed [67 % of all terrorist attacks and plots](#), compared to [around 15 % in 2002](#).

EU involvement


The USA is an EU strategic [partner](#) in the promotion of peace and security globally. In 2011, the USA signed a [Framework Partnership Agreement](#) on participation in CSDP operations; it has contributed to EULEX Kosovo. US-EU cooperation also takes place through NATO in the areas defined by the [NATO-EU](#) joint declaration. The USA and EU NATO-members have cooperated in Afghanistan, Libya and in Eastern Europe. On counter-terrorism, bilateral agreements include: an [Operational Agreement](#) between the USA and Europol, the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) [Agreement](#), and the EU-US Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement. The EU-US [Umbrella Agreement](#) provides a framework of rules governing transatlantic data exchange. At parliamentary level, the EU and USA hold a regular dialogue, the [Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue](#). In December 2020, the EU put forward a new [transatlantic agenda for global change](#) which includes, among other things, new forms of cooperation in trade and technology, democracy, security and on the environment.

Venezuela

Venezuela ranks 125th in the Normandy Index and is considered more at risk than the South American average. It performs worse on every indicator except energy insecurity at regional level, with international sanctions exacerbating the situation in this domain.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Since 2010, Venezuela has seen an economic and political [downturn](#) caused by a heavy reliance on oil exports and excess national spending. President Nicolás Maduro was re-elected in May 2018, but the election was contested owing to irregularities in the way the results were announced. Claims to the presidential seat have been disputed, notably by the leader of the main opposition party, Juan Guaidó. Legislative elections – [not recognised](#) by the EU and other international actors – were held in December 2020, giving President Maduro control of Parliament. From 2018 to 2020 Venezuela fell by 18 places in the [Fragile States Index](#), largely as a result of decreased state legitimacy and increased group grievances. Venezuela has one of the highest [homicide](#) rates globally.



New security and hybrid threats

Emigration from Venezuela has reached massive levels, creating a humanitarian crisis in the region, with the number of Venezuelans abroad rising from under 700 000 in 2015 to around 5 million in 2020, according to the [International Organization for Migration](#) (IOM). Venezuela has the largest known oil reserves in the world, and for decades was a major exporter. However, international sanctions and a deteriorating infrastructure make it difficult to access the oil, even within the country. The Maduro regime uses [digital disinformation](#) as a political strategy, and has cracked down on journalists reporting on the Covid-19 pandemic or criticising the official lack of transparency about the pandemic.

EU involvement



In the context of the current political and economic crisis, the EU supported the failed dialogue efforts between the government and the parliamentary majority, and reiterated the need for free and transparent [elections](#) in 2018, and again [in 2020](#). It also imposed [targeted sanctions](#) and an embargo on arms and related material that could be used for internal repression. [EU assistance](#) in the refugee and migrant crisis totals over €170 million for measures both internally and outside Venezuela, including €15 million for stability and peace. Venezuela benefits from four ongoing IcSP projects, mainly related to vulnerable populations and Covid-19, as well as to supporting a negotiated political solution and inclusive transition. The EU promoted an [International Donors Conference](#) to help Venezuelan refugees and emigrants on [26 May 2020](#). It also established an [International Contact Group](#) on [Venezuela](#), with the agreement of some Latin American countries, that is working to [facilitate conditions](#) for a peaceful political process leading to credible elections in Venezuela and to [enable the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid](#). On 21 January 2021, the European Parliament adopted a [resolution](#) on the latest developments in the National Assembly of Venezuela.

Yemen

Yemen ranks 133rd in the Normandy Index, making it the fifth least peaceful country in the world. The conflict between the Saudi-backed government and Iran-backed Houthi forces that erupted in 2014 has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions and created severe food shortages. Despite strong international involvement – including from the USA – ceasefire negotiations have so far failed and the conflict continues.

Traditional sources and indications of conflict

Yemen has suffered [decades](#) of internal conflict, economic mismanagement and extreme weather conditions. A popular uprising in 2011 led the authoritarian president Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. Taking advantage of the ensuing period of [political instability](#), the Houthi movement, tied to the Shia Muslim minority and supported by Iran, took control over northern parts of the country in 2014, thus sparking a [civil war](#) with the Yemeni government backed by Saudi Arabia. An [estimated](#) 100 000 people have since been killed and 4 million displaced as a direct result of the conflict. Furthermore, [over 131 000 people](#) are believed to have died due to the indirect consequences of the war, such as food shortage and lack of health services. Yemen ranks 6th in the [2020 Global Terrorism Index](#), with 555 casualties and 561 incidents. Both al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIL/Da'esh are active in Yemen.



New security and hybrid threats

Yemen ranks 1st in the [2020 Fragile States Index](#). This is mainly due to the lack of central government control in large swathes of its northern and western territories, dominated by Houthi forces. The compounded threats of a fragile state and violent conflict have exacerbated issues such as lack of food and health services. In Yemen, [16.2 million people](#) were food insecure in 2020, with 16 500 in famine-like conditions – a number expected to triple in 2021. Humanitarian groups and the UN have warned that the current conditions in Yemen may result in the [most severe famine](#) in the world. The country ranks 156th out of 181 countries most resilient to climate change in the [2020 Notre Dame Adaptability Index](#).

EU involvement

Over [80 % of the Yemeni population](#) are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. Since 2015, the EU has contributed [€1 billion](#) to support efforts to mitigate the consequences of the conflict in Yemen. This includes support for political dialogue, diplomacy and human rights, humanitarian assistance and development assistance. Of that, €15 million has gone towards crisis-response activities in coordination with the UN, such as support for local and national level political dialogue and ceasefire negotiations. The EU is contributing over €563 million to support humanitarian efforts implemented by EU partners on the ground. EU aid contributions have targeted assistance to internally displaced people (IDPs), as well as healthcare and food security programmes. Finally, the EU has provided around €337 million in support of long-term development assistance. The [EU Humanitarian Air Bridge](#) has delivered medical equipment to help Yemen respond to the coronavirus pandemic, and the EU has also delivered Covid-19 [vaccines](#) to the country.

5. ANNEX – The Normandy Index: Methodology

This annex explains the components and the methodology of the index developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace.

Normandy Index of the European Parliament – Methodology

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Background

Humanity is now facing challenges unparalleled in its history. The 2020 Covid-19 pandemic has caused an immediate crisis globally and crystallised the interconnectivity of a globalised world. This is occurring in the backdrop of 'mega trends' caused by climate change, ever-decreasing biodiversity, depletion of the earth's fresh water, and overpopulation. All of these are occurring in a socio-political time of great uncertainty, with shifting power dynamics amongst global superpowers, the breakdown of traditional alliances and a widespread crisis of democracy.

Such challenges, whether short- or long-term, call for global solutions and require cooperation on a scale unprecedented in human history. In a hyper-connected world, the sources of many of these challenges are multidimensional, increasingly complex and span national borders.

These challenges, if not addressed, increase strain on resources, infrastructure and society, all of which can affect levels of peace in nations and the world. The United Nations and World Bank Pathways for Peace Report released in 2018 recognised the interconnectivity of these challenges and called for risks to be considered multidimensional in nature.

To contribute to the field, the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy seeks to produce the 'Normandy Index' (NI) on an annual basis, and began with an initial launch in 2019. The purpose of the NI is to produce a measurement tool to afford policy-makers and civil society with a succinct analysis of different aspects of the threats facing the international community. It aims at capturing threats to peace and offering insights into the multidimensional risks faced by countries. Annual updates allow the tool to track how dynamics shift from year to year and to assess positive and negative changes in risks.

The NI has three main aims:

- 1 Assess the state of conflict and potential for conflict in each given country, considering the current state and potential future state
- 2 Provide a tool for measuring and monitoring trends across time
- 3 Provide a mechanism to link categories of threat with a ranking of 'state and risk of conflict' that can be quantified and used for policy-making purposes.

Text box 1 – The Normandy Index in context

The NI is intended to contribute to the field in identifying factors that the European Parliamentary Research Service believes pose threats to peace in the coming years. As such, the NI captures and conveys a unique angle to existing composite indices – such as the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) Global Peace Index (GPI).

The GPI produced annually by IEP, ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peace, as defined by the absence of violence and absence of fear of violence. It is therefore a measure of levels of **negative** peace today. IEP also explores the **positive** aspects of peace in its Positive Peace Index (PPI), which measures the levels within the 163 countries of the attitudes, institutions and structures that are known to create and sustain peaceful societies.

Both the GPI and PPI measure levels of peace in the world **today**. The NI however captures **threats** to peace in the world today, making it a useful contribution to the suite of tools used for quantitative analysis of peace and security.

For its inaugural launch, the NI covered 137 countries and regions. The EU-27 is considered one bloc and is given the average of its country members' scores).

Methodology overview

The 2016 EU Global Strategy prioritises a number of domains as being threats to peace in the coming years (European Union, 2016).

Each domain is in and of itself a complex system with multiple, interconnecting dimensions that are hard to quantify. Recognising this, the NI seeks to simplify many of these domain concepts by selecting one key representative indicator, rather than delving into the more complex and subjective exercise of selecting, weighting and aggregating multiple indicators for each domain. The indicators selected for each domain are based on current academic and policy literature, data availability, and in consultation with the European Parliament.

Table 1 presents the indicators selected to capture these domains.

TABLE 1: NI Indicators

| Domain | Indicators | Definition | Source | Number of countries covered | Latest year of data |
|----------------------|--|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| Climate change | INFORM Global Risk Index | INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment index on humanitarian crises and disasters. | United Nations | 191 | 2021 |
| Cybersecurity | Cybersecurity Index | The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a survey measure capturing the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity in order to raise awareness. It is the only available open-source Cybersecurity Index. | International Telecommunication Union | 195 | 2017 |
| Democratic processes | Participatory Democracy Index | A measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy has been achieved within a country. | VDEM | 179 | 2019 |
| Economic crises | Financial Vulnerability – Non-performing loans as % of total loans and annual inflation rate | Non-performing loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality. This dataset was supplemented in 2015-2021 with inflation data from the World Bank and Trading Economics. Over the period six countries have experienced greater than 50% inflation. Commonly classified as hyperinflation, those countries (Lebanon, Venezuela, Sudan, South Sudan, Suriname and Zimbabwe) were subsequently given the maximum economic crisis score in the Normandy Index. | World Bank, Trading Economics | 139 | 2019 |
| Energy insecurity | Energy Imports | Energy imports, net (% of energy use). Banded to be 0 if country is a net exporter of energy. | World Bank, Enerdata | 187 | 2019 |

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------------|-----|------|
| Fragile states | Fragile States Index | The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures that impact their levels of fragility. The index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data – quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation – are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. | Fund For Peace | 177 | 2020 |
| Crime | Homicide Rate per 100 000 people | Homicide Rate per 100 000 people – used as a proxy for crime | UNODC | 237 | 2018 |
| | Perceptions of Criminality Banded | Assessment of the level of perceived criminality in society, ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Country Analysis team. Country analysts assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March. | EIU | 163 | 2020 |
| Resilience to disinformation | Resilience to Disinformation | A measure of how often domestic and foreign governments and political parties use social media and advertising to spread disinformation within the country. | VDEM | 179 | 2019 |
| Terrorism | Global Terrorism Index | A composite score providing an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by terrorism. | Institute for Economics and Peace | 163 | 2020 |
| Violent Conflict | Conflict sub-indicators of the Global Peace Index | Average of the following six indicators from the Global Peace Index: (1) Intensity of Internal Conflict, (2) Deaths from Internal Conflict, (3) Number of Internal conflicts, (4) Intensity of External Conflict, (5) Deaths from External Conflict, (6) External of Internal Conflicts | Institute for Economics and Peace | 163 | 2020 |
| WMD | Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Indicator from the Global Peace Index. | This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include the holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries that are signatories to Non-Proliferation Treaties are scored better in this indicator. | Institute for Economics and Peace | 163 | 2020 |

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2021.
 NB IEP research is directly relevant to the Normandy Index (NI).

The 2016 EU Global Strategy also discusses the importance of **hybrid threats** in coming years. Hybrid threats combine conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific political objectives. They can range from cyber-attacks on critical information systems, through to the disruption of critical services such as energy supplies or financial services, to the undermining of public trust in government institutions or the deepening of social divisions. Given the combined nature of hybrid threats, it is not possible to capture the risk posed to a country using any single measure.

Detailed domain and indicator descriptor

Domain 1 – Climate change

Indicator: INFORM Global Risk Index – Natural disaster risk sub-indicator

Full description: The INFORM Global Risk Index gives an annual per country score between zero and ten, where ten is 'very high risk'.

Rationale: INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters, based on three dimensions of hazard & exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity. It recognises climate change and the risks associated with it as having both natural and man-made components, and that the risk resulting from climate change is also dependent on how countries are able to cope with the effects of climate change.

Source: INFORM (European Commission, 2019)

URL: <http://www.inform-index.org/>

Domain 2 – Cybersecurity

Indicator: Global Cybersecurity Index

Full description: The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) is a measure of the commitment to cybersecurity by member states of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), assessed across five dimensions: legal measures; technical measures; organisational measures; capacity building; and, cooperation.

Rationale: The threat from cybersecurity can only be countered by a systemic and cross-sectoral regulatory approach grounded in technological capabilities. If a country is not currently taking active steps to protect financial and physical infrastructure, personal or government data, it leaves itself open to attacks. Examining the action and measures a country takes to try and minimise threats from cyber-attacks, via this GCI, is a viable, open-source, quantified measure of future threat.

Source: ITU (International Telecommunication Union, 2017)

URL: <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/global-cybersecurity-index.aspx>

Domain 3 – Democratic processes

Indicator: Participatory Democracy Index

Full description: The Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database is a set of country level indicators of political or governmental organisation; a society or institution with an organised government; the state; and the body politic.

The Participatory Democracy Index used in the NI is a measure of the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy achieved within a country.

Rationale: Democratic processes are widely recognised as contributing to peace. Well-functioning democracies themselves have institutions to deal with societal grievances in a non-violent way. It is also believed democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict with other democracies. Democratic countries on average have the highest levels of peace globally in the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a). Furthermore, with the exception of relatively infrequent 'black swan' political or conflict events, a country's current democratic status tends to be a good predictor of future democratic status.

Source: Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) (University of Gothenburg, 2020)

URL: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>

Domain 4 – Economic crises

Indicator: Financial vulnerability – Non-performing loans as % of total loans

Full description: Non-performing loans to total gross loans ratio is calculated by using the value of non-performing loans (NPLs) as the numerator and the total value of the loan portfolio as the denominator. It is often used as a proxy for asset quality.

Rationale: Sovereign debt crisis have been found to be correlated with civil unrest (Reinhart, 2010), and some have argued that sovereign debt crisis followed by extreme austerity measures were a contributing factor to the outbreak of World War II in Germany, and genocide in Rwanda (Goldmann, 2012). Non-performing loans are a good predictor of financial crises with broader social consequences. Most immediately, high levels of debt may affect the state's ability to provide basic public services, which in turn is a key source of legitimacy for a government. Excess borrowing, particularly external debt, means increased exposure to global market risks, and creditor decisions, both of which can make a state vulnerable to external economic shocks (Weltwirtschaftsforum & Zurich Insurance Group, 2019). Unsustainable borrowing and debt may exacerbate underlying societal divisions, particularly if real or perceived inequalities grow.

This dataset was supplemented in 2021 with inflation data from the World Bank and Trading Economics. In 2020/2021, four countries are experiencing greater than 50 % inflation, commonly classified as hyperinflation. Venezuela, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Lebanon and Suriname have therefore been given the maximum Economic Crisis score in the Normandy Index.

Source: World Bank (World Bank, 2020, Trading Economics, 2021)

URL: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS>

<https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/inflation-rate>

Domain 5 – Energy insecurity

Indicator: Energy imports

Full description: Energy imports, net (% of energy use).

Rationale: Energy independence, that is self-reliance on domestic sources of energy including oil, natural gas, or other minerals, as well as clean energy sources, has been a defining component of energy security since at least the oil price crisis of October 1973 (Cohen et al., 2011). Although it is but one aspect of energy security, along with measures such as source diversity and distance to consumption, it is a measure for which open-source, comparable data exists on a global scale, and is therefore sufficient to capture the conceptual threat of energy insecurity.

The IEP has supplemented the World Bank data with more recent data obtained from the 2020 Global Energy Statistical Yearbook, covering 60 countries up to 2019.

Source: World Bank (World Bank, 2020, Enerdata, 2021)

URL: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/eg.imp.cons.zs>

<https://yearbook.enerdata.net/>

Domain 6 – Fragile states

Indicator: Fragile States Index

Full description: A score between 0 and 120, where 120 is the highest level of fragility. Each country is scored annually based on 12 conflict risk indicators, grouped into four dimensions: cohesion, economic, political and social.

Rationale: The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework – known as 'CAST' – that was developed by the Fund for Peace nearly a quarter of a century ago for assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse. The CAST framework was designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, and continues to be used widely by policy-makers, field practitioners, and local community networks. The methodology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data, and produces quantifiable results.

Source: Fund for Peace (The Fund For Peace, 2020)

URL: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>

Domain 7 – Criminality/Homicide

Indicator: Homicide rate

Full description: Country homicide rate per 100 000 population

Rationale: High homicide rates are associated with high risks to security of persons within a country and reflect a diminished government capacity to perform its duties to protect people within its borders.

The EU Global Strategy highlights trans-border crime as a significant potential threat to peace in the world. Transnational organised crime, by its very nature, affects all countries. The nature of trans-border crimes vary greatly, from Class A drug smuggling to human trafficking. Crime records varies from country to country, and therefore no single database captures instances of trans-border crimes.

While the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) publishes a 'transnational organized crime threat assessment', these are meant to be applied at the local level and do not provide a platform enabling creation of a globally comparative ranking of countries.⁵ Further complicating the issue are factors that enable trans-border crime also enable all other types of economic activity: communications, trade, interconnectedness, globalisation and new technologies.

In the absence of a relative country measure for transnational/trans-border crime, the NI uses a country's homicide rate per 100 000 people as a proxy for levels of crime. While this is a crude measure, the link between homicide and organised crime is widely explored,⁶ and has been used in the literature as an indicator of organised crime in a country.⁷

Source: UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020)

URL: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics.html>

Indicator: Perceptions of criminality

Full description: Assessment of the level of perceived criminality in society, ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the Economic Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Country Analysis team. Country analysts assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the March to March period.

Rationale: Perceptions of criminality in a society affect citizens' sense of security and identity, with broader implications for businesses, security spending and security policies. Perceptions of high levels of criminality can have a destabilising effect on the social contract between a government and its population. The Institute for Economics and Peace has found that the cost of violence containment, which is influenced by perceived threats, costs around US\$1 800 per person per year (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a).

Source: IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019a)

URL: <https://visionofhumanity.org>

Domain 8 – Resilience to disinformation

Indicator: Resilience to disinformation

Full description: The Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database has four indicators of the presence of disinformation:

- Government domestic dissemination of false information: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?
- Party domestic dissemination of false information: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?
- Foreign government dissemination of false information: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010

⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011

⁷ Alberto Alesina, 2019

- Foreign government advertisements: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

Each country is ranked on a Likert scale of (0) 'Extremely often', to (4) 'Never, or almost never'. The resilience to disinformation indicator used in the NI is the country average of each of these four indicators.

Rationale: There is growing concern over the ability of both state and non-state actors to not only restrict the free flow of information, but also to actively interfere in the functioning of civil society through the use of disinformation campaigns. Research into resilience to disinformation is a relatively new field of quantification, with a number of emerging sources in recent years (Eurasian States in Transition Research Center, 2018; Global Disinformation Index, 2020). The NI will continually monitor the literature to build on these measures in forthcoming releases.

Source: Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) (University of Gothenburg, 2020)

URL: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>

Domain 9 – Terrorism

Indicator: Global Terrorism Index Score

Full description: A composite score that provides an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The impact of terrorism includes incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by terrorism

Rationale: This is a core indicator of the multidimensional impact of terrorism on a country. This is the most reliable and consistent data source, available across more than 163 countries and updated on an annual basis since 2001.

Source: IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b)

URL: <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

Domain 10 – Violent conflicts

Indicator: Violent conflict

Full description: A composite indicator of the number, intensity of and fatalities in both internal and external violent conflicts.

Rationale: The Institute for Economics and Peace measures, in its annual Global Peace Index, the following four indicators relating to violent conflict:

Number and duration of internal conflicts

This indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a specific country's legal boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP); the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset.

Number of deaths from organised internal conflict

This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict. The UCDP defines conflict as: 'a contested

incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year'. Statistics are compiled from the most recent edition of The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database which has the following definition of armed conflict-related fatalities: 'Fatality statistics relate to military and civilian lives lost as a direct result of an armed conflict'.

Number, duration and role in external conflicts

This indicator measures the number and duration of extraterritorial conflicts in which a country is involved. Information for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding all individual conflict scores where that country is involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries. Conflicts are not counted against a country if they have already been counted against that country in the number and duration of internal conflicts indicator.

Number of deaths from organised external conflict

This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year'. Where no data were provided, several alternative sources have been used: the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database; the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, and the EIU.

Each of these are scored from 1-5. The NI uses the average score across all of these indicators for the Violent Conflict domain.

Source: IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b)

URL: <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

Domain 11 – Weapons of mass destruction

Indicator: Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Indicator and Non-Proliferation Score

Full description: This indicator is based on two scores

- The Global Peace Index Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities Score (**HWC**): a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Countries are given a score of one for low military capabilities. Nuclear countries are scored five.
- Non-Proliferation Score (**NPS**): If a country is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons they are given a score of one. If they are not, they receive a score of zero.

The final WMD score used in the NI is calculated by **HWC – NPS**.

Rationale: This indicator is a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons, including those controlled by the government alone, and government commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Source: IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019b)

URL: <http://www.visionofhumanity.org>

Data availability and imputation

The methodology developed has been designed to align with other prominent global indicators, and substantial effort has been made to populate the index with the best existing country information. However, the major challenge to developing a harmonised composite index is in attempting to overcome the paucity of consistent and comprehensive data across very diverse countries around the world. Data vary significantly, not simply in terms of demographic and geographic characteristics, but also in terms of socio-economic characteristics, which often impacts data collection and quality.

The issue of data gaps is a common challenge to creating an index. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommend a number of statistical techniques for dealing with data imputation to fill in data gaps (OECD et al., 2008). Table 2 lists the approaches used in the NI. Using a combination of these techniques, the NI represents the use of the best possible data without resorting to an overly complex methodology.

TABLE 2 – Data imputation methods

| Method | Description | Application in NI |
|----------------------|---|---|
| Cold deck imputation | Replacing the missing value with a value from another source. | The NI uses this either when using the most recent data point in a series as the current data point, or uses additional country statistics to fill in gaps. |
| Hot deck imputation | Replacing the missing value with a KNN imputation. KNN is an algorithm that is useful for matching a point with its closest neighbours in a multi-dimensional space. It can be used for data that are continuous, discrete, ordinal and categorical, which makes it particularly useful for dealing with missing data. The NI fills in data gaps using the five most similar countries to impute a value. | The NI uses hot deck imputation for data that is not available for all countries. |

Weighting the indicators

As the 2016 EU Global Strategy did not rank domains in order of priority, the NI uses **an equal weight of one** across all domains, simplifying the calculation of the final NI score.

The only NI domain with more than one indicator is that of **crime**, which includes **Intentional homicides (per 100 000 people)** and **Perceptions of criminality banded**, which are weighted at 0.75 and 0.25 respectively.

Domain calculations

This section illustrates how each indicator, and therefore each domain is treated. The domain process takes place in two stages 1) data collection and 2) imputation and banding.

In the case of the NI, banding data is a way of comparing otherwise incomparable information. It takes each indicator and scales them to a score between 0 and 1 relative to the whole data set. To do this, appropriate minimum and maximum values for the data set are decided, so that anything below the minimum is assigned zero, and anything above the maximum is assigned one, and everything else is scaled evenly between the two. Therefore, in year y , after data imputation, the banded score is calculated for indicator i by Equation 1.

Equation 1 – Banding equation

$$Banded_i = \frac{\text{Country Indicator Value in Year } y_i - \text{minimum cutoff } f_i}{\text{maximum cutoff } f_i - \text{minimum cutoff } f_i}$$

Banding this way indicates the implicit assumption that the higher levels of the indicator are better. However, higher levels of some indicators, such as the Global Terrorism Index score, represent a less desirable case for countries. In such cases, the banded score is reverse and is calculated by Equation 2.

Equation 2 – Reverse banding equation

$$Reverse\ Banded_i = 1 - \frac{\text{Country Indicator Value in Year } y_i - \text{minimum cutoff } f_i}{\text{maximum cutoff } f_i - \text{minimum cutoff } f_i}$$

The banded indicator score for each country is then the domain score, as each domain is measured by only one indicator. Each domain score lies between zero and one.

An integral part of this process is to set appropriate minimum and maximum cut off values for the banded scores. Empirical and normative methods are available to do this. While some data may be distributed normally and therefore lend itself well to standard and well-defined mathematical techniques, such as defining outliers as those greater than three standard deviations from the mean, other data sets do not follow well-behaved trends. The final choice of technique to use must depend on a number of considerations: the nature of the data, the underlying distribution, the purpose of the index, what information is being conveyed, etc. The presence of outliers affects not only the average, but the variance, skewing both the minimum and maximum.

To account for this, IEP in some instances sets artificial minimums and maximums to ensure results are not too heavily influenced by outliers. In the cases where outliers are present, the lower bound set for the banding process are set as the lowest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range below the first quartile (where the interquartile range is defined as the distance between the first and third quartiles). Similarly the upper bound set for the banding process is set as the largest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile.

Aggregating domain scores to final NI score

Since each domain is weighted equally in terms of threat significance, the final aggregated NI score can be calculated as the average of the 11 domain scores. The final NI score is therefore a value between zero and ten for each country in each year.

$$NI\ Score = 11 \times \frac{\sum_{i=D1}^{D11} \text{Country Indicator Banded Score}_i}{11}$$

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The Normandy Index, now in its third year, aims at measuring the level of threat to peace, security and democracy around the world. It was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2021 exercise, and explains how the index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 51 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

The paper forms part of the EPRS contribution to the Normandy World Peace Forum 2021. It is accompanied by two papers, one on the EU's contribution to peace and security in 2021, the other on the EU's relations with Turkey.

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